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PREFACE
These papers are the products of a faculty history seminar, a
student African History Club, and of work by graduate students at
the African Studies Program of Boston University. As the Roman
numeral on the title page hopefully implies, there is to be a series
of volumes like this one, which will make available some of the
work being done both by historians in the New England area, and
scholars overseas. The papers deal with a wide range of subjects:
we remain interested in the problems of colonial policy and we
hope also, of course, to contribute to African history as it has
developed since World War II.
The faculty seminar and the publication of these papers would
not have been possible without the generous support of the
Director of the African Studies Program, Professor William O.
Brown. Furthermore, though an editor suffers some exasperation in
the often tedious work of editing, he also receives unexpected
kindnesses, even from his colleagues! I thank, therefore, Dan
McCall and Norman Bennett, both of the African Studies Program.
Mrs. Alyce Havey made the arrangements for typing and publica-
tion; Janice Hall Dyer was an excellent secretary; and Jacoba van
Schaik gave essential help with the wearisome task of proof-
reading.
There is, however, one acknowledgement which must stand on its
own. Dr. Robert E. Moody, Chairman of the Boston University
Press and Chairman of the Department of History, gave much of
his time to show me what an editor ought to do. Of course, I am
responsible for such editorial blemishes as remain.
Boston University Jeffrey Butler
October
,
1963
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I.
Historical Inferences from
Linguistic Research in
Sub-Saharan Africa
by
JOSEPH GREENBERG
Professor of Anthropology, Stanford University, Stanford, California

The purpose of this paper is to describe the principal methods by
which inferences of interest to the historian can be derived from
linguistic data, and to illustrate these methods by using examples
from African languages. Close study of language and careful inter-
pretation of the results can yield a rich harvest. There are great
possibilities in African studies in this field, but it is fair to say,
almost everything remains to be done. However, it is important
neither to overestimate nor to underestimate those possibilities.
I
Historical interpretations drawn from languages in Africa have,
on the whole, been done poorly, in many instances so poorly that
the intelligent non-linguist can easily perceive the weaknesses of
the methods being used. The methods criticized here are exemplified
in the works of C. K. Meek, H. R. Palmer, and more recently
E. Meyerowitz . 1 Their procedures consist, in part, of isolated guesses
regarding the historical connection between words in different
languages, usually without any clear distinction between resem-
blances based on borrowing and those based on common origin. The
hypotheses may be called isolated since they are not advanced
within a framework of classification of the languages involved, the
well-established methods of comparative historical reconstruction
(“comparative philology”) or systematic consideration of the factors
involved in borrowing. The other main class of inferences concerns
the etymology of specific words within a language, largely place
names and tribal names. Particularly in the case of proper names, the
fact that the words are often not transparent etymologically in the
1 Representative examples of the procedures of these authors are contained
in such works as C. K. Meek, Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria (2 vols.,
London, 1931) and A Sudanese Kingdom (London, 1931), R. H. Palmer,
Sudanese Memoirs (3 vols., Lagos, 1928), and E. Meyerowitz, The Sacred
State of the Akan (London, 1951).
3
4 Joseph Greenberg
language concerned, opens the door to abundant but unverifiable
results.
These methods can be illustrated by an example from the work
of C. K. Meek. It is to be understood that this is but one of many
instances of similar methods that could be drawn from a variety of
writers. I do not wish to imply that Meek, the value of whose
contributions to African studies are not in question, sinned more
grievously in this respect than a number of other investigators.
In his work on the Jukun of Nigeria, Meek seeks to etymologize
the name of their chief god Chido.
2
The following quotation will
indicate the starting point of Meek’s speculations.
The meaning of the expression Chido is not clear. Mr. Lowry
Maxwell, who is a competent Jukun scholar, asserts that Chido ==
“The one who is above,” from the root chi or ki — to be and do =
above. This is the explanation given by most intelligent Jukun. But
as the root chi in the sense of sky-god, earth deity, sun, moon, it
would seem probable that the above explanation is a late ra-
tionalization.
There then follows a long list of words from many parts of
Africa. Further, a connection is asserted with the Egyptian Osiris,
which is interpreted as usi ( one of the numerous variants of the chi
root followed by ra ) . The latter is identified with Ra, the Egyptian
god of the sun so that Usira means “Lord Ra.” No attempt is made
here to explore fully the numerous other ramifications of this com-
plex of conjectures. Rather, a few considerations are advanced for
their methodological interest in the present context.
Thus, in regard to Meek’s explanation of Osiris as consisting of
the widespread usi, uchi
-f- ra, the name of the sun god, it may be
pointed out that such an etymology would surely be rejected by any
respectable scholar of Egyptian. The name of Osiris in Egyptian is
wsr while the name of the sun god is r.s The word r contains
as its second consonant the pharyngeal ‘ which is quite stable in
Egyptian and cannot be disregarded. We have no right therefore to
analyze w§r into ws, which does not occur by itself in Egyptian
2 Meek, Sudanese Kingdom, especially 179-83. The quotation which follows
occurs on 180.
3 Ancient Egyptian forms are cited without vowels since these were not
expressed in writing.
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-f- r. This leaves Meek’s root uchi without any foundation in
Egyptian.
Of the forms of this root which Meek cites from numerous Bantu
languages, two quite different roots are involved, one reconstructed
as *se
,
meaning “earth” and the other as *edi, meaning “moon.”4
Here Meek quotes examples from present-day Bantu languages
without paying any attention to the elaborate body of work on
reconstructed Bantu roots initiated by Meinhof and based on system-
atic comparison of the correspondences of sounds.
It would be understandable if a negative reaction against this
type of methodology were to lead to a general rejection of linguistic
methods. It would, however, be unjustifiable. Once the historian
realizes that reliable methods of interpreting linguistic materials
exist, he will be wary of assuming that the linguistic key will
magically unlock all the boxes of historical secrets. Linguistic methods
are capable of giving answers to certain questions but not to others.
Moreover, these results range from very nearly certain conclusions
in some instances to suggestive but highly uncertain results in
others.
In what follows, the basic methodology for historical conclusions
based on language will be outlined and illustrated, as far as possible,
by African material. 5 Because this type of investigation has not yet
been undertaken on a wide scale in Africa, and because of the
relatively undeveloped state of comparative linguistics in that con-
tinent, the examples given are, for the most part, not to be taken as
definitive conclusions. Such conclusions cannot yet be asserted with
the assurance which may eventually accrue to them and to many
others when research of this kind will have progressed beyond its
present fledgeling state.
4 The transcription of Proto-Bantu forms is modified here in accordance with
present practice. In Meinhof’s system they would be *-ki and *-yeli respec-
tively. The most extensive collection of proto-Bantu etymologies is W. Bour-
quin, Neue Ur-Bantu-Wortstamme (Berlin, 1923).
5 The arrangement follows in basic outline the analysis contained in the
classic and still usable essay of Edward Sapir, “Time Perspective in Aboriginal
American Culture,” reprinted in Selected Writings by Edward Sapir in
Language, Culture and Personality, ed. D. G. Mandelbaum (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1949), 389-462.
6 Joseph Greenberg
II
In one way or another, classification is the basis for practically
all historical inference drawn from language. From the purely
linguistic point of view, the importance of classification is that by
this means languages are classed together as showing unmistakable
evidence of common origin, that is, as ultimately deriving from
divisions in an original speech community followed by divergent
developments. Historical comparative linguistics has a highly sophis-
ticated body of method through which such languages may be
compared and many of the features of the extinct ancestral language
can be reconstructed. Classification has not only this fundamental
significance for comparative linguistics as such; in itself it leads to
certain inferences of significance based solely on the classification
together with the geographical distribution of the people who speak
the languages. The key principle governing such conclusions has
been named the center of gravity principle or the principle of least
moves. 6 It can easily be understood from an illustration. The present
example is that of the origin of the Bantu, obviously a key problem
in African culture history.
Bantu languages cover an enormous area, almost all of Central,
South and East Africa. They are so similar to each other that their
relationship was recognized at an early date. Since it takes time for
linguistic differences to develop, the relative uniformity of Bantu
over a large area suggests a fairly recent and rapid spread of the
Bantu-speaking peoples. In spite, then, of the large area and
numerous population, the Bantu group can be treated almost as a
single language and its place can be discovered within a much
larger group of languages. This larger group is the Niger-Congo
family, the most extensive family of languages spoken by people of
the Negroid physical type.
The Niger-Congo family consists of six branches, each presumed
to consist of languages descended from a distinct dialect of the
ancestral Niger-Congo language. These six branches are West At-
lantic (e.g., Fulani, Wolof, Temne) in the extreme west of Africa,
6 For a brief exposition of these principles, see J. H. Greenberg, “Historical
Linguistics and Unwritten Languages,” in Anthropology Today, ed. A. L.
Kroeber (Chicago, 1953), 265-86.
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the Mande, spoken chiefly in the central basin of the Niger River,
the Gur or Voltaic spoken in the same general area but on the
whole farther to the east, e.g., in northern Ghana and Upper Volta,
the Kwa group occupying a coastal strip from Liberia to the Eastern
Regions of Nigeria, the Renue-Congo group except for Rantu
concentrated in Nigeria and the part of Cameroun bordering
Nigeria. Only the sixth branch, Adamawa-Eastern, is spoken in
regions not usually included in West Africa. Even here the extensive
Eastern subbranch spoken as far east as Zande in the Sudanese
Republic bears the same evidence of recent rapid expansions as
Bantu . 7
This predominance of branches in West Africa strongly suggests
West Africa as the original homeland of Proto-Niger-Congo and is
the first illustration of the center of gravity principle, namely, that
each genetic subfamily gives equal and independent evidence
regardless of the number of speakers or areal extension. As was
mentioned in passing, Bantu is affiliated with the Renue-Congo
subfamily of Niger-Congo and all of the non-Bantu languages of this
subfamily are found in Nigeria and the Cameroun. There are scores
of Benue-Congo languages and this branch in turn may be tenta-
tively subdivided into five major groups, one of which contains
Bantu along with Tiv, Batu, Ndoro and Mambila. Since these latter
languages are all spoken in the same general area of the central
Benue valley in Nigeria, we reach the conclusion that Bantu origi-
nated in the general Nigeria-western-Cameroun area and, more
specifically, though somewhat less certainly, arose somewhere in
the central Benue region.
The assumption that Bantu developed as a separate group in, for
example, East Africa would force us to assume numerous separate
and independent migrations by the other languages of the Benue-
Congo group, all providentially arriving in approximately the same
general area of Nigeria and neighboring portions of Cameroun.
Another example of the operation of this principle in Africa con-
cerns the Fulani, who are found in separate areas from Senegal
to the Lake Chad region in the east. The Fulani language belongs
7 For a more detailed account of the membership and distribution of Niger-
Congo and other African language families, mentioned in this article, see
J. H. Greenberg, Languages of Africa (Bloomington, 1962).
8 Joseph Greenberg
to the West Atlantic branch of Niger-Congo. All of the other
languages of this subfamily are found in the western part of this
area. Again, the consideration of more detailed relationships leads
to a more specific hypothesis. Within West Atlantic, Fulani is
most closely related to Serer-Sin and somewhat more remotely
to Wolof, both spoken in Senegal. This suggests that the Fulani-
speaking population of the Fouta Senegalais is the nuclear popula-
tion from which the others split. The western origin of the Fulani
is, indeed, attested from the historical record, much of the eastward
movement having taken place in recent times.
Ill
In addition to the place of origin, we should like to have an ab-
solute rather than a relative chronology. Here the only objective
method thus far devised is glottochronology. 8 It is based on the
common-sense notion that when dialects have developed into lan-
guages, the more recent the date of separation the greater the
resemblance. The percentage of common retention of original words
in a standard vocabulary list is used as the measure of this resem-
blance. This is translated into an absolute chronology on the basis
of the rate of change in this same list observed in areas such as
the Near East and Europe where there are written records. The
assumption is being made, of course, that this rate of change is
reasonably constant everywhere.9
It must be realized, of course, that determination of dates by
this method is subject to a number of sources of unreliability. At
the very least, the confidence limits based on pure sampling error
must be taken into account. In the case of Africa, very little use has
been made of this method as yet. Olmsted arrived at a date of
approximately 1000 B.C. for Proto-Bantu. 10 Another example is
that of the separation between Malagasy, the language of Madagas-
8 A survey of glottochronology theory with a full bibliography is to be
found in D. H. Hymes, “Lexicostatistics so Far,” Current Anthropology, I
(1960), 3-44.
9 This assumption has been brought into serious question by K. Bergsland
and H. Vogt, “On the Validity of Glottochronology,” Current Anthropology,
III (1962), 115-58.
10 D. L. Olmsted, “Three Tests of Glottochronological Theory,” American
Anthropology, LIX (1957), 839-42.
Papers in African History 9
car, and Maanyan of Borneo, apparently the most closely related
language within Malayo-Polynesian. The date given by Dyen is
1900 years before the present, in other words, the very beginning
of the Christian era. 11
IV
The type of inferences discussed so far only tells us about the
movement of peoples with, hopefully, a time dimension based on
glottochronology. We would, of course, also like to know basic
cultural facts, for example, those relating to technology, subsistence
economy, social organization and religion. At this point, valuable
information can be derived by application of comparative linguistic
method. As was mentioned earlier, the systematic comparison of
related languages allows at least a partial reconstruction of sound
system, grammar, and vocabulary of the ancestral language. This
method has been worked out in great detail in the course of its
application to Indo-European and a number of other language
families.
Many of these results are, obviously, of no intrinsic interest to
any one but the linguist. Thus, to know that the Proto-Indo-Euro-
pean word “three” was in all probability *treyes (in the nominative
masculine and feminine) reveals nothing of interest to the general
historian. However, that we can reconstruct original numbers up
to one hundred does suggest certain conclusions. There must have
been something worth counting. This seems to have been cattle,
for which there is indeed an ancestral Indo-European vocabulary.
From these and other elements of the Proto-Indo-European vocabu-
lary there emerges the picture of the ancestral Indo-Europeans as
a typical Neolithic village people.
Much more tentative conclusions of this kind can be drawn from
African materials at the present state of our knowledge. In the two
largest language families of Africa, Niger-Congo and Afroasiatic
(Hamito-Semitic), there appear to be striking differences in the
reconstructible vocabulary for wild animals. Thus, there is definitely
a Proto-Afroasiatic word for “lion” but none for “leopard”. In Proto-
11 I. Dyen, Review of O. C. Dahl, Malgache et Maanyan, Language, XXIX
( 1953 ), 577-90 .
10 Joseph Greenberg
Niger-Congo, on the other hand, there is an ancestral word for
“leopard” but none for “lion”. This, of course, suggests a forest
habitat for the original speakers of Niger-Congo and a more open
country for the speakers of Afroasiatic.
Turning to domestic animals, the evidence here is very challeng-
ing. For Proto-Niger-Congo there are undoubted words for “cow”
and “goat”. The former could conceivably refer to the West African
dwarf cattle (Muturuwa) before domestication, but the latter is
difficult to explain away. We have no glottochronological estimate
for Niger-Congo as a whole, but the differences among Niger-Congo
languages are such that at least 8,000 years is indicated; probably
more. Until recently, dates of approximately 7,000 years have been
current for the age of the first plant and animal domestication. In
view of these and other considerations from African linguistic data,
recent evidence assigning greater age to the Neolithic are welcome
(e.g., the radiocarbon date of 10,000 B.P. for Jericho). There may
also be a Proto-Niger-Congo word for “to cultivate” if the root of
Proto-Bantu *lim- and Fulani rim- is more widespread than appears
on present evidence.
The Afroasiatic data definitely point in the same direction. There
is an inherited word for “cattle”. Further, there is a verb and asso-
ciated noun “to hoe the ground, cultivate” and “hoe”. It seems not
to have been pointed out previously that Akkadian marru
,
“hoe”,
and mararu “to hoe”, Arabic marr “a hoe” and Egyptian mr (vowels
not known) “a hoe” find their counterpart in the western subgroup
of the Chad branch of Afroasiatic spoken in the northern region
of Nigeria. Here we find Ngamo marra, Bolewa mara
,
Kanakuru
mira, Angas mar, Ankwe maar, all meaning “to hoe, to do farm
work” and Sura mar “a farm”. This is a highly probable etymology
from the viewpoint of sound correspondence and meaning. Borrow-
ing among Egyptian, Akkadian, and Arabic is possible, but unlikely,
even for Arabic, with the predominantly non-Moslem Chad groups
just cited. If anything, the time-depth of Proto-Afroasiatic is even
greater than that of Proto-Niger-Congo. The earliest written Egyp-
tian of about 3,000 B.C. is already very different from Akkadian,
the earliest recorded Semitic language. A guess of 7,000 B.P. would
be a conservative one.
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V
Another major source of historical inferences is the study of loan
words. In many but not all cases it is possible to show on purely
linguistic grounds that borrowings have taken place. In a certain
fairly high proportion of such cases it is feasible, again from purely
linguistic considerations, to discover which is the source language
and which the borrowing language. A comparison of the sound
systems of the languages will sometimes show that one language
which does not have a particular sound will regularly substitute
another similar sound in borrowings. Or, again, the word will be
analyzable grammatically in one language but not in the other.
These points can be illustrated from a study of the linguistic con-
tacts between the Hausa of the northern region of Nigeria and
their eastern neighbors, the Kanuri-speaking people of Bornu near
Lake Chad. 12
The Hausa word for “reading” and “writing” would be expected
to come from Arabic in view of the undoubted fact that writing
first came to the Hausa with the coming of Islam. In fact, the
Hausa word for “reading” karatu obviously resembles the Arabic
qara?a “to read”. The word for “writing”, however, rubutu
,
is
nothing like Arabic. However, it is always possible that an in-
digenous word with a related meaning has been transferred to a
new meaning. Thus, English “to write” is not borrowed from Latin
but is a Germanic word meaning “to scratch”, cf. German ritzen
,
reissen. It will be noted that both of these words in Hausa contain
a suffix -tu. This suffix is not fund otherwise in Hausa.
A comparison with Kanuri soon makes it clear that the words
are both borrowed from Kanuri, which has a suffix -t to form verbal
nouns and indeed has precisely these two formations, karate “read-
ing” and rzbote “writing”. Hausa, which has no such vowel, sub-
stitutes i or u in such cases, an example of the phonetic criterion
mentioned earlier. The Kanuri word for “read” has been borrowed
from Arabic, so that the word in Hausa is an indirect loan from
12 For a detailed discussion of Hausa-Kanuri borrowings, see
J.
H. Green-
berg, “Linguistic Evidence for the Influence of the Kanuri on the Hausa,”
Journal of African History, I (1960), 205-12.
12 Joseph Greenberg
Arabic, via Kanuri. The root for "write”, however, rabo-, is in-
digenous, as is shown by the cognate form in Teda, arbu-, which
means in this language “to draw designs, incise”.
The words for “market”, “town-wall”, and “walled town” are
also well attested borrowings from Kanuri into Hausa. The historian
immediately sees the significance of all this. It suggests that Islam
came to the Hausa via the Kanuri. But, and this is what makes
the matter of further interest, Hausa tradition assigns conversion
to a delegation in the fourteenth century from the Mandingo king-
dom of Mali considerably to the west, evidently a connection of
greater prestige. I do not doubt that this connection with the west
also exists and that a delegation, whose descendants are still in
Kano, did in fact come. However, when we consider the attested
historical fact of the early existence of the Kanuri-speaking kingdom
of Kanem as a powerful state and the relatively weak and un-
organized Hausa city states at the same early period (approxi-
mately eleventh and twelfth century A.D. ), this suggests a reinter-
pretation of the history of the Islamicization of the Hausa.
There are occasions when not only the establishment of the
source language of borrowings and the cultural implications derived
from their contact are important, but also the mere fact of borrow-
ing having taken place at all. This is the case when the peoples
involved are no longer in direct geographical proximity. In such
cases, it often happens that since the contact was at an earlier
period, the source of the resemblances is not the languages in their
present form, but is the resultant of former cultural intercourse
involving ancestral languages. Thus we have a combination of the
two factors already discussed, the ancestral word method and
borrowing. For example, it is well established that certain words
of Germanic origin in Finnish derive from the ancestral Proto-
Germanic rather than from any specific present-day Germanic lan-
guage and it is even agreed that the number for “100” was bor-
rowed by Proto-Finno-Ugric speakers from Proto-Indo-European.
A case in point in Africa, which cannot be discussed here in more
than cursory terms and still requires much further investigation,
concerns the evidence for early borrowing between certain speakers
of Nilotic languages in East Africa and speakers of Cushitic, a
large subfamily of Afroasiatic (Hamito-Semitic) found chiefly in
Papers in African History 13
Ethiopia and Somalia. The Nilotes chiefly concerned are the South-
ern Nilotes (Nandi-Suk, Tatoga) and the Eastern Nilotes (Masai,
Lotuko, Teso, Turkana, Bari and others). I will only consider the
former case here. It is part of the intricacies of such problems that
one of the questions which has not yet been resolved is the extent
to which these borrowings in the two Nilotic groups were inde-
pendent of each other, and possibly from different Cushitic groups,
and the extent to which words of Cushitic origin may have passed
secondarily from one Nilotic group to the other.
The Southern Nilotes are at present divided into two groups
linguistically and geographically, the Nandi-Suk of western Kenya
and the Tatoga, a small group farther south in Tanganyika. The fact
that most of the suspected Cushitic words are found both in Nandi-
Suk and Tatoga and that one of them, the number “nine”, shows
the regular working of a striking sound shift by which earlier l was
changed to sh in Tatoga (Nandi sokol “nine” = Tatoga sagesh)
indicates that the borrowings occurred at a time when the linguistic
separation between Nandi-Suk and Tatoga had not yet taken
place. 13
The Cushitic languages are also divided into a number of distinct
groups. Here the evidence points to the Eastern Cushitic languages
consisting of the following subgroups: 1) Afar-Saho, 2) Sidamo
group, 3) Galla-Conso, 4) Somali, Baiso, Rendille. 14 In fact, further
investigation may confirm the present very tentative hypothesis that
it was the ancestral language of the fourth of these subgroups that
was the immediate source.
Sometimes our interest in regard to borrowing may concern the
terminology of a particular cultural sphere, e.g., iron-working or
cattle duration, rather than the period, and type of contact between
individual peoples. This parallels the cultural anthropological dis-
tinction between diffusion and acculturation studies. Thus, a study
of the word for “horse” and the terminology for saddles and other
13 The importance of this sound shift for the problem of the age of Cushitic
borrowings in Southern Nilotic was first noted by Harold Fleming in an un-
published work.
14 Baiso, a hitherto unreported language, is spoken on Hano Island in Lake
Margherita, Ethiopia. I am indebted to Herbert Lewis and Harold Fleming
for material on this language.
14 Joseph Greenberg
riding accoutrements in Africa sheds some light on the manner
of spread of this complex; e.g., the probable existence of a term
of ancient Egyptian origin for “horse” in Beja, a large area chiefly
in the Sudan, in which the Arabic word has diffused and, the spread
of another term for horse of apparent Mande origin southward into
the forest area of West Africa and certain coastal regions in which
the Portuguese term has taken root.
VI
A further type of linguistic evidence can also make contribution,
i.e., etymological data from a single language. This is notoriously
dangerous but can, in certain instances, give reasonable results,
particularly where compounds or fixed phrases are involved. This
can be illustrated from Hausa. Here the word k’arfe means both
“metal” and “iron”. The term for “copper” is a phrase jar k’arfe
,
literally “red iron” or “red metal”. This suggests the chronological
priority of iron and is supported on non-linguistic grounds. Another
example is the Hausa term for “maize” which is dawar Masar
,
“sorghum of Egypt”. This again suggests the priority of sorghum
which was certainly domesticated in Africa and is at present the
staple crop of the Hausa. It also seems to indicate that maize came
from Egypt, or at least that the Hausa thought it did. Possibly
Egypt here is to be taken as a general term for the Arab north.
It is indeed very suggestive of the cultural contacts of the Hausa
that maize, brought by the Portuguese from the New World to
Africa, should have come via the Arabs, from the north, rather
than from the relatively close forset zone to the south.
VII
All the methods considered here have been based on contem-
porary linguistic analyses without reference to earlier written
sources which give linguistic information. In Africa such documen-
tary evidence is frequently important and can be combined with
methods of the kind described above to lead to new hypotheses
or to corroborate or to correct conclusions not based on other evi-
dence. For example, the apparent survival of the Meroitic term
qereny
,
an important subordinate official in certain languages of
the Nuba hills of Kordofan, most strikingly in Koalib kweleny
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“chief”, suggests Meroitic political influence in an area where it
had only been vaguely suspected. 15
Evidence of a quite different sort is furnished by the very few
vocabularies of African languages spoken by slaves in the New
World. Thus a vocabulary of Hausa in Brazil in the late nineteenth
century showed that the Hausa spoken there had not undergone
a sound shift already recorded in the early nineteenth century in
Africa itself, thus indicating the establishment of a Hausa com-
munity in Brazil with linguistic patterns sufficiently well established
to resist changes from later migrants at a period at least as early
as the eighteenth century. 16
The principles described do not exhaust the methodological
possibilities, but they are the most important ones. There is no
doubt that when the vast detailed work necessary has been carried
out, contributions of real significance will be made by linguistic
methods to the history of Africa.
15 In fact, kw- is the singular prefix of the personal class in Koalib but it
may have been folk-etymologized in this manner. Compare Swahili ki-tabu
“book” with Arabic kitab where ki- has been interpreted as a class prefix.
16 For more detailed evidence see J. H. Greenberg, “The Application of
New World Evidence to an African Linguistic Problem,” Memoirs de Vlnstitut
Francais d’Afrique Noire, XXVII (1853), 129-31.
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The history of the western Sudan from at least the tenth century
up to the time of the Moroccan invasion of 1591 is largely the story
of three successive great empires: ancient Ghana, ancient Mali, and
the Songhai empire of Gao. These were not the only states of the
region during this time, of course. In the far west, in the middle
Senegal valley, before the thirteenth century, there were the signifi-
cant little kingdoms of Takrur and Silla. A thirteenth century inter-
lude when Ghana was in decline and Mali was only just emerging
was marked by a brief predominance of the Sosso kings of Kaniaga.
South of the Niger bend, in the upper Volta basin, the Mossi-
Dagomba kingdoms, such as Wagadugu, Yatenga and Dagomba,
began to emerge about the fifteenth century1 among a people who
had previously been noteworthy mainly for their raids against Mali
and Songhai, and these states were to display remarkable stability
for the next four centuries. Over in the east were the small Hausa
states, founded perhaps about the tenth or eleventh centuries, and
behind them lay the more powerful kingdom of the Sefawa, who
began to flourish in Kanem about the eleventh century and who
later established themselves in Bornu. However until the seven-
teenth century, Hausaland was subject to influences and pressures
from Mali and Songhai, pressures and influences, incidentally,
which doubtless served to check expansion from Bornu/Kanem.
Although from time to time reference will be made in this paper
to features of these other states, this is done essentially for purposes
of comparison, to illuminate the nature of the imperial character
and history of Ghana, Mali and Songhai. For there can be no doubt
that throughout the period under discussion the dominating politi-
1 This is not, perhaps, the generally accepted date (cf. M. Delafosse, Haut-
Senegal-Niger; L. Tauxier, Le Noir de Yatenga etc.), but is that reached by
the present author as the result of independent research on Dagomba and
Mamprussi—see the forthcoming proceedings of the International Seminar on
Ethno-History held at Dakar in December 1961.
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cal, economic and cultural initiatives and influences stemmed from
these three great empires. There seems no question in fact that the
empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai rank among the highest
achievements of Negro Africans in history. The intention of this
paper, then, is to try and assess what were the formative principles
at work in these states.
Information about Ghana, Mali and Songhai comes from a variety
of sources.2 There is some relevant archaeological evidence, though
as yet nothing like as much as one would like to have. A fair
amount of their own historical tradition has survived. In the case
of Mali and Songhai, this was successfully maintained by oral
means into modern times when it could be rendered in writing by
European observers, initially by explorers like Barth3 and later
mainly by colonial administrators like Maurice Delafosse,4 or by
European-educated Africans.5 Some of the tradition of ancient
Ghana has also survived, not directly, but as prolegomena to the
tradition of Mali. As such it began to be written down in Arabic,
together with some of the tradition of Mali, from the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries onwards, by Sudanese scholars, especially
those of Timbuctu, whose primary purpose was to provide more
or less contemporary chronicles ( Tarlkhs
)
of the Songhai empire
and of the Moroccan conquest of 1591-92 which brought this to
an end. 6 This leads us to a third source, namely the writings of
geographers, historians and travellers of the medieval Islamic world.
Some of these authors had themselves visited the western Sudan,
2 There is an extensive treatment of the history of ancient Mali in Ch.
Monteil, “Les Empires de Mali”, Bull. Com. Et. Hist. Sc. A.O.F., XII (1929),
291-447, and of Songhai in
J. Rouch, Contribution a VHistoire des Songhay,
Mem. d’LF.A.N., No. 29, 1953. For ancient Ghana, see R. Mauny, “The
Question of Ghana”, Africa, XXIV, 1954, and J. D. Fage, “Ancient Ghana;
a Review of the Evidence”, Trans. Hist. Soc. Ghana, III, 2 (1957), 77-98.
3 H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa (5 Vols.,
London, 1857-1858); see especially IV, 406-36, 579-630.
4 M. Delafosse, Haut-Senegal-Niger, (3 vols., Paris, 1912).
5 For example, in recent years, especially Dj. Tamsir Niane, e.g. his “Recher-
ches sur l’Empire du Mali au Moyen Age”, Recherches Africaines, 1959.
6 Abderrahman es-Sadi, Tarikh es-Soudan, ed. and trans. by O. Houdas
(Paris, 1900; and Mahmoud Kati, Tarikh el-Fettach, ed. and trans. by O.
Houdas and M. Delafosse (Paris, 1913).
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for example Ibn Hawqal in the tenth century7 and Ibn Battuta in
the fourteenth; others based their accounts on what was known in
North Africa from its continual and growing trans-Saharan contacts
with the Sudan. In the latter category, al-Bakrl ( 1067 ) , al-ldrlsl
(1154), al-’Umari (c. 1345), Ibn Khaldun (c. 1400) and al-MaqrlzI
(c. 1420) are particularly significant. 8
In many respects this Arabic literature, both domestic and exter-
nal, is the best source for this enquiry into the nature of Sudanic
empire-building. It is specific as to time (i.e. the date of composi-
tion is usually known, and events mentioned in the texts are often
dateable from this if they are not already explicitly dated) and
often also as to geographical orientation. Secondly what these
authors have to say about the western Sudan is written and com-
mented upon (sometimes also, and notably in the case of Ibn
Khaldun, analysed) from a fixed point of reference, namely that
of the Muslim civilisation of the time.
It would be impossible here to relate the known history of Ghana,
Mali and Songhai in any detail. A very cursory outline will have
to suffice.9 Ghana was already in existence when it came within
the sphere of Muslim North African observation in the eighth cen-
tury. Indeed, it may well have come into being some centuries
earlier than this. The centre of the state lay some 200 miles north
of modern Bamako. The exact boundaries of its empire are not
7 It is the general opinion that Ibn Hawqal visited the western Sudan in
person; whether this was actually so may perhaps be another matter.
8 Relevant extracts from the texts of all these authors, with a parallel French
translations may be consulted: Ibn Hawal, Description de VAfrique, trans.
et Aegypti, 13 facsimiles, Cairo, 1926-1938. More specifically, the following
translations may be consulted: Ibn Hawgal, Description de VAfrique, trans.
M. G. de Slane, Journal Asiatique (Paris, 1842); El Bekri, Description de
VAfrique Septentrionale, trans. M. G. de Slane (Algiers, 1913); Edrisi, Descrip-
tion de VAfrique et de VEspagne, trans. R. Dozy and M.
J.
de Goeje (Leyden,
1866); Ibn Battoutah, Voyages, trans. C. Defremery and B. R. Sanguinetti (4
vols., Paris, 1853-1859) (see also new translation by H. A. R. Gibb in progress
for the Hakluyt Society, London); Al-Omari, VAfrique moins VEgypte, trans.
M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes (Paris, 1927); Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire des Ber-
beres, trans. M. G. de Slane (new ed., 4 vols., Paris, 1925-1956). A translation
of the relevant part of Maqrizi is to be found in Demombynes’ translation of
‘Umarl.
9 This is based on the literature noted in note 2.
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known, and were probably in fact ill-defined, but at the peak of
its power, which was almost certainly in the tenth century, it seems
to have been effective within a radius of some 200 miles. Thus its
southern limits lay close to the upper Senegal and the upper Niger,
while northwards it reached into the desert to a considerable extent.
The dominant people in the empire were the Soninke, a northern
branch of the great bloc of peoples speaking Mande languages. In
1076, Ghana was overrun by the Almoravids, and thereafter began
to decline. It finally disappeared as an independent state early in
the thirteenth century, when the power of Mali was beginning to
rise.
Mali was the creation of a clan or group of clans of the southern
Mande who lived in the upper Niger valley. It reached its peak of
power and size in the mid-fourteenth century. At that time, Takrur
in the west was at least nominally vassal to Mali, while in the east
Malian influence was felt as far as Hausaland. To the south-west
its boundaries were close to the northern limits of the thick forest;
in the south-east it was bounded by the Mossi kingdoms. Its empire
extended northwards into the desert to Walata and north-eastwards
towards Air. This sizeable empire began to decline during the
fifteenth century, when the reins of power began to be taken over
by the Songhai, a people from the middle Niger upstream of Gao,
whose kings had earlier been numbered among the vassals of Mali.
From 1464 onwards, a new Songhai empire was being erected on
the ruins of the old Malian one. Its capital was Gao, some 700 miles
east of Niani, the capital of Mali. Songhai’s power was accordingly
less extensive in the west, where indeed an independent remnant
Mali state remained in the upper Niger valley, but it was more
effective in the east, where at least the western Hausa states were
tributary. It was also more extensive in the north, where it included
Air and also the valuable rock-salt deposits at Taghaza. The Songhai
empire fell to pieces following the capture of its three principal
towns—Gao, Timbuctu and Jenne—in 1591 by an expeditionary
force from Morocco.
Although a large part of the available information about Ghana,
Mali and Songhai comes from Muslim writers (including, be it re-
membered, Muslim Sudanese); although it would seem that, from
the time of the Almoravids onwards, the Muslim world in North
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Africa was willing to accept these empires as part of the Muslim
comity of nations; and although their history has recently been
learnedly and at length related and analysed by a modern Arabist,
J.
Spencer Trimingham, in a book entitled A History of Islam in the
Sudan, 10 it would seem to be a mistake to think of these empires
as Muslim states.
It is in the first place quite obvious that the first of the three
states, Ghana, had an independent pagan existence before the Arabs
and Islam began to reach across the Sahara from the Maghrib. The
famous description of it written by al-Bakri 11 (from what would
appear to be excellent first-hand sources) on the very eve of the
Almoravid invasion, clearly pictures a pagan monarchy in which the
role of the Muslims—who would seem likely to have been Magh-
ribians for the most part—was limited to trade with North Africa
and to the provision of some technical administrative assistance.
However al-Idrlsi, writing of Ghana a century after al-Bakri and
the conquest by the Muslim Almoravids, gives a picture of what
appears to be a thoroughly Islamised monarchy (which even
claimed to be sherifan ) ruling in an Islamic manner over a
thoroughly Islamised people, at least in the capital. 12 There are
difficulties in Idrisi’s account which cast some doubts on its authen-
ticity, but there is nothing inherently improbable in it. There is
evidence that nearby Takrur had begun to undergo a thorough
Islamisation even earlier. Al-Bakri reports the conversion of its
king something like a generation before the Almoravids even. 13
Moreover, by the fourteenth century, at least, its people, the
Tukulur, had begun to produce the class of Muslim clerics, the
torodbe, for which they were later to be famous, and who were to
play an important role in the large-scale Islamisation of the whole
western Sudan that began some 400 years later. 14 (However it
may not be irrelevant to this enquiry to note that after about the
fourteenth century, Takrur seems to have been politically of no
account. It disappears as an independent state, and until the
10 London, 1962.
11 El Bekri, Description, 327-31.
12 Edrisi, Description, 6-7.
13 El Bekri, Description, 378.
14 See Trimingham, History, 47, 160-62.
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eighteenth century, indeed, its people were commonly subject to
alien and pagan dynasties.) Al-Bakri also reports the conversion
of the king of ‘Malel’, further into the interior beyond Ghana, and
this is doubtless to be identified with one of the petty riverain
Mande chieftaincies from which the great empire of Mali was to
spring. 15
It must be admitted that the evidence relating to Ghana and its
neighbours in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is slight. The con-
temporary sources really amount to no more than a few pages
of al-Bakrl and of IdrlsI, and to these may be added little more
than the very late and brief remarks of the Timbuctu Tarlkhs and
of Ibn Khaldun. Nevertheless the picture that results is a consistent
one of a thorough islamization of the whole region, beginning just
before the Almoravid invasion but greatly accentuated after it.
This picture would seem to be confirmed by such archaeological
evidence as is available. The French archaeologists, Thomassey and
Mauny, see no reason to doubt the identification of the site that
they excavated at Koumbi Saleh with one at least of the capitals
of ancient Ghana, and what their excavations revealed was to all
intents and purposes a medieval North African city. 16
The evidence available for an assessment of the Mali and Songhai
empires is much fuller. Much more of their own indigenous tradi-
tion has survived and has been recorded; Mali was well known to
contemporary North African writers; and some at least of Songhai’s
own Arabic chronicles remain available for analysis. These last,
incidentally, show that local tradition regarded Mali as the natural,
lineal successor to Ghana. 17 As will be seen later, this would appear
to be good history. Therefore it would seem reasonable to infer
that much of what is known of Mali once applied also to Ghana.
There is a fair amount in the evidence for Mali and Songhai to
suggest that the islamization which seems to have characterised
post-eleventh century Ghana was carried over into the later empires.
For example, all the Songhai kings from 1464 to 1591 are known
to have had Muslim names, and this appears to have been the
15 El Bekri, Description, 331.
16 P. Thomassey and R. Mauny, “Campagnes de Fouilles a Koumbi Saleh”,
Bull. I.F.A.N., 1951, 438-62; B, 1956, 117-140.
17 Es Sadi Tarikh es-Soudan, 18-19; Kati, Ta’rikh el-Fettach, 75-76.
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case for at least half of the kings of Mali from c. 1240 to c. 1400.
A fair number of these kings apparently made the pilgrimage to
Mecca. Ibn Khaldun suggests that this custom may have developed
at a very early stage, namely in the twelfth century—but he is a
very late authority. 18 The first reasonably certain pilgrimage would
seem to be that of the Mansa Wali ( Ule; Ali? ) of Mali in the 1260’s.
These points are perhaps not very significant. The wealth, pomp
and splendour displayed in some of these pilgrimages, notably the
very well attested ones of the Mansa Musa of Mali in 1324-5 and of
the Askia Muhammad of Songhai in 1495-7, 19 might suggest that their
purpose was primarily to further political and economic relations
with North Africa. They certainly had this effect. They led, for
instance, to the transmission of regular embassies across the Sahara;
to the establishment of hostels for Sudanese students in Cairo; to
the coming to the Sudanic courts of men like as-Sahili (who is
said to have built mosques and palaces at Timbuctu and Gao ) and
of other less well remembered advisers, technicians, clerics, jurists,
and simple adventurers; and they certainly led to an increase in
trans-Saharan trade, particularly with Egypt.
If the purpose of the pilgrimages was essentially political and
economic, then there would have been no need for the Sudanese
kings who went on them to have been very devout or deep Muslims.
Indeed the superficiality of their Islam might seem to be suggested
by an anecdote of al-‘Umari’s about Mansa Musa
,
whose pilgrimage
is usually accounted the most splendid of all. Al-‘UmarI says that
until Musa arrived in Cairo, he did not know that it was unlawful
for him to have more than four wives.20 But probably the moral
of the story is rather the reverse, namely that if in 1324, Musa was
not as yet very well instructed in Islam, his intentions were devout
and sincere, for it is said that when his error had been pointed out
to him he at once announced that he would mend his ways.
However, we need not rely simply on evidence of royal names
and pilgrimages to suggest the extent of Islam in Mali and Songhai.
18 Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire, II, 111.
19 See for Mansa Musa: Al-Omari, UAfrique, 70 et seq.; MaqrizI (in Ibid.,
89-93); Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire, II, 112-14; for Askia Muhammad: Kati,
Tarikh el-Fettach, 25-27, 124-32.
20 Al-Omari, VAfrique, 53.
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For Mali, there is the first hand evidence of Ibn Battuta, who toured
the empire during 1352-3, and also the account written from first-
hand sources by al-‘UmarI about the same time.21 Both authors
seem concerned to stress the strength of Islam in the state. It is
true that al-‘Umar! mentions the wide spread of what he calls
magic and sorcery, but he is at pains to point out that murders by
sorcery are punished by the king. It is possible to read Ibn Battuta’s
account and almost to conclude that Mali was a Muslim state. He
was obviously greatly impressed both by the general justice and
public security that were maintained throughout the state, and by
the particular care taken to protect the persons and property of
visiting North Africans. Both he and al-‘Umar! agree that the king
of the time, Sulaiman, was a devout Muslim. The latter wrote:
He built mosques of worship and convocation and minarets, and
instituted weekly prayers, gatherings and the call to prayer. He
attracted jurists of the Malik! rite to his country, and was himself a
student of figh 22
At the Mali capital Nyani, Ibn Battuta noted the people’s
punctiliousness in observing the prayer sequence, their assiduousness
in attending congregational prayers and in bringing up their children
to observe them. On Fridays the crowd is so great that unless one
goes early to the mosque it is impossible to find a place.23
He also comments on the popular observance of the great Muslim
festivals.
A comparable picture is given in the Timbuctu Tarikhs of the
situation in the Songhai empire in the time of the Askia Muham-
mad, who liberally supported the ‘ulama of Timbuctu and Jenne,
performed both the obligatory and the superogatory duties’ of
Islam, and ‘established Islam on sure foundations’.24
But there is really no evidence in these Muslim authorities to
show that Islam was at all relevant outside the larger towns, such
as Nyani, Jenne, Timbuctu and Gao. There is nothing to suggest,
for example, that the system of qadls, noted by Ibn Battuta and
21 See note 8.
22 Al-Omari, VAfrique, 53.
23 Ibn Battoutah, Voyages, IV, 421.
24 Kati, Tarikh el-Fettach, 114-15.
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others, extended beyond the limits of these towns. It seems quite
possible that even within them their jurisdiction was limited to
Muslims, conceivably even to immigrants from North Africa, a class
to which some at least of the qadis themselves probably belonged,
at least initially. Elsewhere, it must be supposed, justice was ad-
ministered according to pagan custom.
More than this, the Muslim authorities contain a good deal to
suggest that the fundamental organization of government was still
pagan, even if the literate Muslims were employed as scribes and
technical advisers. Thus Ibn Khaldun thought that the royal suc-
cession at Mali sometimes, at least, went through the female line.25
This al-Bakri had said was the normal mode of succession in pre-
Muslim Ghana.26 The exact significance of these observations is
not clear ( matrilinealism is certainly not characteristic of the mod-
ern Mande).27 Nevertheless, here there was something about the
monarchy which struck Muslims as very queer and outlandish.
Furthermore, although the Mali court had acquired some oriental
trappings, Ibn Battuta’s first-hand description of its ceremonial
suggests close resemblances to the pagan practices at the Ghana
court of al-Bakrl’s time. Thus subjects coming into the presence of
the king had to bare themselves to the waist, prostrate themselves,
and cover themselves with dust. The king did not speak directly
with the people, but only through a linguist or herald, and he was
surrounded by his court drummers and griots 28
The offices of government would seem essentially indigenous.
The Mali king was mansa, the head of a Mande clan (whose resi-
dence is Mali (or Mande), namely ‘where the master is’). His
local representatives were fariba ( cf
.
fa, ‘family head’ ) . His military
officers were fararis ,29 For Songhai, we have fari or farma for a
minister or local governor; hi-koy and dyini-koy for the commanders
of the riverain navy and of the army respectively; hari-farma for
25 Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire, II, 111.
26 El-Bekri, Description, 328.
27 The subject is fully discussed by N. Levtzion in “The Kings of Mali,”
Journal of African History, IV, 3 (1963), 341-54.
28 Ibn Battoutah, Voyages, IV, 403-08.
29 For a full description and terminology, see Monteil, “Les Empires”,
309-17.
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the official in charge of navigation and fishing; korey-farma for the
minister in charge of relations with North Africans—and so on.30
(Incidentally this last example suggests once again that North
African Muslims had an extrajudicial status. It is also worth noting
that this list of Songhai titles would appear to be a mixture of
Songhai and Mande terms.)
It would seem reasonable to suppose that the Muslim traits in
Mali and Songhai were essentially glosses on a type of monarchy
that was fundamentally pagan. Exactly what this type of monarchy
was is not now easy to discern. But there would seem to be enough
clues in what is known of pre-Muslim Ghana and of Islamised Mali
and Songhai to suggest that it originally may not have been unlike
that of ancient Kanem further to the east. The evidence here is
for a divine kingship of a typical Nilotic (or perhaps Negro) pat-
tern. This seemed very strange to early Arab commentators. Thus
al-Muhallabi (late tenth century) wrote
they exalt and worship [the king] instead of the most high God.
They falsely imagine that he does not eat, for his food is taken into
his palace secretly, and if anyone should meet the camels carrying it,
he is instantly killed.
. . . The religion [of the people] is the worship
of their kings, for they believe that it is they who bring life and
death, sickness and health. . . , 31
Nearly 400 years later Ibn Battuta reported that the king of Kanem
‘never shows himself to his people and never speaks to them except
from behind a curtain’,32 a custom that persisted into the nineteenth
century.
It is generally presumed that this tradition of divine kingship
originated east of Kanem, in the Nile valley. How strong it ever
was west of Kanem is perhaps an open question. It certainly seems
to have travelled up the Niger to the Songhai, whose first dynasty,
the Zas
,
seem to have been of this type (together with the kings
of Bomu, Yoruba, etc.). Its existence among the Mande can really
30 For a full list of Songhai ministerial titles, see Rouch, Contribution,
192-93, n.2.
31 No original text of al-Muhallabi is known; this passage is quoted by
Yaqut. See F. Wustenfeld, Jacut’s Geographisches Worterbuch (6 vols.,
Leipzig, 1866-1873), II, 932-33.
32 Ibn Battoutah, Voyages, IV, 442.
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only be inferred, from al-Bakri’s description of Ghana and from
what might seem to be residual traits in Mali, for example that of
giving audience through an intermediary. This question is of some
importance because of the undoubted extent of Mande influence
in the formation of the great historic empire of the Songhai. The
small Songhai kingdom of the Zas became tributary to Mali, and first
regained its independence under what its tradition represents as a
second dynasty, the Sis or Sonnis. The founders of this second
dynasty (probably about 1275), Ali Kolon and his brother, may
have been Mande. If not, they would certainly appear to have been
men who had held high appointments in the Mali service.33 It was
the last of this line, Sonni Ali (1464-92), who was the effective
founder of the great empire which superseded that of Mali. It was
the founder of the next dynasty, the Askia Muhammad, who did
most to consolidate it, and he seems certainly to have been of
Mande origin.34
But if the line which led to Sonni Ali had originally been Mande
or Mande-influenced, by his time it had become thoroughly natural-
ized. Sonni Ali’s success in founding a new empire to replace that
of Mali as ascribed by the Timbuctu Ta’rikhs to his success in
mobilizing the pagan spirit of the Songhai against the Islamising
tendencies of the Mali regime. Though it would seem that he him-
self owed some nominal allegiance to Islam, the Timbuctu chroni-
clers regarded him with hatred as a pagan who was implacably
hostile to the Muslim (and doubtless Mande-inspired) tradition of
civilization and scholarship in the towns.35 Ali’s militant paganism
was so strong, indeed, that it bred a Muslim reaction under one of
his generals, Muhammad, who became the first of the new Askia
line. The subsequent history of Songhai has been interpreted by
Jean Rouch almost in terms of a continual competition for power
33 Es-Sadi, Ta’rikh es-Soudan, 9-12; Kati, Ta’rikh el-Fettach, 93-94, 334.
34 Tarikh el-Fettach, 114, where it is stated that Muhammad came from
a Soninke clan, and 113 where his surname is given as “Toule” = Toure,
cf. Sekou Toure. Note also, 106, that initially Muhammad was supported by
only one of the great chiefs of the realm, and this, significantly was a descend-
ant of Mansa Musa.
35 Es-Sadi, Tarikh es-Soudan, 103-04; Kati, Ta’rikh el-Fettach, 81-83. See
also Rouch, Contribution, 181-86.
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between two parties in the state, the one pagan and national
(tribal?), the other Muslim and universalizing.30 This competition
was so sharp that it weakened the state and was a factor in
explaining the easy success of the Moroccans in occupying the
main centres of the empire. Ultimately, however, the invasion of
the Muslim Moors resolved the internal conflict of Songhai. The
kings and their kingdom could maintain their independence and
individuality only by going over whole-heartedly to the pagan
cause, and by fighting back from the ancient pagan centres of the
Songhai stock further down the Niger in Dendi.
It seems plausible to paint the end of Mali in similar colours.
For, with the rise of Songhai, the once great empire was reduced
to the status of a petty state in the upper Niger valley, its original
homeland. When a Mande kingdom once again becomes note-
worthy, it is sailing under manifestly pagan colours—hence the
style Bamhara for the kingdom of Segu developed by Biton-
Kululabi towards the end of the seventeenth century. But the
character of the Mali empire at its birth is less clear. Local
traditions would appear to confirm al-Bakri’s story of the advent of
Islam to the Mande of the upper Niger just before the time of the
Almoravids. 37 Their coming, and the later dispersion of Islamised
Soninke following the fall of Ghana,38 must have tended to increase
the islamization of the area. But before the thirteenth century, what
became the nucleus from which the Mali empire was to be de-
veloped seems to have been divided between a number of petty
states and competing dynasties.39 The dynasty that founded the
empire, that of the Keita, would seem to have been immigrant
Mande from further down the Niger. It is possible that the Keita
had already been in contact with Islam.40 But the great folk-heroes
of this dynasty, its founding-father, Nare Fa Maghan (c. 1200-18),
and the real originator of the empire, Sundiata (c. 1230-55), are
36 Rouch, Contribution, 192-209.
37 Monteil, “Les Empires”, 344-45.
38 See Trimingham, History, 31, 60.
39 See Monteil, “Les Empires”, 305, 344-53.
40 Monteil, “Les Empires”, 349-51. Note that if the Keita came from down-
stream, they came from the direction of Jenne, which according to Es-Sadi,
Tarlkh es-Soudan, 23, was a Muslim city by c. 1200 A.D.
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recalled in indigenous tradition by these pagan Mande names.
There is, of course, a Muslim name for Sundiata, namely Mari-
Diata. But, against this, tradition ascribes Sundiata’s success in
relieving Mali of the pressure of the Sosso and building up his
empire essentially to his command of pagan magic.41 Sundiata, in
fact, seems just as much as Sonni Ali, to have been a harnesser of
pagan forces.
The conclusion then, whether we look at Ghana, Mali or Songhai,
seems to be that these empires were in origin pagan creations which,
once they had become established, found a degree of islamization
convenient for reasons of state. In the cases of Mali and Songhai,
there is reason to believe that this islamization was somewhat
superficial. In Ghana, because of the Almoravids, it may have been
more fundamental. (But here it is worth pointing out that Muslim
Ghana was a steadily declining power.) What were these reasons
of state that led to a degree of islamization in these pagan empires?
Fundamentally they would seem to be connected with trade. From
the economic point of view, the function of these empires was the
control and exploitation, by ambitious West African peoples or clans,
of the Western Sudan’s trade with North Africa, a trade in which
the exchange of West African gold for Sharan salt was perhaps of
particular importance. This control and exploitation could be
achieved in two complementary ways. One was by expanding later-
ally across the internal West African trade routes running north
towards the Sahara, and so channelling these through centres which
the empire-builders controlled and which became the markets for
North African traders. The early prominence of Ghana is clearly
due to its position north of the gold-producing region of Wangara
( equivalent to the modern Bambuk ) . Later, after the upsets caused
to the westernmost trans-Saharan routes by the Almoravid outburst
and by the disruption of Ghana, first the Mande and then the Song-
hai sought to control a new diagonal by-pass running along the na-
tural route of the Niger north-eastwards to Timbuctu, the West
African export centre nearest to North Africa. This route also cut
across the supply line running northwards from the Gold Coast,
whose mines were opened up as a result of Mande initiative about
41 See e.g., Monteil, “Les Empires”, 359-65.
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the middle of the fourteenth century. 42 In this connection it would
appear that the issue of whether or not the Keita were Muslims is
less significant than the tradition that they were traders reaching the
Mande centres in the upper Niger valley from further downstream.
Equally, the domination by Songhai boatmen of riverain traffic, at
least as far upstream as Macina, was doubtless an important factor
in Songhai’s victory over Mali later on. Doubtless too it helps to
explain why it was so important to Sonni Ali to appeal to the pagan
sensibilities of his people.
The second way in which western Sudanese empire-builders
sought to gain wealth was by levying tribute on other clan groups
and their villages. This undoubtedly helped to create at their
capitals exportable surpluses of marketable commodities, since
initially much trade was probably state or royal trade. In this
connection it is worth noting that Charles Monteil once remarked
that ‘a Sudanese empire is essentially an association of individuals
aiming to dominate others for profit/43
Once an empire of this type had been established, then there
were obvious advantages in its royal and mercantile classes adopting
an Islamic front so as to establish surer relations with the Muslim
states and traders of North Africa who were their customers and
suppliers. But in its origins, the empire-building process would
seem to have been fundamentally a pagan reaction to the develop-
ment of North African trade. Furthermore, following the initial
success of Ghana, it seems to have been essentially a Mande or
Mande-inspired process.
However there is a difficulty in this interpretation. From the time
of the Almoravid conquest onwards, it would appear that the
Mande merchant classes, particularly the Soninke and later the
Dyula, were steadfastly Muslim.44 As such, for example, they
brought Islam as well as international trade to Hausaland in the
42 This dating is now generally accepted; see Ivor Wilks, “The Northern
Factor in Ashanti history”, Jour. Af. Hist., II, 1961, 28-29; R. Mauny, Tableau
Geographique de YOuest Africain au Moyen Age, Mem. dT.F.A.N., No. 61,
1961, 300; Eva L. R. Meyerowitz, Akan Traditions of Origin (London, 1952),
29-44.
43 Monteil, “Les Empires”, 311.
44 See, for example, Trimingham, History, 31, 143.
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fourteenth century. One might have expected, therefore, that both
the growth of trade and the growth of empire should together have
led to a much deeper and more permanent islamization of the
empires and of their peoples. However there would seem to be both
particular and general reasons why this did not happen. On the
particular side, it must be remembered that although Sundiata was
emulating an example set by the Soninke (i.e. the northern Mande)
of Ghana, who had been islamized, he himself represented southern
Mande who were breaking up a Soninke commercial dominion by
establishing a new riverain Niger trade route. Thus it would be
politic for him to appeal to pagan loyalties. Similarly, it has been
suggested, Sonni Ali was using the pagan coherence of the Songhai
to wrest control of this riverain route from islamized Mande.
On the general side, there might seem to have been good political
reasons for the imperial rulers trying to establish their dominion as
Muslim princes. One of their greatest problems, and one which
never seems to have been solved satisfactorily, was how to secure
enduring allegiance from other subjected pagan clans which pos-
sessed totally different ancestor and land cults from that of the
ruling clan. A universal allegiance of Muslim individuals to a
Muslim king might well have seemed a suitable solution. But in
fact the pagan cults were too strong. Thus Askia Muhammad’s
islamizing policy soon brought a pagan reaction (and in fact his
own downfall). More importantly, perhaps, most of the Sudanic
emperors seem to have recognised that the social upsets result-
ing from an active campaign of Muslim proselytization would
have been bad for trade, and so would have weakened the economic
mainspring of empire. Thus we are told that, initially at least, the
Muslim merchants of Ghana dealt with the Wangara gold-miners
by dumb-barter. 45 Later on, al-‘UmarI says that Mansa Musa had no
wish to destroy paganism among the gold-miners lest by so doing
the supply of gold might be reduced.46 There may have been
advantages for traders in being Muslim, but to try and impose the
new and alien religion upon producers was apt to upset the
intimate and particular relations which the ancestors of each
45 E.g. Magoudi, Les Prairies d’Or, ed. and trans. by C. Barbier de Meynaud
and P. de Courtelle (9 vols., Paris, 1861-1877), IV, 92-93.
46 Al-Omari, VAfrique, 58-59.
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individual pagan kinship group had established with the spirits of
the land which they tilled or mined, and of the water which fed
the land and which occasioned the deposits of alluvial gold. From
the economic point of view, therefore, there were limits beyond
which it was not good policy to push Islam.
It is at least possible to argue also that from the political point of
view, in the western Sudan Islam was more a destructive than a
constructive force. The period considered in this paper both begins
and ends with an invasion of Muslims which either immediately ( as
in the case of the Moroccans) or ultimately (as Ibn Khaldun
clearly states in the case of the Almoravids47 ) led to the destruction
of a pagan system of peace and prosperity. Furthermore, Jean
Rouch gives grounds for believing that Askia Muhammad’s Islamic
policy seriously weakened the Songhai empire established by Sonni
Ali. 48 On the other hand, however, it would seem that Delafosse was
going too far when he suggested that the apparent stability of the
Mossi-Dagomba states was due to their continuing paganism. 49 It
seems more probable that this stability was due in part to the fact
that these states remained relatively small, so that their rulers were
not faced with the problem of seeking allegiance from pagan groups
that were not assimilable into their own.
47 Ibn Khaldoun, Histoire, II, 110.
48 Rouch, Contribution, 209.
49 Delafosse, Haut-Senegal-Niger, II, 124.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a generalized description
of the nature and extent of the known European sources for
tropical African history, and of the ways in which scholars have
employed these sources up to the present time. It also seeks to
show, using the Dutch-language records as an example, how, in
conjunction with other types of evidence, European archival
materials may be called on to help solve problems in “African” as
opposed to “colonial” history.
I. Description of the European Sources
The documentary sources in European languages for the history
of tropical Africa are to be found partly in Europe and other places
outside Africa, and partly in Africa itself. Official archives currently
held in Africa are in many cases extensive, since most of the states
which gained their independence after the Second World War
inherited the local records of their former colonial masters. In
Dakar, for example, are housed the archives of the Gouvernement-
general de VA.O.F., without reference to which research into the
modern history of any part of former French West Africa could
hardly be attempted. At independence both Ghana and Nigeria
took over substantial collections of documents from the colonial
governments of those territories, and have since set up efficient
national archives services. In Guinea there were some losses of
material, due to a policy of destruction and removal adopted by
the departing French, and the records of German East and West
Africa, which were transferred to Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi
and to British and French Cameroons and Togoland respectively,
also suffered from dispersion and neglect. But, in general, all
territories which evolved directly from colonial to independent
status took over the archives of the retiring colonial governments
more or less intact . 1 The same will presumably happen in Kenya,
1 Philip D. Curtin, “The Archives of Tropical Africa: a Reconnaissance,”
Journal of African History, I, 1 (1960), 129-47.
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Nyasaland and the Rhodesias and, it is to be hoped, in Angola and
Mozambique also.
Source materials for tropical African history are also to be found
in the home archives of the ex-colonial powers. In part these
metropolitan holdings duplicate the records preserved in Africa.
Where the home material is unique it normally relates to “colonial”
history and to the history of “European activities in Africa” rather
than to “African” history as the term is now understood. On the
other hand the survival rate for documents has been higher in the
metropoles than in their colonies, and many sources which might be
expected to exist in Africa have decayed or been lost and may
today be consulted only in Europe. The two sets of records, African
and European, are therefore complementary, and for research
purposes recourse must normally be had to both.
Where colonial rule in Africa was abandoned some time ago—as,
for example, when a colony was transferred from one European
state to another—the records of the abdicating power were usually
repatriated to Europe in their entirety. Thus the local archives of
the Dutch establishments on the Gold Coast, sovereignty over
which was transferred to the British in 1872, are to be found not
in modern Ghana but in the Netherlands. The same is true of the
records of the commercial companies which operated in Africa at
the time of the slave trade and of the archives of most of the
missionary societies. In consequence, European-language sources
for African history, many of them of great value, exist today in
several European countries, such as Holland, Denmark and Sweden,
which have had no colonial connection with Africa since the nine-
teenth century or earlier.
Taken as a whole, the European-language documentary records
are very voluminous, complex and difficult to use. This was
recognized in a practical way in 1954, when a committee of scholars
convened by the Institute of Historical Research, University of
London, set in motion a scheme for the production of guides to the
European archives for the benefit of historians of Africa. Up to now
this committee has confined its attention to the materials known to
exist for West African History, but it is hoped that in time other
areas of the continent will be dealt with also. The present plan is
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for one volume each on Belgium and Holland, France, Portugal,
and Scandinavia and Germany. This West African series is being
modelled on the “Guides to the materials in foreign archives
relating to the history of the United States,” published by the
Carnegie Institute in Washington, D.C. Each volume will catalogue
all relevant documents class by class in institution by institution in
country by country, and will supply brief notes on the location,
origins and function of each holding institution, on the overall
nature of its holdings and on the rules governing their use.2 The
West African guides are not intended as calendars. They will, how-
ever, give enough detail to enable a research worker to track down
a likely source and order it from the stacks of a repository with a
minimum of difficulty. The first in the series, Materials for West
African history in the archives of Belgium and Holland, by Patricia
Carson, was published in early 1962.
Miss Carson’s work lists materials in the archives of Antwerp,
Brussels, Ghent and Tervuren in Belgium, and of Amsterdam,
Gouda, Haarlem, The Hague, Leiden, Middelburg, Rotterdam and
Utrecht in the Netherlands. This wide geographical coverage is the
most valuable, and perhaps the most unexpected, feature of her
book. Most students working on the history of the Dutch overseas,
particularly those from foreign countries, stay in The Hague, where
they rely on the Rijksarchief, or State Archive, for their manuscript,
and the National Library, Colonial Ministry Library, Library of the
Royal Institute, etc. for their printed sources. They normally have
neither the time nor the money to comb through the various
provincial and municipal archives. Indeed, one would hardly expect
to find material on African history in, say, Ghent in Belgium, or
Middelburg in the Netherlands. Yet, as Miss Carson’s guide shows,
the writing of a definitive work on the overseas trade of West Africa
in the eighteenth century would be impossible without reference to
the Ghent Public Archive’s Collection d’Hoop, which contains the
papers of the great slaving entrepreneur, Pierre van Alstein. Simi-
larly, the log-books of ships which visited the West Coast of Africa
often contain valuable information about the peoples of the coastal
2 Patricia Carson, Materials for West African History in the Archives of
Belgium and Holland ( London, 1962 ) , Editor’s preface.
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states. The most extensive Dutch collection of these log-books is
not in the Rijksarchief in The Hague, but at Middelburg in Zeeland.3
Nevertheless, the bulk of the Dutch-language manuscripts which
relate to the history of Africa are to be found in the main Nether-
lands state repository, the Rijksarchief. These manuscripts fall into
four main categories. To begin with there are the records of the
first Netherlands West India Company, 1621-1674, which are of
limited value only, partly because the Directors of this Company
were more concerned with fighting Spain and Portugal at sea and
with their colonizing ventures in North America and Brazil than
with Africa, and partly because a contemporary historian, Joannes
de Laet, destroyed a portion of the Company’s official correspond-
ence on the grounds that, since he had used it himself, it could be
of no interest to posterity.4 Next, there are the records of the second
Netherlands West India Company, 1674-1791, which are more
extensive. In addition to a very large body of material relating to
ships, cargoes, manifests, invoices, account books, muster rolls,
armaments, and the design, repair and upkeep of forts, they contain
copies of all inward and outward correspondence passing between
the Directors of the Company at Amsterdam and their subordinates
in Africa, and the minutes of the Directors’ resolution, or decisions,
regarding policy and trade. After the demise of the second Company
in 1791 and the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in
1814, the Dutch possessions in Africa ceased being the agencies of
a trading company and became colonies of the Dutch Crown. From
1814 onwards, in consequence, the Dutch home records bearing on
Africa are organized as are their counterparts in Great Britain, with
sub-divisions corresponding to the various ministries concerned,
Trade and Colonies, Foreign Affairs, Admiralty, and so on. This, the
third section of the Rijksarchief collection, is useful mainly for the
diplomatic history of Africa. Lastly, there is the vast series known
as the Archief van de Nederlandse hezittingen ter Kuste van Guinee
(Archive of the Dutch settlements on the Guinea Coast). This is
the set of records kept at Elmina Castle, the headquarters of the
3 Ibid.
4 But see Engel Sluiter, “The Dutch Archives and American Historical
Research,” Pacific Historical Review, VI (1937), 31-32, who warns against
exaggerating the extent of de Laet’s vandalism.
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Dutch administration on the Gold Coast, down to 1872, the year of
the transfer of all Dutch possessions in West Africa to Great Britain.
At the time of the transfer the entire Dutch archives, which as
currently bound run to some thousands of volumes, were moved
from Elmina Castle to The Hague.
From this description it will be clear that the total volume of
Dutch manuscript material for African history is very considerable
indeed. Yet to date surprisingly little use has been made of it.
Charles R. Boxer,5
J.
G. Doorman, 6 Nicolaus Hadeler,7
J.
K.
J. de
Jonge,8 W. R. Menkman,9 and K. Ratelband10 have drawn on the
manuscript resources of the Rijksarchief for various purposes,
chiefly for the elucidation of problems of colonial history. Ivor
Wilks11 and Douglas Coombs 12 have used parts of the same
collection for work on Ghanaian history in the 17th-18th and 19th
centuries respectively, and a number of scholars are looking into
the Dutch sources at the present time. But so far only the surface
has been scratched. The same is true, in still greater degree, of the
materials for African history in the archives of Denmark, Germany
and Scandinavia, while the records of the major colonial powers of
5 Charles R. Boxer, Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola,
1602-1686 (London, 1952).
6
J. G. Doorman, “Die Niederlandisch-West-Indische Compagnie an der
Goldkiiste,” Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, XL, 5-6
(1898), 390-496.
7 Nicolaus Hadeler, Geschichte der hollandischen Colonien auf der Gold-
kiiste, mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Handels (Bonn, 1904).
8
J. K. J. de Jonge, Oorsprong van Nederlands Bezittingen op de Kust van
Guinee in Herinnering Gebragt uit de Oorspronkelijke Stukken (’s-Gravenhage,
1871).
9 W. R. Menkman, De West-lndische Compagnie (Amsterdam, 1947).
10 K. Ratelband (Ed.), Vijf Dagregisters van het Kasteel Sao Jorge da Mina
( Elmina ) aan de Goudkust ( 1645—1647
)
(’s-Gravenhage, 1953).
11 Ivor Wilks, “The Rise of the Akwamu Empire, 1650-1710,” Transactions
of the Historical Society of Ghana, III, 2 (1957), 99-136. Margaret Priestley
and Ivor Wilks, “The Ashanti Kings in the Eighteenth Century: a Revised
Chronology,” Journal of African History, I, 1 (1960), 83-96.
12 Douglas Coombs, “The Place of the ‘Certificate of Apologie’ in Ghanaian
History,” Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, III, 3 (1958), ISO-
93. Douglas Coombs, The Gold Coast, Britain and the Netherlands, 1850-
1874 (London, 1963).
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tropical Africa, Great Britain, France and Portugal, though better
known, still contain whole areas of untouched material.
II. Employment of the European Sources to Date
This general neglect by professional historians of the European
sources is a reflection of the misconceptions which they, in common
with other observers of the African scene, held until quite recently
about the continent they sought to study. Before the Second World
War the approach of nearly all historians of Africa—there were
some exceptions, such as Delafosse, Monteil, Palmer—was firmly
“colonialist.” Writers of that period concerned themselves with
“European activities in Africa” to the exclusion of almost everything
else. They saw the events in their narratives through the eyes of
the administrator and soldier, the settler, trader and missionary. As
a subject for academic inquiry, colonial history is, of course, entirely
respectable, and there need have been nothing objectionable about
the works these authors produced. But they made the mistake of
equating the history of the colonizers with that of the colonized and
assumed that, since the peoples of tropical Africa were non-literate,
the history of the area could be written only from the records of
the literate foreigners who discovered, penetrated, conquered,
partitioned and occupied it. The colonial historians were unaware
that tropical Africa had any past—or at least any past that could
be dignified by the name “history”—before Europeans appeared on
the scene.
The first to make a coherent and effective protest against the
misconceptions and wrong emphases of colonial history were those
exponents of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism who began
expressing themselves in writing after the end of the War. Justi-
fiably, the nationalists resented the stereotype of the continent
which they read again and again in European history books, “the
familiar idea,” as Melville
J.
Herskovits put it, “of undifferentiated
Africa as mostly jungle, overrun by great herds of wild animals,
inhabited by human beings classed as ‘savages.’ ”13 They objected
to the way in which the colonial historians portrayed the actions of
13 Melville J. Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa (New
York, 1962), 20.
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Europeans as consistently good, and the actions of Africans as
consistently bad. They saw that Africa must discover its own past
and be proud of it, or else cultural independence from Europe
would be unattainable even though political independence might be
won. They demanded proof that the generally held view of tropical
Africa as a primitive and barbarous land until touched by the magic
wand of European civilization was false. This desire on the part
of the nationalists to free African history from the strictures of
colonial history was, and remains, a major preoccupation of those
engaged in the search for the African Personality. 14
By a natural swing of the pendulum some of the nationalists’
early claims were hasty and exaggerated. There was a tendency to
over-emphasise the contribution of ancient Africa to the mainstream
of civilization, as, for example, in the ascription of an impossibly
advanced technology to the Empire of Ghana. 15 But this was a
passing phase, and the hard core of nationalist criticism of colonial
history was entirely sound. The colonial historians failed to see any
dynamic in African history because they did not expect to find one.
They thought of Africans as passive agents in a process by which
externally-sponsored economic, religious and educational innova-
tions would in time produce results, but they did not expect that
these results would be spectacular or quickly achieved. As late as
1951 Margery Perham could write in a Foreign Affairs article that
it was “not a very bold speculation to believe” that the then British
colonial territories in Africa would become “fully self-governing
nation-states by the end of the century ”16 Because they saw no
prospect of rapid development in the future, the colonial historians
tended in their writings to subscribe to the myth of an unchanging
African past.
It has not only been the African nationalists who have protested
14 Joseph K. Zerbo, “Histoire et Conscience Negre,” Presence Africaine, 16
(Oct.-Nov. 1957), 53. See also I. Wallerstein, “La Recherche d’une Identite
Nationale en Afrique Occidentale,” Presence Africaine, 34-35 (Oct.-Jan. 1961),
79-91.
15 On the general point see Herskovits, Human Factor, 458-59. My refer-
ence is to the well-known Earl Sweeting paintings, reproduced as picture-
postcards by the Ghana National Archives.
16 Margery Perham, “The British Problem in Africa,” Foreign Affairs, XXIX,
4 (July 1951), 637. (My italics.)
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against the presuppositions of colonial history. In the years follow-
ing the War the colonialist emphases have been challenged from
two other, and separate, points of view. In the first place, there has
been a sustained assault on the moral perspective of the colonial
historians. This attack has come mainly from Marxist writers, who
are here following in a direct line from Lenin and other foes of
economic imperialism. The current Marxist anti-colonial school
uses substantially the same evidence as the colonial historians, but
interprets it in a different, often totally contradictory, way. The
result is a history of Africa with a different moral perspective, to
be sure, but the approach adopted is still essentially “Eurocentric”
European activities, policies and problems continue to occupy the
centre of the stage, the difference being that these are now
regarded as uniformly bad instead of uniformly good. In many
ways the impact of the anti-colonial school has been healthy. It has
helped to overthrow—more quickly, perhaps, than might have
happened otherwise—some of the more offensive complacencies of
the colonial historians. But its publications are as far from being
true “African history” as were those it so violently attacks. In anti-
colonial Marxist writings on Africa it is apparent, at any rate to the
non-Marxist, that one systematic bias has merely been exchanged
for another. 17
Secondly, the colonialist approach has been rejected by those his-
torians of Africa who criticize it for its failure to penetrate beyond
the barrier which the absence of written records appears to impose.
As their starting-point these writers have assumed that, if the past
of the non-literate peoples of Africa is to be uncovered, the historian
of the area must look to unwritten evidence. This type of source the
colonial historians either disregarded or knew nothing about.
Exponents of the “ethno-history” of Africa have thus been led to
make a re-assessment of oral tradition, and have devised new methods
for checking and controlling it. 18 Increasingly, they have sought aid
from allied disciplines, such as archaeology, comparative anthro-
17 For an example of the writings of the Marxist anti-colonial school see
D. T. Niane et J. Suret-Canale, Histoire de VAfrique Occidentale (Paris, 1961).
18 See J. Vansina, “Recording the Oral History of the Bakuba—I. Methods/'
Journal of African History, I, 1 (1960), 43-51, and the same author’s De la
Tradition Orale: Essai de Methode Historique (Tervuren, 1961).
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pology, musicology, linguistics, botany, zoology and the history of
art. In their attempt to go beyond the written word, they have made
their greatest contributions so far in the pre-colonial period and, in
more modern times, in areas where contact with Europeans has
been non-existent or minimal.
A weakness of historical writing on tropical Africa to date has
been its disparate or compartmentalized nature. Distinctions have
been drawn between the prehistorical, protohistorical and historical
eras, and between the pre-colonial period and the colonial. Like
all time divisions of this kind, the periodization is arbitrary, yet in
most works no easy transition from one period or era to another
is made. The various types of African history, moreover, have up to
now been largely written by different types of writers, the specialist
training of the individual determining his choice of subject-matter.
Few writers, for example, are equally at home in both the Euro-
pean-language records and the oral traditions and archaeology of
the area of their study. Yet it is only by a successful tieing together
of all types of inquiry that many of the problems of African history
will be solved,19 and the ideal achieved of a smoothly flowing
narrative without the jolts and jars that at present characterize
transitions from one type of evidence to another.
The key to the attainment of a truly autonomous and integrated
history of tropical Africa is undoubtedly to be found in the proper
use of the written sources, and it is not only European-language
sources that are here involved. Recent research shows that materials
in Arabic relating to tropical (as opposed to Sudanic) Africa are
very much more numerous than was once supposed.20 It is being
discovered, moreover, that Arabic or Arabic-type script has in the
19 Good examples of the simultaneous use of European sources and oral
tradition are the article on “The Ashanti Kings in the Eighteenth Century,” by
Priestley and Wilks, already cited, and D. P. Abraham, “Maramuca: an Exer-
cise in the Combined Use of Portuguese Records and Oral Tradition,” Journal
of African History
,
II, 2 (1961), 211-25.
20 H. F. C. Smith, “A Neglected Theme of West African History: the
Islamic Revolutions of the 19th Century,” Historians in Tropical Africa (Pro-
ceedings of the Leverhulme Inter-Collegiate History Conference, Salisbury,
Southern Rhodesia, 1962), 145-58, and the same author’s frequent contribu-
tions from 1959 onwards to the Bulletin of News of the Historical Society of
Nigeria.
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past been used to write down several African languages previously
thought to have either no literature at all or an inconsiderable
quantity of it. In Northern Ghana, for example, documents at
present being unearthed are in Dagbane, Mamprusi and even Guan,
as well as in Arabic, Hausa and Fulani. Kings of West African forest
states like Ashanti, it appears, made use from time to time of
Muslim scribes in order to carry on diplomatic negotiations with
their neighbour monarchs in the Islamic lands to the north. Some
of this diplomatic correspondence is now turning up in Ghana.
More may be found in the court archives of states like Segu, which
were conquered by the French at the end of the nineteenth century
and whose written records were removed to Paris at that time. 21
So far as the European-language sources are concerned, those
that have already been examined (in part, and for their own
particular purposes) by the colonial historians must be studied
again. Those that have never been used at all must be intensively
investigated. Properly employed, the archives of the ex-colonial
powers can be made to yield a wealth of information which the
authors of the individual documents comprising those archives did
not know they possessed. It is as true of African historiography as
of any other that what one learns from a piece of historical evidence
depends on the questions one puts to it.
III. The Potential of the European Sources
There are many different kinds of documents in the European
colonial archives from which material for autonomous African
history may be obtained. The following is an example of one such
document. It is the text of a letter written (through an amanuensis)
by Nana Osei Tutu Kwamina, King of Ashanti, to Herman Willem
Daendels, the Dutch Govenor-General at Elmina Castle on the
Gold Coast. At the time of writing (1816) a “palaver,” or matter of
contention, had arisen between Ashanti and the neighbouring state
of Wassa, whose king was named Eltifor. A war had recently been
fought between the Ashantis and the Fante people of the coast, who
were under the half-hearted and largely ineffective protection of
21 Ivor Wilks, in a communication to the Conference on the Teaching of
History in Ghanaian Schools and Training Colleges, Legon, Ghana, April 1963.
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British merchants residing at Cape Coast, Commany ( modern
Kommenda) and other places. The people of Elmina, traditionally
hostile to the Fantes and allies of the Ashantis, were also under
European protection, in this case that of the Dutch. The Wassas,
who in the past had acknowledged the overlordship of Ashanti, had
taken advantage of the general confusion to desert their Ashanti
alliance, join the Fantes and attack Elmina.
The King of Ashanti thus found himself in a difficult situation,
and his letter shows the incisive manner in which he dealt with it.
He dictated his instructions to Willem Huydecoper, a First Assistant
in the Dutch administration at Elmina, who had been sent to
Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, in order to greet the King on behalf of
the Governor-General, and propose to him, among other things,
that a highway should be cut by Ashanti labour from the capital
to the coast for the convenience of trade and that the Governor-
General should pay a state visit to Ashanti as soon as possible.
Huydecoper was a mulatto and spoke Twi, the language of the
Ashantis, fluently. One can therefore be certain that he understood
exactly what was in the King’s mind when he took down the royal
instructions. The original text is in Dutch.
Koemassie,
29 November 1816.
The King of Ashanti
to
His good friend the
Governor-General H. W.
Daendels, etc., etc.,
at Elmina.
My good friend,
Your honourable letter has been very well explained to me by
W. Huydecoper. Your presence here will crown everything with
success and good results will flow from your visit. Everything here
will be at your service.
The highway will, according to your order and request, be begun
next week. Eight days after the work has started, I will send you a
report on how far it has proceeded. It is not intended, however, to
carry the road farther than Insadjoesoe, for I await a reply from you
concerning the Wassas. On receiving this I will continue the road to
Great Commany. From here to Insadjoesoe is four days, and from
that place to Elmina is nine days. We are leaving Denkyera on
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the right hand, since if we let the road go through Denkyera it
would be much too long. It is now planned to go through Bekkwai,
which is best.
Now we will speak about Tando. I sent this person to the Wassas
to fetch my prisoners of war, and did not send him for any other
purpose. I therefore repudiate all that he has done, and look to you
to arrange matters for me in the best possible way. All the swearing
and oath-drinking that has taken place I count as nothing.
With the Wassas I used not to have any palaver. When I last
went out against the Fantes to exterminate them, my sister Adomma
drank oath with these Wassas, and swore that there was no palaver
between me and them, and that in consequence they must not go
and ally themselves with any other people in order to fight against
me. Then, when I was engaged in fighting the Fantes, I took a
number of prisoners of war, amongst whom I found, to my surprise,
various soldiers of Eltifor’s. I did not make much of this, however,
but rather sent the Wassas a slave and some jaw bones as a present,
and in the end forgave them.
Then, when I was on my way back and had halted for the night
at Assikoema, messengers came to me from Eltifor to thank me for
the present of the slave and the jaw bones. I took these messengers
with me to my capital, gave them various presents and bade them
farewell. But after they had gone, other messengers came, one from
Elmina and one from Accra. The Elminas gave me the following
message:
“That the Elminas greet the King, and wish to inform him
that, while they were carrying some presents for him through
the Wassa country, the Wassas stole away their presents and
threatened them with death; that they had therefore gone to
Accra by sea and had come from there hither; that the Wassas
were now allied to the Fantes and Commanys and had attacked
Elmina; that Elmina’s sufferings were due to its Ashanti
connection; and that the King of Ashanti had been insulted by
these Wassas and he must come with his army and punish
them.”
I thereupon fitted out an army and sent all my generals with it to
go and fight the Wassas. Then the Akims, who at that time were my
subjects, allied themselves with the Aquapims. I had to recall the
army, but I fitted it out again and sent it to fight the Fantes and
afterwards to destroy English Commany and the Wassas. When this
army of mine was at Abra, Your Excellency told it not to go against
Commany, and out of respect for you I turned my army back and
thus complied with your request. [I have also since refused to aid
the Elminas with troops.]
But you will be able to read everything in Huydecoper’s journal.
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I pray you will forgive and forget all bad things, and our work will
prosper. I expect your friendship above all else. The Wassa and
Commany palavers I request you to settle for me: each of them for
190 perequins besides the 99 slaves and the powder and lead which
the Commanys have taken from the Elminas.
My good friend, if the Commanys will not settle this palaver with
you, I will supply men to the Elminas and they will put [the town
of] Commany to death.
Praying God to grant you health, I name myself,
Your sincere friend
This is X the mark of
Say Quamin, King of Ashanti.
In our presence,
(Signed) W. Huydecoper,
P. Woortman.
P.S. My name is Say Toetoe. Quamin is the name of my birthday.
The oldest Kings of Ashanti have always been good friends to the
Hollanders. So never forget me, and I also will never forget you.
Say Toetoe, Poekoe Tintin, Kwesie Boaroem, Say Coedjo22—these
kings were like brothers to the Hollanders, and I am no less.
This document shows clearly that a state like Ashanti, for all that
in the early nineteenth century it maintained few written records,
nevertheless conducted its foreign relations at that period with
sophistication and subtlety.
It would be misleading to imply that all Dutch-language manu-
script materials possess a degree of interest for the modern historian
of Africa comparable to this letter from the King of Ashanti of
November 1816. Most of the Dutch documents are concerned with
“European activities in Africa,” usually of a petty, humdrum type.
The Dutch, moreover, never controlled more than a small strip of
territory along the western section of the Gold Coast, and Dutch
agents were few, and less enterprising, in terms of places visited and
distances travelled, than either the British or the French. Yet
historians are finding increasingly that the Dutch sources can be
made to yield useful information in ways that are often unexpected.
In the first place, the records are full of detailed reports on
controversies between rival fort commanders and accounts of court
22 The Ashanti kings here referred to are Osei Tutu, Opoku Ware, Kusi
Obodum and Osei Kojo who, according to the traditional accounts, were the
first four kings of Ashanti after the union.
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cases involving, say, a European on one side and an African on the
other. The matters being argued may have lost their interest, but
the details of the arguments, the evidence of the witnesses and the
grounds of the judgments may be extremely significant. Here, for
example, is what Miss Carson’s guide says about Volume 62 in the
“Register of letters despatched to the Directors of the West India
Company, 1700-1789”:
Papers about the despatch of cargoes. Papers about the difficulties
with the Portuguese. Papers about the despatch of slave ships . . .
Records of the advice given by old natives about questions of
ownership, etc.23
This source has not been examined, but a fair inference seems to
be that the “advice given by old natives” might provide useful
material for a historian of Ghanaian land tenure and inheritance.
Secondly, “official reports” by Dutch commercial agents and
colonial servants often contain information of a scope far wider
than is suggested by the word “official.” The Dutch are, and were, a
meticulous people. Every outgoing holder of a senior executive post
had to provide for the benefit of his successor a memorie van over-
gave, or “handing-over report.” In this he recorded not only an
inventory of the guns, stores, buildings, etc., responsibility for which
he was now transferring, but also any observations on local politics
and practices which he felt might guide the officer taking over from
him.
Thirdly, officials of the Dutch Gold Coast administration sent on
diplomatic missions had to report frequently to their superiors and
maintain a complete diary of day-to-day events. An ambassador to
the court of an African king, for example, was obliged not only to
keep a record of his official negotiations but also set down precisely
what presents and “dashes” he gave and received during his stay.
The fact that presents were exchanged is of small consequence, but
from the lists of the presents themselves and, in particular, from
their size and type, can often be deduced the relative power and
23 Carson, Materials, 42. For a detailed description of the local Dutch
archives at Elmina see R. Bijlsma, “Het Archief der Nederlandsche Bezittingen
ter Kuste van Guinea,” Verslagen omtrent ’s Rijks oude Archieven (’s-Graven-
hage, 1923), XLIV, Eerste Deel, 1921, Bijlage XI, 337-82.
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standing in the community of the chiefs, linguists, army com-
manders, etc. surrounding the king. From this information, in turn,
the historian can determine exactly who were the men that counted
in a particular African state at a particular time, and is thereby
assisted in working out such matters as the processes of state
formation, transitions from military to civil type government, and
the like.
This question of lists of presents is a good illustration of the
general point that a European source may be of little value in
itself, but takes on increased significance when used in conjunction
with other types of evidence. The written document, normally the
product of a foreign, non-African pen, may not contain much that is
directly relevant to African history. But what it lacks in relevance it
makes up for in chronological precision.24 The simple statement in
a European source that “so-and-so was destooled today” may pro-
vide a peg on which a whole pattern of oral tradition may be hung.
Dutch and English, French, Danish, German or Portuguese reports
of the same event can be compared and, in the case of Ghana
history, the Dutch reports can sometimes even be compared with
one another. For long periods at a time Dutch agents were stationed
at Axim and Accra as well as at Elmina. The accounts provided by
these agents of a happening in the interior of the Gold Coast may
often be proved to have been influenced by the attitudes of the
indigenous inhabitants of the towns where the agents resided. Thus
in favourable cases a variety of checks on oral tradition can be
obtained by juxtaposing written materials from different areas and
in different languages.
Fourthly, not too much should be read into the fact that Euro-
peans, until the nineteenth century, lived only on the coasts of
Africa and did not, except occasionally, penetrate into the interior.
These European residents were traders, and in competition with
other traders.25 The profit margins of the companies for which they
worked were often small. No factor on the Guinea coast, for
example, could build a new fort or open a new trading station
24 Abraham, Maramuca, 217.
25 See E. C. Martin, The British West African Settlements, 1750-1821
(London, 1927), 45-46.
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without permission from his principals at home, and such permission
was not given unless a strong case could be made out. As part of
their normal duties, therefore, agents of European commercial
companies in West Africa were constantly writing appreciations of
the total trading situation, not only in the areas they knew
intimately on the coast, but also in the interior since, especially in
the eighteenth century, a large part of West African purchasing
power was centred on the states of the forest. From the European
records, therefore, can be learnt a great deal about areas which no
European ever visited, and the coastal factors were much better
informed about the situation in the interior than has sometimes
been supposed.26
Finally, it must never be forgotten that for the world of scholar-
ship as a whole Africa has long been under the wing of its neigh-
bour, Asia. The International Congress of Africanists has only
recently broken free from its parent, the International Congress of
Orientalists,27 and several famous European booksellers still list
their “Africa” books in catalogues marked “Orientalia.” This situ-
ation is not only a reflection of the comparative newness of African
studies. It finds a parallel in the relationship that used to exist in the
era of European expansion between Europe on the one hand and
Africa and the more distant parts of the world on the other. In the
days of sailing ships the West Coast of Africa was a frequent port of
call for vessels going to the Caribbean and South America, and to
India, Southeast Asia and the Far East. From European descriptions
of “the world beyond” written from the fifteenth to the eighteenth
centuries, therefore, one can often glean information about Africa,
even though the title of the work to hand may contain no reference
to the continent at all. This is particularly true of travellers’ ac-
counts, encyclopaedic compilations and the reports of explorers and
navigators. A work entitled “Voyage to the East Indies,” or “Exact
description and narrative account of the Dutch (French, English,
26 Margaret Priestley, “Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast in the Eight-
eenth Century: a Survey of Contemporary Evidence,” Historians in Tropical
Africa (Proceedings of the Leverhulme Inter-Collegiate History Conference,
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, 1962), 287.
27 See I. I. Potekhin, “Toward the First International Congress of Afri-
canists,” African Studies Bulletin, V, 3 (Oct., 1962), 34-35.
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etc.) possessions in the East and West Indies,” or even “The great
and famous voyage round the world performed in the years such-
and-such by the honourable Captain so-and-so” often proves to
contain useful, and sometimes unique, material on Africa.
These are only some of the ways in which the European-language
sources can be made to yield information for the new-style, autono-
mous history of tropical Africa. As suggested above, the reaction
against a Eurocentric and biassed colonialist approach produced on
the one hand nationalistic and anti-colonial history anxious to “set
the African record straight,” and on the other an intensive quest
for a new methodology and new tools of research with which to
uncover a past which it was believed conventional historical inquiry
could not penetrate. The stage has now been reached when the
European sources can, as it were, come into their own again. They
provide, above all, the time-scale, the precise chronology without
which the results of ethno-historical inquiry must necessarily remain
vague, and the controlling framework of hard, unassailable fact into
which the findings of research in other disciplines can be fitted.
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Sierra Leone and Liberia1 are the two outstanding examples of
attempts to found on the African coast settlements of Africans who
had been expatriated as slaves, and of descendants of such.2 Both
countries have been subjected to much derogatory criticism from
foreign observers, though both have at various times found warm
defenders. On the whole, most observers since 1870 (at least until
recent years) have tended to judge the British colony of Sierra
Leone a greater success than the Liberian Republic. The last three
or four decades of the nineteenth century saw Sierra Leone Creoles
exercising commercial and cultural influence through very extensive
areas of west Africa; their far-ranging presence is attested by the
very witnesses who judged them unfavourably. But in these years
the range of Liberian influence became if anything restricted; even
the survival of the Republic seemed doubtful.
A number of historians have recently worked to make the Sierra
Leonean achievement more widely understood and appreciated. 3
But surprising little research on Liberian history has been pub-
lished4 (surprisingly in view of the flowering of African studies in
the United States, where so many of the documentary sources may
1 The work on which this paper is based was begun in the United States
during the summer of 1961 with the assistance of a grant from the Carnegie
Trust for the Universities of Scotland, to whom I wish to express my most
sincere gratitude. An earlier version of the paper appeared in Sierra Leone
Studies, No. 16, June 1962.
2 The French settlement of recaptives at Libreville was on a very much
smaller scale. B. Schnapper, La Politique et le Commerce Frangais dans le
Golfe de Guinee de 1838 a 1871, (Paris & La Haye, 1961), 97 ff. Some
Liberated Africans were also settled in the Gambia, but these settlements were
much more varied in composition.
3 Above all C. H. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (London, 1962).
4 But see D. F. McCall, “Liberia: An Appraisal,” Annals, CCCVI, American
Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1956, I am indebted to Profes-
sor McCall and to other members of Boston University’s African Studies Pro-
gram, for searching criticism of a draft of this paper.
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be found). The present essay (based, on its Liberian side, solely
on a selective reading of printed material), attempts to draw some
comparisons between the experience of the two settlements up to
about 1870, and to suggest possible explanations for their divergent
fortunes thereafter.
The Common Background
The coast along which both states were founded lies within the
tropical forest-belt, south and west of the highlands where the
Niger, Gambia, and Senegal rivers rise. The early European contacts
appear to have occurred towards the close of a period of migration
and dispersion of peoples; in this area the units of political author-
ity were generally small, and there seemed to be great hetero-
geneity of language and culture. The appearance probably exag-
gerated the reality; societies like Poro provided some bonds of
unity across political and even linguistic boundaries, while itinerant
Muslim traders provided contact with the states of the western
Sudan. As the coastal trade with Europe developed, ivory, gold
and hides came down from the interior, while dye-woods were
cut in the coastal forest and trade in pepper led Europeans to coin
the name of “Grain Coast.” But by the eighteenth century the
economy of the region was dominated by the slave trade, although
both the total numbers exported and the proportion of slaves to
total exports were smaller than in other parts of west Africa.
The existence of a subsidiary trade in African produce on a thinly
populated and supposedly fertile coast helps to explain the develop-
ment of African colonization in this particular region. During the
later eighteenth century schemes for commercial and agricultural
development in Africa became increasingly popular with European
businessmen, philanthropists and statesmen. Some of these schemes
included the planting of colonists; and—especially after the dis-
astrous Bulama enterprise of 1792—many people believed the most
suitable colonists would be free or liberated Negroes from outside
Africa. Sierra Leone, promoted by the increasingly active anti-
slavery lobby of English Evangelicals, was the first successful ap-
plication of this idea of associating colonization with the diffusion
of commerce, civilization and Christianity.
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The American Background to Liberia
Parallel ideas were current in the newly independent United
States. From 1786 onwards there were suggestions that American
Negroes should be sent to joint the Colony of Sierra Leone: in 1817
a Congressional Committee urged the newly formed American
Colonization Society to investigate this possibility.5 That Society
preferred an independent settlement of its own; after an unsuccess-
ful attempt on Sherbro Island in 1820, it secured its site at Cape
Mesurado in December 1821. But some of its more earnestly
Evangelical sponsors regarded the new colony as a parallel enter-
prise to Sierra Leone; its growth was expected to assist the civilizing
of Africa, as well as offering Negro emigrants opportunities which
they could not hope to enjoy in the contemporary United States.
Yet these were not the whole purpose of the colonization move-
ment in America, and the complexity of the domestic background
created peculiar difficulties for the Liberian settlements. Granville
Sharp had first promoted colonization in Sierra Leone out of con-
cern for Africans left impoverished in London; but the problems
of free Negroes in the United States soon developed on a far
larger scale. In 1790 there were 59,527, but by 1820 they numbered
233,634 out of a total Negro population of 1,771, 656, and a United
States population of 9,618,000; they were most heavily concentrated
in mid-Atlantic states, north and and south of the Mason-Dixon
line, and to a growing extent in parts of the Middle West. 6 It was
in hope of removing this unassimilated and discordant element from
5 Letters from W. Thornton to J. C. Lettsom, 1786-1789, in T. J. Pettigrew,
Memoirs of Lettsom (London, 1817), II, 497-540. E. L. Fox, The American
Colonization Society, 1817-1840 (Baltimore, 1919), 40-42, 52, 67. C. J. Foster,
“The Colonization of Free Negroes in Liberia,” Journal of Negro History
XXXVIII (1953), 43. Report of Congressional Committee on the Slave Trade,
Feb. 11, 1817, printed in A View of Exertions Lately Made for the Purpose
of Colonizing the Free People of Colour in the United States, in Africa or
Elsewhere (Washington, 1817). On the Colonization Society the best general
source of information, published since this paper was first drafted, is P. J.
Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York,
1961).
6 For general discussion of the problems of free Negroes in this period, see
J. H. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (New York, 1948), ch. XIV.
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United States society—if not to Africa, then to Haiti or some
remote quarter of the American continent—that influential South-
erners like Jefferson, Clay and Randolph (and many Northerners
and Westerners too) supported plans for colonization. 7 While
some colonizationists sincerely hoped to encourage the manumis-
sion of slaves by providing facilities for their expatriation, others
were chiefly anxious to be rid of potential trouble-makers.
The American Colonization Society therefore found itself trying
to achieve varied and even contradictory aims, among which the
hope of developing and civilizing Africa was inevitably pushed
into a subordinate role. Bostonians might support missionary work
in Liberia, and equip colonists with farm implements, books, tools
and printing materials; 8 the officers of the Society were largely
pre-occupied with retaining nation-wide support in the United
States. Too much hostility to slavery would doom the Society
throughout the South; too open an acquiescence would damage
its reputation with Northern reformers. Its compromise position
—
‘neither to destroy nor to perpetuate”9—was actually less morally
equivocal than it sounds; only through such ambiguity could North-
erners and Southerners be drawn to seek a gradual reduction of
slavery. There seemed a genuine possibility that in those border-
states where slavery had already served its economic purpose, the
attractive power of overseas colonies of freed slaves might encour-
age, not merely manumissions by individual proprietors, but the
gradual undermining of slavery itself. 10
This was probably illusory. Even in the border states, support
for colonization seems to have been strong only at periods of racial
tension, such as slave revolts. Such a boom followed Nat Turner s
insurrection of 1831, which killed more than fifty white Virginians;
even here, it was notably stronger in the non-slave-holding sections
of the state. But soon afterwards the great rise in slave-prices
in the cotton states provided a far more profitable channel for
7 Report of inaugural meeting of A.C.S., Dec. 21, 1816, in A View of Exer-
tions
.
. . see B. Dyer, “The Persistence of the Idea of Negro Colonization,”
Pacific Historical Review, XII (1943); Foster, “Colonization,” passim.
8 Staudenraus, Colonization, 121-24.
9 Ibid., 174.
Cf. Fox, Society, 11-12, 113.
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disposing of surplus slaves. 11 At the same time, the impassioned
attacks of W. L. Garrison, who denounced Colonization as a hypo-
critical plan for making the slave system even more secure, swung
many earnest Northern supporters over into the Abolitionist move-
ment, dividing the critics of slavery along partially sectional lines.
During the tensions of the 1850’s and the Civil War itself there
was a somewhat despairing revival of interest, though more in
schemes for re-settlement within the Americas than in specifically
African colonization. Lincoln himself hoped that these might pro-
vide the basis for some humane form of apartheid. 12
In retrospect, all these plans for exporting American racial prob-
lems seem to have been unrealistic, for three good reasons. The
first—the physical and financial problems of providing transport
and reception facilities for a really substantial part of the Negro
population—might theoretically have been overcome, though prac-
tically this never seemed likely. The second reason—the continuing
demand for slave labour in the cotton states, and the consequent
great increase in America's Negro population—might alone have
been decisive. The final crippling difficulty was the reluctance of
free Afro-Americans to leave the country which, despite all their
handicaps and humiliations, they had come to regard as their own.
As early as 1817 Philadelphia Negroes (who had earlier shown
readiness to support “any commercial enterprise desirable for the
purpose of civilizing Africa”), firmly rejected colonization as a
“circuitous route” back to bondage; 13 and later Negro leaders in
the Northern cities, with exceptions like the Reverend Alexander
Crummell, 14 joined the Abolitionists in charging the Colonization
11 S. M. Elkins, Slavery (Chicago, 1959), 209-12.
12 See especially his “Address on Colonization to a Deputation of Negroes,”
Aug. 14, 1862, in R. P. Basler (ed. ), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln
I (5 vols.. New Brunswick, 1953), V, 370-75. J. G. Randall, Lincoln the
President (London, 1945), II, 137-41. For Mid-Western support for coloni-
j
zation, see D. Christy, Ethiopia: Her Gloom and Glory (Cincinnati, 1857),
esp. 250-55, Memorial of March 1, 1855.
13 Staudenraus, Colonization, 34.
14 A. Crummell, The Relations and Duties of Free Colored Men in America
to Africa, (Hartford, 1861); see G. Shepperson, “Notes on Negro American
Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism,” Journal of African
j
History, I (1960), 301-02.
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Society with self-interested hypocrisy. 15 Meanwhile Southern freed-
men “voted with their feet”—in the negative. Voluntary emigrants
to Liberia were usually difficult to obtain, though the number
increased after 1831 (out of fear of reprisals for Turner’s insurrec-
tion), and again in mid-century. 16 The American Colonization
Society estimated that, of 11,909 emigrants sent up to 1866, 4541
were born free, 344 purchased freedom, and 5957 were emancipated
on the express condition that they emigrated. 17
Differences in Immigrant Population
Apologists for Liberian failings have sometimes pointed to the dif-
ficulties of this latter group, suggesting that men suddenly and per-
haps involuntarily transferred from plantation life could hardly be ex-
pected to prove energetic and enterprising citizens of a new frontier
colony in Africa. This may be true; even so, Liberia received more
immigrants with experience of personal freedom in a western
country than Sierra Leone. The most important such group there
was the 1131 Nova Scotians, who arrived together in 1792: they
were an independent-minded community, largely ex-servicemen of
the American war, deeply Evangelical in religion, British in al-
legiance, yet suspicious of British promises. The 550 Maroons who
arrived in 1800 came from a community which had resisted the
Jamaican government intermittently but with success over 140
years; though noted for their discipline and cohesion, they had
known colonial society chiefly as its enemies. The only other Sierra
Leoneans to arrive from outside Africa during the nineteenth cen-
tury came in small groups. Of the “Black Poor” sent by Sharp from
London to the abortive settlement of 1787, Kuckzynski estimates
that no more than 65 survived to join the Colony of 1792; the
15 E.g., S. E. Cornish & T. E. Wright, The Colonization Scheme Considered
in Its Rejection hy the Colored People. . .
.
(Newark, N. J., 1840).
16 Foster, “Colonization,” 55-56. H. H. Bell, “The Negro Emigration Move-
ment, 1849-54,” Phylon, XX (1959). Annual emigration figures are reprinted
by Staudenraus, Colonization
,
251.
17 C. H. Huberich, The Political and Legislative History of Liberia (N. Y.
1947), I, 41. This does not include 1227 sent by the Maryland Colonization
Society to its settlement near Cape Palmas, which was separate until 1857.
On emancipations, see Fox, Society
,
ch. IV; Staudenraus, Colonization, 114.
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Afro-American Paul Cuffee took 38 freedmen to Freetown in 1816;
and throughout the century there was a small trickle of immigrants,
some of them gifted, from the West Indies. 18
Descendants of these settlers long retained some sense of social
superiority; but on the whole it was not they who played the
greatest roles in Sierra Leone’s nineteenth century development.
After Parliament began to legislate against the slave trade, the
Colony received a stream of new settlers in the shape of recaptives
or Liberated Africans; 60,000 arrived up to 1840, Kuckzynski esti-
mates, although only 37,000 were still living there at that date.
Some settled in the new villages of the Sierra Leone peninsula;
others prospered in commerce, not only in Freetown, but along the
whole West African coast; their children, the Creoles, largely pro-
vided West Africa with its first professional class. In Liberia only
5722 recaptives were landed at all, more than 3000 of them in some-
what difficult circumstances in 1860-61. 19 Some of the earlier arrivals
were settled in the village of New Georgia, near Monrovia, de-
scribed by the Agent in 1832 as “the most contented and inde-
pendent of any in the colony . . . rapidly improving in intelligence
and respectability.” Though they inter-married with Americo-
Liberians, and adopted many of their customs, they retained dis-
tinctive institutions too; in 1834 Agent Pinney agreed that Iboes
and Congoes should elect their own headmen.20 Their role in Libe-
rian history has never been studied; but clearly as a community
they do not compare with the dynamic recaptives of Sierra Leone.
One last difference in population was that, whereas Sierra Leone
usually contained something of the order of one hundred European
civilians, there were few white men in Liberia except missionaries
and, in early years, the Colonization Society’s Agents. It is true
18 R. R. Kuckzynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire,
I (Oxford, 1948), 154. On all these groups see C. H. Fyfe, History, passim.
19 Cf. W. D. Boyd, “The American Colonization Society and the Slave
Recaptives of 1860-61
. . .
” Journal of Negro History, XLVII (1962), Ap-
pendix.
20 Huberich, Liberia, ch. XVI. A. Alexander, A History of Colonization on
the Western Coast of Africa (Philadelphia, 1846), 378-79, report by Mechlin,
1832. S. Wilkeson, A Concise History of . . . the American Colonies in Liberia
(Washington, 1839), 56-57, 82. J. W. Lugenbeel, Sketches of Liberia (2d ed.,
Washington, 1953).
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that these pious and dedicated men often played dominant roles:
but after
J. J. Roberts became Governor for the Society in 1841,
the settlement was administered by Americo-Liberians. There is
mention of one white American settler, married to a Negro woman,
and later in the century there were Europeans in charge of German,
Dutch and British trading establishments; but to a greater extent
than their neighbours, Liberians were free from the competition,
advice, and example of resident white laymen.21
Agriculture and Reasons for its Failure
These, broadly, are some of the differences in origin and back-
ground between the two colonies. How did their actual develop-
ment compare? The sponsors of both attached great importance to
the development of agriculture,22 which they hoped would provide
a secure livelihood for the colonists, and a sound Jeffersonian foun-
dation for society: also a flourishing export trade from which some
of them hoped to profit. Jehudi Ashmun, the zealous young clergy-
man who guided Liberia through some of its early difficulties,
found time to write The Liberian Farmer, a pamphlet of simple
practical advice on agricultural methods and the care of possible
crops.23 Though tropical agricultural science was nowhere well
developed at this time, much of Ashmun’s advice seems to have
been quite well adapted to Liberian conditions. In particular, there
seemed to be good prospects of extending the cultivation of the in-
digenous variety of coffee; but it was only when the Ceylon coffee-
leaf disease spread through Asian plantations after 1869 that Libe-
rian coffee was able to make much headway in the world market.
Exports then rose rapidly, according to figures obtained by the
Colonization Society’s Agent in 1892:
—
21 Kuckzynski, Survey, 178-87. H. Bridge, Journal of an African Cruiser
(N. Y. & London, 1845), 33. For an estimate of the number of Europeans in
trade see Liberia (Bulletin of the American Colonization Society), No. 6,
Washington, 1895; letter of Clement Irons.
22 In both countries iron deposits were known to exist from the early nine-
teenth century, but these were left commercially undiscovered and undeveloped
until well into the twentieth century.
23 Reprinted as Appendix 7 to R. R. Gurley, Life of Jehudi Ashmun
(Washington, 1825). Also see 128-33 of the Appendix; Huberich, Liberia, I,
365-66.
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1855: under
1865:
1875: over
1885: over
1892: over
5000 lbs.
23,400 lbs.
100.000 lbs.
800.000 lbs.1,8 ,
lbs.
“There are at present few male citizens who do not own and
operate a coffee plantation,” he reported.24 But this was bonanza
development; a few years later Indonesian producers had re-stocked
their plantations, and the vast development of the Brazilian coffee
industry was under way, supported by foreign capital. Meanwhile
Liberians seem to have done nothing to improve the efficiency of
their plantations or their marketing organization: as so often when
African farmers have sought direct access to world markets, there
were complaints of inadequate or careless preparation of the crop.
As world prices fell from around twenty cents a pound to as low
as five cents, Liberian exports collapsed once more to under 500,000
lbs.25
This is a familiar story in West Africa, very similar indeed to
that of Sierra Leonean ginger. The instability of world prices and
market conditions, rather than physical difficulties or human fail-
ings, have been the chief cause of that failure of peasant agriculture
which foreign observers so regularly regretted.26 Even so, failure
has never been total. Visitors to Liberia in the 1830’s frequently
referred to the spread of cultivation; even in 1849 R. R. Gurley of
the Colonization Society, visiting Liberia as government Commis-
sioner, observed “substantial farmhouses surrounded by well-cleared
and cultivated plantations of from ten to thirty and fifty or seventy
acres,” along the St. Paul’s River and elsewhere.27 But peasant
agriculture was not particularly rewarding. Since many African
food crops were unattractive to America-bred palates, even the
24 Report by Rev. E. E. Smith, Liberia, No. 1, Nov. 1892.
25 Report by G. W. Ellis, Jr., ibid. No. 26, Feb. 1905. Cf. H. H. Johnston,
Liberia (London, 1906), Vol. I, 602-03; G. W. Brown, The Economic History
of Liberia (Washington, 1941), 158, where different figures are cited.
26 Cf. Fyfe, History, 259, 353-54, 466-67.
27 Gurley to Clayton, Feb. 15, 1850 (U.S. Congress; 31st Congress, 1st
Session. Executive Document No. 75). Cf. Huberich, Liberia I, 666 ff;
Buchanan, to A.C.S., May 17, 1839.
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local market was not secure; rice could sometimes be bought more
cheaply from local African producers.28 As in Sierra Leone, far
greater rewards could be achieved by success in commerce. “In
agriculture,” Gurley was told, “little more is done than to supply
ourselves with the necessaries and a few of the conveniences of
life.”
Agriculture might have been made more remunerative by greater
applications of capital and technical skill to sizeable plantations;
but since the available land was limited (especially in Sierra
Leone), this would have involved encouraging social inequalities,
and possibly undue dependence on foreign capitalists. (Liberia
finally decided to face these risks after the first World War). Never-
theless, even in Sierra Leone the nineteenth century saw a few
attempts at larger-scale farming, all more or less abortive: at first
with European capital, later by wealthy Africans like Moses Pindar
Horton and Samuel Lewis.29 In Liberia, where land was less scarce,
immigrants could apparently obtain large holdings more easily and
there may have been ideas of introducing the plantation system
as they had known it in the American South; in 1838 Lewis Sheri-
dan, a wealthy freedman from North Carolina, was granted a long
lease on six hundred acres. But here the labour needed for the
care of crops cost up to sixty cents a day, and was not easy to
come by.30 The reasons for agricultural failure deserve more study;
but clearly no attempt at large-scale farming in either country
achieved sustained success in the nineteenth century.
Transportation: The Steamship
No export trade in perishable agricultural produce could be
expected to flourish without regular transportation facilities to over-
seas markets and sources of credit. In this respect Sierra Leone,
an established port of call for British and other African shipping,
28
J. W. Lugenbeel, Liberia, 15.
29 N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development in West Africa; the Sierra
Leone Experience (London, 1961), 131-36. See Fyfe, History, 354, 422, 490,
506, 525, 536; J. D. Hargreaves, A Life of Sir Samuel Lewis (London, 1958),
26-28.
30 Wilkeson, History, 74. Huberich, Liberia, I, 345-46; 414-17. Bridge,
Journal, 44 ff, 96.
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had certain advantages over Liberia. Voyages to Liberia from
American ports were quite frequent in the early years of the settle-
ments, but many seem to have depended on business provided
by the Colonization Societies on the outward journey, and the
absence of predictable schedules must have impeded any Liberian
attempts to find regular outlets for their exports in the United
States.31 As early as 1822 Ashmun proposed that the Colonization
Society should grant a monopoly of Liberia’s foreign commerce to
the Baltimore Trading Company (in whose service he then was):
they could then stipulate for four regular annual voyages, which
would carry produce, supplies and new colonists on the Society’s
behalf, as well as bringing home camwood from the forests and
produce from the farms. But the Society, anxious to retain its
support from merchants in New York, Philadelphia and Boston as
well as in Baltimore, could not agree to exclude any of these ports
from that Liberian trade whose prospects it was depicting so
favourably.32 In 1846 the Chesapeake and Liberian Trading Com-
pany was founded in Baltimore—evidently as a semi-philanthropic
venture, for there were hopes of attracting Negro capital and
employing Negro crews; but its voyages were somewhat irregular,
and it apparently did not survive the wreck of its ship in 1853.33
By this time, steamship promoters were preparing to enter the
west African trade. In August 1850 the Naval Committee of the
House of Representatives supported a proposal from the Coloniza-
tion Society that the United States should subsidize the develop-
ment of quarterly steamship service to West Africa from New York,
Baltimore, and New Orleans, on the grounds that this would both
encourage steamship construction in the United States and assist
colonization and American commerce in Liberia.34 But it was the
African Steamship Company which, in 1852, included Liberian
31 Mr. G. H. Brooks, Jr., although he does not discuss trade with Liberia
in his doctoral thesis on “American Legitimate Trade with West Africa, 1789-
1914” (Boston University, 1962), suggests that many American merchants
avoided the settlements because of doubts as to their credit-worthiness.
32 Gurley, Ashmun, 117, 161; App., 39-44. Staudenraus, Colonization,
158-61.
33 G. S. Stockwell, The Republic of Liberia (New York, 1868), 222-27.
34 U.S. Congress. Report of the Naval Committee to the House of Rep-
resentatives, August 1850.
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ports in the slower of its new scheduled steamship services from
Britain; after 1879 the house of Woermann, already active in Libe-
rian trade, introduced steam services from Hamburg and with
their help developed a commanding position in Liberian trade.35
This orientation of Liberian trade and communications towards
Europe may have tended to discourage the inflow of commercial
capital, and possibly immigrants, from the United States.
These steamship voyages began about the time when Liberians
were beginning to build their own sailing ships, capable not only
of coastal voyages but of reaching Liverpool and New York; and
it has been argued that the steamers ruined this most promising
development of Liberian enterprise.36 But, even if it is assumed
that these new products of Western technology might have been
permanently excluded from Liberia, it is difficult to see that these
enterprising local shippers could ever have secured more than a
limited share of their own country’s carrying trade, or that the
re-investment of their profits would have been sufficient to trigger
off real economic growth in other sections of the Liberian economy.
On the other hand, the new cheap and regular transport services
lowered the costs of taking Liberian produce to world markets,
and, in the short run at least, made it easier for small African
traders to compete directly in that trade. If prices to producers
fell at this time, this was not due to the steamers—logical though
it might seem locally to blame them—but to the instability of world
market prices, already identified as perhaps the major handicap
to West African economic development.
Comparison of African Commercial Enterprise
This point is underlined if the progress of Liberian commerce
is compared with that of Sierra Leone. Many friends of the Libe-
rians were confident that they would prosper more than their
neighbours, since their independent status enabled them to protect
themselves against foreign competition. By the constitution of 1847,
citizenship in Liberia was restricted to “persons of colour,” and
35 P. E. Schramm, Deutschland und Vhersee (Braunschweig, 1950), 237-43,
372-73.
33 Brown, Liberia
,
118, 134-35, 141-42; McCall, Liberia
,
90.
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restrictions were placed upon the commercial activities of for-
eigners. At first the external trade of Sierra Leone had indeed been
virtually a British monopoly. But after the failure of Macaulay
and Babington in 1827, few European firms of any size traded
directly in Sierra Leone until late in the century; instead, foreign
capital was used tp extend commercial credit to independent Free-
town merchants. Liberated Africans, prospering by their enterprise
in retail trade, increasingly moved into larger operations and used
steamships to develop direct connections with European exporters.
The very dependence of the Sierra Leone economy upon Great
Britain thus assisted the rise of a well-to-do African commercial
class, who played such a notable part in diffusing the cultural and
commercial influence of the Colony not only in the immediate
vicinity, but on the lower Niger and through much of West Africa.37
It seems that the Liberians may have got off to a quicker start
than the Sierra Leoneans in reaping what Ashmun called “the
precarious gains of this country traffic.” In 1831 a new colonist
commented on how quickly young settlers learned “drive as hard
a bargain, as any roving merchant from the land of steady habits,
with his assortment of tin ware, nutmegs, books or dry goods.” The
sentiment will be familiar to any student of nineteenth century
Sierra Leone but hardly at such an early date. There are references
to substantial fortunes made by such men as
J. J.
Boberts, first
President of the Bepublic; the Reverend C. M. Waring, a Baptist
preacher turned trader; Sheriff Francis Devaney, who declared
in 1830 that he would not accept $20,000 for his business; and
Colonel Hicks, a former slave from Kentucky turned commission
merchant, who in 1844 impressed American naval officers by his
gracious hospitality.38 But it is notable that these names rarely
appear among the prominent Liberians of later generations. (If
Liberian history were studied with the painstaking attention to
biographical and family history that Mr. Fyfe has devoted to
37 C. H. Fyfe, History, 266-67 & passim; also his “Four Sierra Leone Recap-
tives,” Journal of African History, II (1961); “The Life and Times of John
Ezzidio,” Sierra Leone Studies, IV ( 1955 ) ; “European and Creole Influences
in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone before 1896,” VI ( 1956 )
.
38 Staudenraus, Colonization, 153-55; Alexander, Colonization, 338 ff;
Bridge, Journal, 96-98.
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Sierra Leone, we might learn a great deal about the subsequent
decline )
.
Trade figures are too unreliable for precise comparison; but in
1831 and 1832 Liberian exports were estimated, respectively, at
$125,549 and $88,911, compared to figures for Sierra Leone of
£81,000 and £58,920. Moreover, much of the profit of Sierra
Leone’s trade still went to Europeans. Very roughly, Sierra Leone
was exporting over three times as much as Liberia, though her
settled population was more than ten times as large. Since literary
evidence suggests that agriculture for the local market was at this
time more productive in Liberia, it seems that settlers there still
enjoyed appreciably higher standards of income per head. As
outward signs of this, Monrovia, during the 1830’s and ’40’s, was
building churches and schools, public offices and frame-houses of
distinctive architectural style. There were libraries and debating
societies; the Liberia Herald was well-established as a newspaper
at a time when Sierra Leone’s Gazette had ceased publication.
Comparing the two colonies in 1834, F. H. Rankin concluded that
“the American settlement is decidedly far in the advance with
regard to intellectual cultivation.” But he noted that the Liberians,
unlike the majority of Sierra Leoneans, had brought with them
from America “a stock of civil and social knowledge, as well as an
impulse to improvement,” and rightly foresaw changes in the
relative condition of the two settlements.39
During the second half of the century, these changes were re-
flected in comments by foreign observers. Though reliable figures
are hard to find, it seems clear that Liberia’s foreign trade devel-
oped slowly after 1850, while Sierra Leone’s increased appreciably
though erratically.40 By the 1870’s visitors were no longer praising
the enterprise of Liberian traders; they rather tended to complain
that a commercial oligarchy was controlling the trade and govern-
ment of the state. Winwood Reade, in 1870, was well-disposed to-
wards the Liberians, and he conceded that their settlements were
“respectable and well-ordered”: but he feared that their economy
was stagnant and that
39 F. H. Rankin, The White Mans Grave (London, 1836), 1, 36-40.
40 Cox-George, Finance, 142-44.
Papers in African History 71
Nothing can save them from perdition except the throwing open
of the land; the free admission of European traders and of negro
settlers from Sierra Leone; or in other words, the free admission
of capital and labour. 41
External Support and Finance
Some conditions which may explain why Liberia fell behind nine-
teenth-century Sierra Leone in wealth and influence have already
been mentioned; but possibly the most important was her ambigu-
ous relationship to the United States. The original aim of the
Colonization Society was to win substantial financial support from
the Federal government; hence its efforts to appease all sections of
the country, so that it could claim nation-wide public approval.
But its purpose was too controversial to succeed; not only was its
attitude to slavery unacceptable both in New England and in the
Deep South, but the proposals for Federal aid touched off con-
troversies about the proper power of the Federal government. Sub-
sidies were indeed secured for the re-settlement of Liberated Afri-
cans, totalling $264,710 in the years 1819-29. Thanks to the efforts of
W. H. Crawford, President Monroe’s Secretary of the Treasury,
these funds were used indirectly to assist the settlement of Americo-
Liberians also; in particular they subsidized the fortification of
Monrovia, and military operations against slave-dealers which made
the colony’s power respected in the 1820’s. But not until 1858, on
the eve of the Civil War, were new Federal funds obtained by the
Society; these were to assist emigration, and could not be applied
directly to support the government of Liberia. State governments
at various times gave some assistance to emigration; Maryland
voted its State Colonization Society a total of $443,883 over the
period 1831-57. But essentially the Society’s funds depended on
private contributions, which they always knew to be “inadequate
to the consummation of our design.” Hence from the 1830’s the
Liberian settlements found they had to bear the expenses of their
own government—not as a matter of principle, but because little
American money was available.42
41 W. W. Reade, The African Sketchbook (London, 1873), 11, 260; see
his letter encl. in C.O. 267/313, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, Feb. 28,
1871.
42 Staudenraus, Colonization, 24 ff; 50-58; 150-51; 178; 242-46; 118; 224-25.
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It may be objected that the government of Sierra Leone too was
expected to be financially self-supporting. This was certainly the
ruling principle of the nineteenth century Treasury, but it was not
completely applied. The Liberated African Department received
grants totalling over £,350,000 during the century; the ordinary civil
budget received substantial subsidies during the early years of
Crown Colony government; and even after Treasury control was
tightened in the 1860s, it could still exact a reluctant grant-in-aid
if that seemed the only means by which a respectable government
could be carried on. Larger still was the British government’s mili-
tary expenditure in Sierra Leone; as Dr. Cox-George has pointed
out, this represented a substantial injection of purchasing power
into the economy, as well as a direct reinforcement of governmental
power. 43 Finally, there were concealed subsidies not appearing in
the colonial accounts—notably the cost of local naval operations
against slave-traders and in support of legitimate commerce. In
all these ways, the British government contributed heavily to the
establishment of ordered government and the expansion of Sierra
Leonean influence.
Lacking such support, the Liberians could hope to finance a
government capable of protecting an expanding trade only by
imposing customs duties. It was the reluctance of foreign merchants
to recognize the validity of duties imposed by a government spon-
sored only by the American Colonization Society which prompted
the proclamation of Liberia as an independent Republic in 1847.44
But this solved no problems. Merchants trading on the long coast-
line claimed by the new state would not willingly accept taxation
without some return, notably in the form of protection against those
coastal Africans who had long regarded it as their prescriptive
right to plunder vessels wrecked or stranded on their shores. Yet
the Liberian government could not provide effective protection
without receiving funds to build up military, police and preventive
services. As a beginning, it attempted in 1865 to confine foreign
trade to six ‘ports of entry”; predictably, chiefs and traders alike
Fox, Society
,
57 ff. J. H. T. MacPherson, History of Liberia (Baltimore, 1891),
31 ff.
43 Cox-George, Finance, ch. 6 and p. 164.
44 Cf. Huberich, Liberia, I, ch. V.
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resented and evaded this restriction, (which some alleged was de-
signed to strengthen the “merchant oligarchy” in these six Liberian
ports).45 Foreign merchants continued to trade outside Liberia’s
fiscal control; but they nevertheless held the Liberian government
responsible when their property was violated, sometimes invoking
I
the coercive power of their own governments. To escape from this
financial deadlock, President Roye in 1870 sought a loan in London;
but the inexperienced Liberians were cheated by unscrupulous,
financiers, and received little concrete return for the new embarrass-
ments brought by a public debt. 46
Liberian Relations with Indigenous Africans
Given better and stronger government (and the stimulus of more
readily accessible export markets), Liberia might have hoped to
achieve at least as much as Sierra Leone in the way of commercial
and cultural penetration of its hinterland. The political fragmenta-
tion of the hinterland created especial difficulties for both settle-
ments, but from early times Liberians were trying to overcome
them. Ashmun believed that missionary schools for aboriginal chil-
dren might provide an effective instrument of “civilization,” and
substantial numbers of boys do seem to have attended such schools.
Even more important as a channel for the communication of tech-
niques and beliefs was the practice, early established in Liberia
as in Sierra Leone, by which settler families would receive local
children into their homes. Enemies of the settlement claimed that
this relationship could become tantamount to slavery, and un-
doubtedly it was exploited as a cheap form of labour; but the
A.C.S. Agent, Rev. E. E. Smith, warmly defended the practice in
i. 1892:
In the families of the Liberian farmers native boys are brought up
to manual labour and become efficient farmers; the girls are taught
45 Johnston, Liberia, I, 248, 350-2. Reade, Sketchbook, 11, 257.
46 Johnston, Liberia, I, ch. XV; R. L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa
(N.Y. 1928), 11, 796-97. A critic suggests that, in view of Liberia's “low
credit-rating,” this loan was actually “a regular business transaction conducted
according to the standards of the time.” I accept the point, but see no reason
to modify the language used above. Sierra Leone, though it did not find loans
easy to come by, was of course protected from such “regular business transac-
i tions” by the dependence of its government on Whitehall.
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housework. A small proportion of these young people are taught
to read and write, and some of them become prominent citizens of
the State.
Smith estimated that there were over 3,000 youths in settler homes,
and that they remained there for an average period of seven years,
after which some would start farms of their own. 47 It seems clear
that a study of social intercourse and inter-marriage between
settlers and indigenous peoples might surprise many who gen-
eralize about supposedly superior settler attitudes; and this might
apply to Sierra Leone as well as to Liberia.
Early Agents of the Colonization Society sponsored some explora-
tory journeys inland, and signed treaties, notably with the chief
of the “Condo” confederacy at Boporo, north of Monrovia.48 At the
same time the Colonization Society was building great hopes on the
arrival in Liberia of Abdul Rahman, an elderly slave who claimed
descent from the founder of the Fula state in Futa Jalon.49 Abdul
Rahman died without leaving the coast, and Boporo became hostile
in the 1830’s; but some commercial contacts continued, and bred
hopes of finding mines and great markets. From the 1860’s Liberian
governments, like their Sierra Leone neighbours, began to encour-
age exploring journeys; the most notable, that of Benjamin Ander-
son, reached a Mandinka town called Musardu in the highlands
now in southern Guinea.50 E. W. Blyden, already a prominent
though controversial figure in Liberia, was at that time preaching
in both countries the importance of developing relations with the
Muslim states of the western Sudan.
Liberia’s International Weakness
But it was along the coast, where revenue might be quickly
collected, that the Liberians ( like British colonial governments
later), were most active in claiming sovereignty. Ashmun’s vigorous
47 Report of Rev. E. E. Smith, Liberia, No. I, Nov. 1892.
48 Gurley, Ashmun, 364; App. 26-38, 80-89. Alexander, Colonization,
260-61; lohnston, Liberia, I (Nov. 1892), 148.
49 Staudenraus, Colonization, 162-64.
50 B. Anderson, Narrative of a Journey to Musardu, (N.Y., 1870). Mr.
Svend Holsoe of Boston University has identified Musardu as Moussadougou,
north of Beyla.
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assaults upon neighbouring slave-traders had initially given Liberia
a good name among British anti-slavery men, though this was
tarnished for some by Garrison’s attacks. In the early 1830’s a British
African Colonization Society planned to plant its own sister colony
of American Negroes at Cape Mount; in 1850 Lord Shaftesbury
and Samuel Gurney helped collect £1,000 to assist Liberia to buy
the coastline between Cape Mount and Sherbro Island.51 As late
as 1865 the prospects for a Liberian “pax” seemed good enough
for the Chairman of a British Parliamentary Committee to toy with
the notion of transferring the Sherbro to her flag.52 But when the
Liberians tried to assert their authority in 1860 they were resisted
by the most influential ruler on this coast, Manna of the Gallinas,
with strong encouragement from
J.
M. Harris, a British trader who
was beginning to develop trade there. Manna’s resistance encour-
aged the government of Sierra Leone to exert more active influence
on this coast; after prolonged and sterile negotiations, they used
the power of the Royal Navy to impose a settlement unfavorable
to Liberia in 1884.53 It is doubtful whether Sierra Leone’s claim
to these countries was better grounded in treaties and consent than
Liberia’s; the decisive factor was naval power. A period in African
history was opening when local disputes were sometimes decided
by armed strength on the spot; in such strength Liberia remained
notably deficient.
American friends of Liberia claimed that its settlers enjoyed a
freedom, under government of their own people, such as they could
not hope to secure in the contemporary United States. “The adult
male inhabitants consider themselves men, and know how to enjoy
the blessings of a free institution,” a ship’s captain reported in 1830;
and it was no liberated slave but a former barber from upstate New
York who wrote in 1865 “the ponderous weight of human bondage
51 T. Hodgkin, An Enquiry into the . . . African Colonization Society
.
. .
an Account of the British African Colonization Society (London, 1833), John-
ston, Liberia, I, 226-27; Christy, Ethiopia, 177-79.
52 Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Vol. V: Adderley’s questions, and replies of
Burton (2534-42); Wylde (2767-71); Wildman (3706-28); Chinery (5128-
39); Bradshaw (6906-17).
53 For this boundary dispute, see John D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Parti-
tion of West Africa (London, 1963), 45-47, 85-88, 240-43.
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has rolled off from my soul.”54 Nineteenth century Sierra Leoneans
too enjoyed important liberties—in theory, the liberties of British
subjects: but in practice these were often very restrictively defined
by colonial legislation, and they never included the basic liberty
of self-government. For Liberia, however, the price of freedom was
political and economic weakness. And by the end of the nineteenth
century, weakness had become so dangerous that only the counter-
balancing forces of inter-power rivalry (sometimes brought skilfully
into play by Liberian governments intent on survival), saved that
freedom from being lost.
54 Capt. W. E. Sherman to E. Hallowell, 10 May 1830, in Third Annual
Report, Connecticut Colonization Society (New Haven, 1830), appendix;
H. W. Johnson, Jr., quoted Stockwell, Republic, 193-96. Buell, II, 733-34.
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The story of the involvement of the United States Navy in the
suppression of the African slave trade is not generally known. It
is the purpose of this paper to describe its role in the fight against
that trade on the west coast of Africa. On June 5, 1843 the frigate
Saratoga left New York under the command for Commodore Mat-
thew Perry, later commander of the first U.S. Naval Mission to
Japan, 1852-1854. 1 The Saratoga was the first flagship of the newly-
commissioned United States African Squadron. 2
The hopes of many men went with the Saratoga. To some in
Washington, the ship symbolized the fulfillment of a dream to place
the United States in the van of the battle against the slave trade.
For the Saratoga this was the maiden voyage, and nearly all signs
pointed to a successful one. The ship sailed across the Gulf Stream
logging prodigious distances for such a heavily gunned frigate
(once in twenty-four hours it made two hundred and fifty miles3 ).
On June 23, the frigate rounded the headlands of the Cape Verdes
and anchored off Teneriffe.4 On July 13, Perry took the Saratoga
to meet the other ships of the Squadron, the Macedonian
,
the
Decatur
,
and the Porpoise
,
to cruise off the Guinea coast.5
I
The commissioning of the African Squadron was an event with
a considerable history. In 1807 President Jefferson had signed the
1 E. M. Barrows, The Great Commodore (New York, 1935), 160-61, 212 ff.
2 Perry to Upshur, lune 5, 1843, in M. C. Perry, Letters to the Secretary
of the Navy, Apr. 10, 1843—Apr. 29, 1845 (Washington, National Archives
Microfilm, FM 89, Roll 101, 1949); Barrows, Great Commodore, 161. Here-
after, first references to the microfilmed letters of the respective squadron
commanders to the Secretary of the Navy will be cited as LSN, followed by
inclusive dates, then WNAM, followed by FM and Roll numbers. Succeeding
references will cite the Squadron Commander, followed by the word “Letters.”
3 Barrows, Great Commodore, 161.
4 Perry to Upshur, June 29, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
Perry to Upshur, July 13, 1843 and Aug. 3, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
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Slave Importation Prohibition Act; 6 but like most laws, the Act was
merely a scrap of paper without the willingness and means to
enforce it. Jefferson’s policy of a small coastal Navy left America
with little power on the high seas, and the slave trade continued
almost unabated. Indeed, President Madison found it so serious
that he mentioned the continuing problem in his Annual Message of
1810. 7 In 1816, the African Society of London estimated that 15,000
slaves were being taken annually from Africa to America, a quarter
of the total number taken from that continent each year. 8
The explanation for this prolonged defiance of the law in the
United States was simple. After the Revolution, the American South
had turned from growing rice, tobacco and indigo to cotton, which
far more than the former staples required slave labor to make it
economically successful. Consequently, after 1807 the trade in
African slaves continued by smuggling, which (as had been true in
Colonial New England) was winked at by almost everyone. In
1819, for instance, three American schooners were captured coming
back from the “Havana run” with one hundred and seven slaves.
However, the Federal Judge at Mobile, after condemning the ships,
“reserved” for future order the disposition of the slaves—which
involved placing them indefinitely in the hands of three bondsmen
who happened to be friends of his. Nothing was done to the slave-
traders.9
Great Britain, meanwhile, had not been idle in its efforts to stop
the slave trade. By 1820 it had, by treaty and convention, bound
nearly every major maritime power in the world to suppress the
trade; and from many of them it had gained the right to stop and
search their merchant vessels for slaves. 10 Most of the major
maritime powers had in addition joined in the establishment of
6 W. E. B. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the
United States of America 1683-1870 (Cambridge, 1896), 108.
7 Ibid., 111.
8 Ibid., 110.
9 Ibid., 117.
10 H. G. Soulsby, The Right of Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-
American Relations 1814-1862 (Baltimore, 1933), 14; DuBois, Suppression,
133-35; C. Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade (London, 1949), 62.
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mixed courts. 11 In all of these agreements, however, the United
States was conspicuously absent.
Smarting from the Treaty of Ghent ( where no mention had been
made of the issue of impressment, over which it had avowedly
fought the War of 1812), the United States refused to sign a treaty
involving the “right of search.” It found little meaning in Castle-
reagh’s distinction between “belligerent” right of search (impress-
ment) and “reciprocal” right, limited to the detection of slavers.
This dispute over the right of search was to affect Anglo-American
relations for nearly fifty years; one of its offspring was to be the
African Squadron.
The differences of view were fundamental. It was obvious to
British statesmen that unless every nation granted a right of search,
all slavers would merely flock under the wings of those who refused.
The United States, on the other hand, had an economy based on
agriculture, not machines. In addition, it had a chip-on-the-shoulder
attitude characteristic of short men and emergent nations. It had
lost face in the recent war over a demand which Britain now
wanted it to accede to in peace, in order to stop a practice which
many interests did not want to stop. 12 When John Quincy Adams
was asked by George Canning whether he could conceive of a more
atrocious evil than the slave trade, he replied:
Yes. Admitting the right of search by foreign officers of our vessels
upon the seas in time of peace; for that would be making slaves of
ourselves. 13
11 Soulsby, Right of Search, 14. A “mixed court” was a special tribunal
staffed by citizens of the treaty signatories to adjudicate cases arising from
the capture of slavers.
12 Even John Quincy Adams himself had once said: “Slavery in a moral
sense is an evil, but in connection with commerce it has its uses.” S. F. Bemis,
John Quincu Adams and the Foundation of American Foreign Policu (New
York, 1949), 122.
13 Adams to Channing, June 29, 1822, in J. Q. Adams, Memoirs of John
Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1875), VI, 37. On another occasion, Lord
Palmerston had expressed the British point of view with equal candor:
“.
. . to appoint a commission to inquire whether the right of search is essential
for the suppression of the slave trade is about as rational as appointing a
commission to enquire whether two and two make four.” Quoted by Soulsby,
Right of Search, 25.
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Consequently, the negotiations between the two countries over
the issue were hardly fruitful. When the Foreign Secretary, Castle-
reagh, in 1823 raised the subject of a mutual right of search treaty,
Adams, then Secretary of State, replied with a denunciation of the
practice of boarding on the high seas in peacetime. 14 Castlereagh
for his part had refused even to renounce the principle of impress-
ment. 15
While these negotiations were proceeding, developments within
the United States were altering the character of the Law of 1807.
Already the internal slavery question was becoming a heated issue,
dividing the country along sectional lines. Commercial and farming
elements in the North, who were to wink at conditions amounting
to virtual slavery forty years later, were in 1818 horrified at the
Southern practice and determined that it should not spread. The
colonization movement to return freed slaves to Africa was well
developed, fostered by Northern humanitarians and Southerners
who feared the influence of the freedmen on the slave population.
In 1819, therefore, the Slave Trade Act was passed directing the
President to use armed cruisers on the coasts of the United States
and Africa in order to suppress the slave trade. At the same time the
foundation of the future state of Liberia was provided for, to serve
as a haven for the “safe keeping, support and removal beyond the
limits of the United States” of all slaves freed by the cruisers. 16 An
initial appropriation of $100,000 was made to enforce the Act. In
1820 an amendment was added making slave trading an act of
piracy, punishable by death. 17
The Americans were, therefore, in a position to “show the flag”
and with it their determination to stop the trade at its source. But
14 Adams to Hugh Nelson, U.S. Minister in London, Apr. 28, 1823, in
J. Q. Adams, The Writings of John Quincy Adams (New York, 1917), VII,
398-99.
15 Soulsby, Right of Search, 18.
16 DuBois, Suppression, 121.
17 For the Act’s provisions, see Statutes at Large of the United States
(Boston, 1855), III, 532-34. While Congress passed this “Piracy Act,” the
United States never signed a treaty to this effect; such an action would have
submitted it to a “law of nations” and made its ships subject to search. See
Squadron Order dated Jan. 17, 1849, in B. Cooper, LSN, Nov. 22, 1848
—
Sept. 3, 1949 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 104).
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this precursor of the African Squadron hardly showed that determi-
nation. Only occasional cruisers were despatched to the coast of
Africa, where they remained for only a few weeks at a time. 18
In addition, international complications hindered suppression of
the trade. American and foreign slavers, heretofore accustomed to
fly American colors with immunity, merely switched to Spanish
colors when the American cruisers appeared. The first cruiser
reported what was to become the common pattern:
... we [the ship Cyane ] have made ten captures, some by fair
sailing, others by boats and stratagem. Although they are evidently
owned by Americans, they are so completely covered by Spanish
papers that it is impossible to condemn them. . . . The slave trade
is carried on to a very great extent. There are probably no less than
three hundred vessels on the coast engaged in that traffic, each
having two or three sets of papers. 19
When the cruiser Cyane captured and sent to New York a Spanish
slaver, the Spanish Minister lodged a stiff protest. Even worse, when
in 1821 the Alligator captured and sent to New York four slavers
under French colors but which she strongly suspected were Ameri-
cans, the French Minister raised such a tempest that Adams gave
the French in February 1822 a blanket repudiation of Americas
intention to commit such acts again in peacetime.20 Indeed, the
instructions to the Commanders before leaving for the African coast
had been from the beginning very explicit in that respect:
Whatever well-grounded suspicions you may entertain [that a vessel
had been fitted out and intended for piracy] you will not molest her,
unless you have satisfactory evidence that she has either attempted
or actually commited some piratical aggression on some merchant
vessel of the United States.21
Meanwhile, the Congress was proving more cautious than the
Executive over the slave suppression issue. In 1824, negotiations
18 List of cruisers and captures in Appendix A. The Schooner Alligator, for
instance, remained on the Coast from November to December 1821, while the
Schooner Shark was there only from September to November of the same year.
19 Captain Edward Tranchard, Captain of the Ship Cyane, to the Secretary
of the Navy, Apr. 10, 1820, in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 95.
20 Soulsby, Right of Search, 23. In spite of this, 600 slaves were retaken and
eleven slavers captured through the end of 1821: DuBois, Suppression, 126.
21 Navy Department to Perry, May 29, 1819, cited by Bemis, Adams, 424n.
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between Secretary Adams’ Minister and George Canning, the new
British Foreign Secretary, resulted in the Anglo-American Treaty,
which for the first time included a carefully circumscribed right-of-
search provision.22 But the Senate, still jealous of American rights
on the high seas, altered the treaty by so many amendments to
which the British could not possibly agree, that it was never
ratified.23 Shortly thereafter, the American cruisers were recalled
from the African coast.24
Within a decade President Jackson placed the final capstone on
this policy of intransigence. In 1834 his Secretary of State informed
the British Minister, Sir Charles Vaughn, that the policy had been
formed “not to make the United States a party to any convention
on the subject of the slave trade.”25
The results of this policy were soon evident. The slave trade
gradually became an American business. One authority estimates
that between 1820 and the repudiation of the Treaty of 1824 the
annual slave traffic to the Americas never exceeded 40,000; but by
1837, the American importation had reached as high as 200,000 a
year.26 As all the maritime powers, one after another, submitted to
the British power of search, and as the first countries began signing
equipment treaties, the American flag was becoming the last haven
of the pirates.27 Even Governor Thomas Buchanan of Liberia was
moved to say:
22 Bemis, Adams, 432-33.
23 Ibid., 434-35. Desire on the part of some Senators to deprive Adams of a
diplomatic triumph in a Presidential election year also played a part.
24 Lloyd, Navy, 52. An occasional cruiser was sent to show the flag, how-
ever. See African Repository and Colonial Journal, CXXVII (Sept. 1835),
265-66.
25 Forsyth to Vaughn, Oct. 4, 1834, cited in Soulsby, Right of Search, 45.
26 DuBois, Suppression, 143. American apathy was not the only reason for
the increase. Cotton supplied the growing market for slaves, and the increasing
risk of slaving supplied the incentive to staggering prices and profits. Slaves
brought anywhere from $500 to $1200 in the period 1840-1860. (Ibid., 162;
Soulsby, Right of Search, 43n.) As a slaver himself pointed out: “It was an
old maxim of the British excise men that no trade could be prohibited when
its profits were more than thirty percent. The profits of a successful slaving
voyage were a hundred and fifty, two hundred, two hundred and fifty percent.”
B. Mayer, Adventures of an African Slaver (New York, 1928), xviii.
27 DuBois, Suppression, 143; Soulsby, Right of Search, 46. “Equipment
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The chief obstacle to the success of the very active measures
pursued by the British Government for the suppression of the slave
trade on the coast, is the American Flag. Never was the proud
banner of freedom so extensively used by those pirates upon liberty
and humanity. . . ,28
Toward the end of the 1830’s, it became apparent that the
British were determined to stop the wholesale flight of slavers to
the Stars and Stripes. American names began to appear on British
prize lists. It was an entirely unofficial affair; British officers simply
took matters into their own hands and boarded American vessels
which looked suspicious. If nothing was found, the result was
usually an indignant protest to the British government when the
) Yankee captain reached home waters. It did no good, for the
British had followed up their blunt use of naval power with a tidy
diplomatic theory. The distinction, they maintained in 1841, lay
between the "right of search,” which they no longer demanded, and
1 the "right of visit,” which they claimed was a just and proper
method of veryifying, by inspection of papers only, the nationality
of a vessel. It involved no more than a single British officer, of the
rank of lieutenant at least, entering only the cabin of the subject
I vessel.29
In American minds there was no difference between the two, but
in the British view, there was a world. In a note to our Minister in
1841, Lord Aberdeen wrote that Great Britain renounced
... all pretension to visit and search American vessels in time of
peace. Nor is it as American that such vessels are ever visited;
but it has been the invariable practice of the British Navy ... to
ascertain by visit the real nationality of merchant vessels met with
on the high seas, if there were good reason to apprehend their
illegal character.30
Treaties” allowed the naval ships to seize suspected slavers if they possessed
the equipment for transporting slaves (uncommon numbers of fresh water
casks, chains, etc. ) . Heretofore, only the presence of slaves on board had made
seizure legal.
28 Quoted by A. H. Foote, Africa and the American Flag (New York,
1854), 152.
29 R. W. Van Alstyne, “British Right of Search and the African Slave
Trade,” Journal of Modern History, II (1930), 37.
30 Cited in ibid., 38. This was no idle statement. In 1816 the British
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The right of search issue was not the only point of friction
between England and the United States, however. There was in
addition a serious dispute over the sinking of the American steamer
Caroline in 1837, as well as the controversies over the Maine
boundary and the Oregon Territory. Indeed, Mr. Andrew Stevenson,
the American Minister in London in 1841, wrote to the State
Department that “there seems to be a general impression that war
is inevitable.”31
II
While statesmen were quibbling over the semantics of “search”
versus “visit,” two more practical men were solving the problem of
the right of search in a simple but effective way. Their solution was
to have far-reaching consequences.
In 1840 Lieutenant Paine of the United States Ship Grampus
had been sent as a token patroller on the African coast, as specified
by the Act of 1819. But Paine looked on the assignment not as a
symbol, but rather as an opportunity to help rid the Atlantic of
an infamous trade. The ship made for Sierra Leone, where Paine
signed an agreement for a joint-cruising expedition with Com-
mander Tucker of the Royal Navy. It was established that each
should be authorized
... to detain all vessels under American colors, found to be fully
equipped for, and engaged in, the Slave Trade; that, if proved to
be American property, they shall be handed over to the United
States’ schooner Grampus, or any other American cruiser, and that
if proved to be Spanish, Portuguese, Brazilian, or English property,
to any of Her Britannic Majesty’s cruisers employed on the West
Coast of Africa for the suppression of the Slave Trade .32
The agreement was a success. In the days before underwater
cables, it took weeks at best for a message to be answered. The
Admiralty had issued a circular to all its cruisers to the effect that the right of
search, being a belligerent right, had ceased with the war. H. Wheaton,
Enquiry into the Validity of the British Claim to a Right of Visitation and
Search of American Vessels Suspected to be Engaged in the African Slave
Trade (Philadelphia, 1842), 35.
31 Stevenson to Forsyth, Mar. 9, 1841, ibid., 52.
32 Quoted in E. D. Adams, “Lord Ashburton and the Treaty of Washing-
ton," American Historical Review, XVII (July, 1912), 771.
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American government, of course, gave orders to put a stop to the
venture as soon as it heard of it, fearing that it conceded too much
of the British claim.33 But the orders did not come until several
vessels had been captured, and both governments had come to be
fully aware of the value of joint cruising. Therefore, when the
British government sent Lord Ashburton to Washington in 1824 to
negotiate the differences between the two governments, he was
prepared to suggest a compromise which he knew would be suc-
cessful—because it had already been tried on the African coast.
Moreover, he had an understanding of a changed situation. The last
thirty years, he knew, had seen the United States grow into a formi-
dable naval power. The issue of impressment had died,34 and Ash-
i burton was not one to live in the past. His American counterpart,
Daniel Webster, was equally aware of the implications of the new
balance of power: “We are no longer a minor commercial power,
nor do we know that we have any particular exemption from war, if
war should again break out,” he told the British Minister.35 Both
negotiators had studied the Paine-Bell Report suggesting joint
cruising on the African coast,36 and this became the basis of
;
discussion and final agreement in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of
1 1842. The negotiations led to the formation of the African Squadron
as one of the provisions of that Treaty.
Specifically, Webster committed his country to the principle of
33 Soulsby, Right of Search, 56.
34 Adams, “Lord Ashburton,” 775, quotes the minister in a letter to Aber-
j
deen explaining his stand: “Impressment as a system, is an anomaly hardly
(
bearable by our people. To a foreigner it is undeniable tyranny, which can
only be imposed on him by force. Our last war
.
. . may perhaps have justified
violence. America was comparatively weak, and was forced for some years
to submit.
. . . But the proportions of power are altered. The population of
America has more than doubled since the last war, and that war has given
her a Navy. . . . Under these circumstances can impressment ever be repeated?
I apprehend nobody in England thinks it can.”
35 Lloyd, Navy, 55-56.
36 “We are of the opinion that a squadron should be kept on the coast of
Africa to cooperate with the British or other nations interested in stopping the
slave trade; and that the most efficient mode would be, for vessels to cruise in
couples, one of each nation. . . .” Quoted in Adams, “Lord Ashburton,” 774.
The Bell of “Paine-Bell” was Lieutenant Paine’s second-in-command during
the cruise in 1840.
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joint cruising between an American squadron and a corresponding
British force, in substitution for the principle of the right of search.
Each country was to supply a squadron whose force totalled eighty
guns at all times on the African coast. Article VIII stipulated that
the two squadrons were to be independent of each other, but the
two governments were to “give such orders to the officers command-
ing their respective forces, as shall enable them most effectually
to act in concert and cooperation, upon mutual consultation, as
exigencies may arise.”37
In theory, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was the perfect solution.
But theory turned out to be quite different from the fact, and even
before Commodore Perry sailed, the first troubles had begun.
Ill
It had been evident since the first few years after the passage of
the 1807 Act that the South was interested in continuing the slave
trade, not in stopping it.38 Only a handful of plantation owners
—
those owning exhausted land in the tidewater areas of Virginia and
South Carolina—were in favor of upholding the law. These men,
whose depleted land had been made valuable by using it for slave-
breeding, had an obvious interest in an end to slave importation.
But the great majority of Southern farmers and plantation owners
favored the illicit trade, for just the opposite reason.
Such sentiment, however, was not confined to the South. New
York, as one authority points out, was “almost as dependent upon
southern Slavery as Charleston itself,” especially as the century
wore on, for the chief cargo of the merchant vessels going east was
cotton. New York money financed the plantations, shipped the
cotton, and manufactured it. In line with their interests, toward the
middle of the century, New York supported a good number of the
American slavers on the African coast. It is not strange, then, that
the New York interests joined the South in fighting all attempts to
stop the slave trade.39 Between them, these pro-slave trade interests
37 Soulsby, Right of Search, 86.
38 See above, p. 80; and also, G. M. Dallas IV, “The African Squadron,
1843-1861” (Cambridge, Harvard Senior Thesis, unpublished, 1956), 34.
I am indebted to Mr. Dallas for permission to cite from his work.
39 P. Foner, Business and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1941), 4, 6, 164, 167.
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in both the north and the south held immense political power in
Washington; if not in the House, then certainly in the Senate and the
Administration.40 It was unfortunate, but not unusual, that the
Secretary of the Navy in 1843 was a Virginian and a staunch
advocate of slavery.41 And he had friends in New York.
The unfortunate fact is that the Treaty of 1842—so carefully and
sincerely negotiated by Webster and Ashburton—was thwarted in
its implementation by Abel P. Upshur. As Navy Secretary, he had
certain powers over the policy set for the new Squadron, and he
used them. In his orders to the first Commander of the Squadron,
Commodore Perry, on 30 March 1843, Upshur wrote:
The rights of our citizens engaged in lawful commerce are under
the protection of our flag, and it is the chief purpose as well as the
chief duty of our naval power to see that these rights are not
improperly abridged or invaded. ... It is to be borne in mind, that
while the United States sincerely desire the suppression of the slave
trade, and design to exert their power, in good faith, for the
accomplishment of that object, they do not regard the success of
their efforts as their paramount interest, nor as their paramount
duty. They are not prepared to sacrifice to it any of their rights
as an independent nation; nor will the object in view justify the
exposure of their own people to injurious and vexatious interruptions
in the prosecution of their lawful pursuits. Great caution is to be
observed on this point .42
Secretary Upshur had immediately changed the primary goal of
the African Squadron from the suppression of the slave trade to the
protection and fostering of American commerce on the coast.
Justifying his attitude, he argued to President Tyler:
The want of such a force heretofore has enabled the English to
exclude us from the most valuable part of the trade of the Gambia
and Sierra Leone, and the French to exclude us entirely from
Senegal. The trade in palm oil, already very valuable, and rapidly
increasing from year to year, is so conducted, that the articles with
40 It was a House Resolution, passed by a majority of 131 to 9, which
prompted President Monroe to initiate the negotiations with Great Britain
which led to the Anglo-American Treaty of 1824. See note 22 above; see also
Soulsby, Right of Search, 26-27.
41 Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York,
1936), XIX, 127.
42 Soulsby, Right of Search, 129.
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which it is purchased must be landed and placed in the hands of
native chiefs and trade agents. The American trader has nothing to
rely on but the integrity and honor of these people—a precarious
dependence, which renders the trade of very little value to him.
The English, on the contrary, keep a sufficient naval force constantly
on the coast, and being thus in a position to enforce their contracts,
the natives do not venture to break them. Hence, this trade is nearly
engrossed by the English, and is very valuable to them, although
most of the articles necessary to carry it on can be more cheaply
furnished by the United States than by them. It is in vain to hope
that our commerce with Africa can be maintained even in its
present condtion, and still more vain to hope that it can be greatly
extended, unless we offer it the protection which it would derive
from the constant presence of our ships of war .43
It is clear from their letters that the commanders of the African
Squadron were under no illusions with respect to their primary
responsibility on the Coast. Commodore Perry’s first official act upon
reaching the Coast was to chastise the natives of Little Berebee,
eastward of Cape Palmas, for the murder of the captain and crew
of the American merchant brig Mary Carver. Eventually, four
towns were burned, and the chief and several of his subjects
were killed.44 Shortly before this incident, Perry had written that
the slave trade had been reduced by the British to such an
extent that there was little left of it: “I cannot hear of any American
vessels being engaged in the transportation of slaves, nor do I be-
lieve there has been one so engaged in years.”45 Later he reported
that he was despatching the Decatur of the Squadron to travel
southward along the coast to touch “at the settlements lying be-
tween Cape de Verde and Sierra Leone with a view of looking after
the American trade in that quarter.”46 In an effort to encourage
commerce, Perry wrote at length about the type of goods desired
and the benefits to be gained:
This trade is, in a prospective point of view, of much more im-
portance to the interests of the United States than is generally
supposed. . . .
43 Upshur to Tyler, Dec. 27, 1842, in Soulsby, Right of Search , 121.
44 Foote, Africa and the American Flag, 236-37. Perry’s account of the
expedition in Perry to Upshur, Jan. 15, 1844, in Perry, Letters.
45 Perry to Upshur, Sept. 5, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
46 Perry to Upshur, Oct. 1, 1843, ibid.
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The cargoes of vessels trading to Africa are made up almost
entirely of American productions; one of the great staples of the
U. States, tobacco, being an indispensible item in all trading cargoes
under whatever Flag. . . . The inferior kinds of Virginia and Ken-
tucky & Maryland tobacco are the most profitable.
The profits on the cargo are great and the articles of African
produce received in return contribute to the wealth, comfort and
convenience of the people of the United States. . .
.
[Later he
enumerates gold dust, palm oil and coffee. The cotton grown, he
says, is distinctly inferior.]
Most of the articles composing the cargo of a trading vessel are
becoming indispensible to the comfort or convenience of many of
the Native Tribes such as tobacco, cotton cloths, hardware, muskets,
gunpowders, all of which may be supplied from the U. States. . . .
But there is another argument in favor of an increase of the
lawful trade to Africa and that is its tendency to check the exporta-
tion of slaves from that country. 47
Continually Commodore Perry complained about the restrictive
duties at Sierra Leone, stated the need for United States consuls at
the major points of trade, and reported several reprimands to
British officers for boarding American vessels
—
principally at
Whydah and Lagos.48 During Perry’s entire two years on the Coast
as Commander of the Squadron, only one American slaver was
taken by his ships.49
Captain Isaac Mayo, Squadron Commander from 1853 to 1855,
shared Perry’s interest in commerce. Perhaps it was because Mayo
was himself a slaveholder,50 but in any event matters in the newly
independent Republic of Liberia commanded a good part of the
efforts of his small squadron. As settlements were established
farther and farther away from Monrovia, the encroachments were
47 Perry to Henshaw, Ian. 29, 1844, in ibid.
48 Perry to Henshaw, Jan. 22 and 29, and Feb. 2, 1844, in ibid.
49 The Brigantine Uncas, taken off the River Gallinas on Mar. 1, 1844 by
the USS Porpoise. No slaves, merely suspicious equipment, were found. Perry
to Henshaw, May 18, 1845, in ibid. Peter Duignan and Clarence Clendenen
in The United States and the African Slave Trade, 1619-1862 (Stanford,
1962), 40, by dating the capture of the Pons and other ships in 1843 rather
than about Dec., 1845, exaggerate the part played by Perry, who was no
longer in command in Dec., 1845. The evidence suggests that Perry regarded
the protection of trade as his primary responsibility.
60 Dallas, “African Squadron,” 56.
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resisted by the indigenous tribes. In addition, intertribal wars
increasingly disrupted peaceful trade. Perry had settled the Mary
Carver incident, and now Mayo was called upon to use the power
of the Squadron to restore trade:
On my arrival at Cape Palmas it was represented to me by
Gov. McGill, the Chief Magistrate of the American Colony at that
place, that a vexatious and somewhat sanguinary war had, for the
last three years, existed between one of the Barbo tribes on the left
branch of the Cavalla River and a Grebo tribe upon the opposite
branch. This war had interrupted the usual trade of the coast, had
created alarm and distrust among the coastal vessels, and had in
various ways proved injurious to the interests of American Colonists
in that quarter.
Governor McGill in the most urgent terms solicited my inter-
ference to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the chiefs of
some of the native towns also sent me a petition to the same effect.
Moved by these applications and by my own desire to prevent
unnecessary bloodshed, I proceeded in this ship [the Constitution,
which had won fame in the War of 1812] to the Cavalla River
(about fifteen miles from Cape Palmas) on the 4th inst., and
immediately sent boats to communicate with the contending parties.
The Grebo tribe gladly accepted my intervention, but the more war-
like Barboes rudely repelled my messenger, threatening to put him
to death.
On the morning of the 5th, I left the ship with five armed boats
bearing a white flag and went as near the beach as the heavy surf
would permit. Again sending a messenger with a white flag (the
head Krooman of this ship) I urged this fierce people to consent to
an adjustment of their quarrel, but they again rudely repelled my
messenger and defied my power; daring me to land, and using terms
which among themselves, are considered equivalent to a declaration
of war. Finding it necessary to intimidate them, I threw a few light
signal rockets over their town, to drive the women and children to
the shelters of the neighboring forest, and then from the launch’s
gun, threw a few shells over their houses. Being wholly unused to
such projectiles, and very much alarmed by their explosion, they
gladly swung out a white flag, and sensibly expressed their willing-
ness for peace.
On the following day it was again impossible for our boats to
land, but I succeeded in getting a deputation on board the “Con-
stitution” from each tribe, whereupon a “Grand Palaver” was held
and peace agreed upon. On the morning of the 6th [7th?] other
deputations came on board. The peace was ratified with all the
formalities peculiar to this country, and I sailed for the Gulf of
Guinea most happy to have terminated this affair without bloodshed.
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With the restoration of peace, Mayo continued, came the resumption
of normal trade.51
It is to be noted, however, that after the initial effects of surprise
and terror of the ships’ guns had subsided, such actions would
no longer always suffice to bring the Africans to terms. Members
of the American Mission Station on the Gabon River, for instance,
saw quite a different outcome from a similar set of circumstances
in July, 1845. On the 12th of that month, the Captain of the French
Brig Tactique demanded that King Glass raise the French Flag
on every occasion that the ship did. The King coolly-refused, even
under the threat of bombardment; for he was quite familiar with
men-of-war, and knew that he could quickly rebuild his huts after
the attack. King Glass merely moved his people out of the coastal
I
village and waited; an American missionary, John L. Wilson, de-
scribed the incident:
I
At 8 o’clock a.m. the Ensign was raised on board the Man of War,
but it met with no response from the shore; a blank cartrage was
fired over the town, but no Ensign was raised aloft. Another was
fired, but still the flag lay snugly folded up at the foot of the
staff, and there it continued for a week afterwards . . . the French
kept up a desultory firing from day to day, at such of the natives
as went out to fish or were seen walking on the beach, their balls
sometimes passing over our premises, but never so near as to
endanger our safety . . . until the Sabbath the 20th, when we could
not mistake the intention to disperse the Congregation which had
assembled at our Church for worship.
The Tactique finally departed, wrote Wilson, shortly before the
U.S. Ship Truxton arrived to protect American interests.52
Returning to Captain Mayo; in addition to his concern over
< coastal unrest, he also saw a threat to American commerce in the
series of treaties which the British and French had been signing
along the Coast. Not to be outdone, the Squadron Commander
kept his country from being excluded from the palm oil trade of
Lagos by signing a most-favored-nation treaty with its British
puppet-King, Docemo:
51 Mayo to Dobbin, Sept. 14, 1853, in Mayo, Letters.
52
J. L. Wilson, to Bruce, Captain of the Truxton, Aug. 2, 1845, in C. W.
! Skinner, LSN, Jan. 14, 1845—Aug. 8, 1846 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 102).
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Flag Ship Constitution
Princes Island (Bight of Biaffa)
Aug. 9th, 1854
Sir:
I have the honor to enclose a duplicate of a letter addressed to
the King of Lagos, to which is appended his reply, and a solemn
pledge given by him and his chiefs for themselves and for their
people, that citizens and property of the United States shall hence-
forward in Lagos be placed on the same footing with the citizens
and property of the most favored nation with which they already
have, or hereafter enter into a treaty. You will perceive that while
this concession is so full on their part, I have carefully avoided
making any pledge whatever on the part of the United States.
Lagos is one of the most important ports on the Bight of Benin,
and is destined to become a place of much commercial importance.
For many years it was one of the two ports most largely engaged
in the Slave Trade, Whydah being its rival.
In 1851 the English Government having in vain tried the effect
of negotiation and threats, proceeded to more stringent measures,
and an expedition from its Squadron consisting of twenty three
armed boats made in November a demonstration against the town
which was repulsed by the natives. In this affair the English lost
in killed and wounded fourteen Officers and men. In December of
the same year the attack was renewed by a much larger force, the
boats of the Squadron being supported by two small steamers which
succeeded in getting into the river. This assault was made with
desperate gallantry, and the natives were forced to abandon their
town after having killed and wounded ninety two of their British
assailants. The British then replaced upon his throne the lawful
King Akitoye, who had been driven into exile by his cousin Kosoko,
a fierce and warlike chief wholly devoted to the Slave Trade.
Akitoye readily bound himself by a treaty with his English allies,
to suppress the Slave Trade in his dominions, to put an end to
the shocking practice of offering human sacrifices, to afford protec-
tion to all Christian Missionaries, and to throw open his country
to foreign trade. An English Consulate was established, and the
stipulations of the treaty have been faithfully observed both by
Akitoye and by Docemo his son, who has succeeded to his throne.
The town in which this King resides contains about eighteen
thousand inhabitants and must from its position become the centre
of a very valuable trade. It is situated at the mouth of the river
Ogu, which extends far into the interior, and affords a direct com-
munication with Abeocuta, a city of eighty thousand inhabitants.
It passes through a country of the richest fertility, supplying to
commerce Palm Oil, Ivory, Cotton, Indigo and Ginger, and is in-
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habited by a people which will gladly till the soil when relieved
from the desolating wars which have been constantly undertaken to
supply the slave trade and the demand for human sacrifices.
Vessels drawing ten feet can pass into this river from the sea, and
from it there is a safe, continuous and invaluable communication
along the coast both to the Westward and to the Southward, by a
chain of lagoons which will bring to it the produce of a great extent
of the country.
The exportation of Palm Oil alone is already very valuable, it
must increase and attract the attention of our Merchants, to whom
the pledge I now forward will secure every desirable priviledge.
The French as well as the English have made a treaty with the
King of Lagos, and this pledge which I have secured may prove
particularly valuable if they should at any time attempt to obtain
exclusive privilege. The King still feels insecure in the possession
of his authority, for his rival Kosoko with about three thousand
armed men and a well appointed flotilla of War canoes, still infests
the Lagoons, and is ready to renew hostilities whenever a favorable
opportunity may be offered. It is this fact that made the King so
willing to enter into the terms I proposed. His strength is chiefly
derived from his relations with civilized nations, and we will doubt-
less magnify his free concessions to me into an alliance, the report
of which will have an effect on his enemies. The willingness with
which the British Consul encouraged the King to take this step,
probably sprung from the same cause, for the British Naval force
on this station has been so much reduced, that the arrival of a
large Ship like the Constitution was very opportune and friendly
relations between its officers and the authorities on shore, could not
fail to exercise a salutory influence.
I received a visit from the King on the 31 of July. He came on
board in great state with a large retinue, and was received with a
salute and other tokens of distinction.
I have the honor to be Very Respectfully Your Obd. Serv.
/s/ I. Mayo
Comm, in Chief,
U.S. Naval Forces
West Coast of Africa
To the
Honb J. C. Dobbin
Secretary of the Navy
Washington
PS. I have in my possession a specimen of the cotton produced near
Lagos, it is of short staple and inferior quality. 53
53 Mayo to Dobbin, Aug. 9, 1854, in Mayo, Letters.
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Captain Mayo was indeed a man of initiative. Ever since Com-
modore Perry had made his first requests, every Squadron Com-
mander had seen the need for American consuls at the major ports
along the Coast Mayo finally took the step of appointing some.
The first was Captain Ira E. Taylor at Sierra Leone,54 followed
by Mr. D. G. Welles at Loando.55 In these cases, apparently, Cap-
tain Mayo was acting on his own:
I have appointed Mr. Archibald Forsyth to act as Consul of the
United States for the English Colony of Bathurst until the pleasure
of the Government can be known.66
The actions of Commodore Perry and Captain Mayo were hardly
unique among the squadron commanders. All of them, it seemed,
took their responsibility towards American traders and settlers
more seriously than their duty to uphold the provisions of the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty. An example is the instruction given
by Captain LaVallette, Squadron Commander from 1851 to 1853,
to Commander Benson of the sloop John Adams. In 1851 a settle-
ment had been established at Bassa Cove, with almost immediate
resistance from the Fishmen.57 LaVallette wrote to Benson:
I am informed by Commander William Pearson of the Dale that
on the 15th Nov. last the natives inhabiting the Coast of Africa
near Grand Bassa had risen upon the Emigrant Settlements there
and massacred a number of the Emigrants, that they had been
repulsed with a loss of about forty killed, and had meditated another
attack had not, as is supposed, the opportune arrival of the Dale
with President Roberts and reinforcements prevented the parties
from putting it in execution.
. . .
You will proceed in the U.S. Sloop “John Adams” under your
command ... to Mesurado, Coast of Africa, and communicate
with Mr. Roberts, President of Liberia, and arrange the course
which will be proper to attain the objects in view.
It would seem to me that if you were to proceed with the Presi-
dent to all the principal settlements on the Coast, landing at each
of them, calling the Chiefs or Kings together and representing to
54 Mayo to Dobbin, Nov. 17, 1853, in ibid.
55 Mayo to Dobbin, Apr. 5, 1854, in ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Roberts to American Colonization Society, Nov. 6, 1851, in The African
Repository and Colonial Journal, XXVII (March, 1852), 92.
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them the inevitable consequences of punishment in any case of
future injury to the settlers it would have the desired effect. . . .
After adjusting affairs in the settlements of the Emigrants on the
coast of Liberia, you will be governed in your subsequent move-
ments by circumstances. We are charged with the protection of our
commerce in this quarter, as well as with the suppression of the
slave trade.58
The John Adams did forestall another attack, and restored normal
trade to the area. 59
The American squadron commanders were quite open about
their desire to foster trade rather than to chase slavers, for they
were convinced that the British and French were up to the same
tricks. One American commander declared that:
Under the pretence of suppressing the slave trade, I have not a
doubt that it is the intention of both England and France to make
as many settlements on the coast as they can, for the purpose of
monopolising the trade of the continent. . . . 60
Another complained that:
It is the policy of the British ship masters on the coast to represent
the Americans as engaged in the slave trade; for if, by such accusa-
tions, they can induce British or American men-of-war to detain and
examine the fair traders, they thus rid themselves of troublesome
rivals. 61
The result of this attitude was predictable. While the American
Squadron devoted its time to protecting the infant settlement of
Liberia, looking for commerce, and sending warning notes to British
Captains, the slave trade began to increase. 62 While the first reac-
58 LaVallette to Benson, Dec. 12, 1851, in E. LaVallette, LSN, Jan. 23,
1851—Mar. 30, 1853 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 106).
59 Benson to LaVallette, Feb. 7, 1852, in ibid.
66 Read to Mason, Dec. 11, 1846, in G. C. Read, LSN, May 27, 1846—
Oct. 11, 1847 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 103). Cited by Soulsgy, Right of
Search, 119.
61 H. Bridge, Journal of an African Cruiser (New York, 1845), 53. Cited by
Soulsby, Right of Search, 119. It is of course clear that at least part of the
reason for the desire to encourage American commerce was to accomplish what
the British had as their goal—to replace the slave trade with legitimate
commerce. See Skinner to Henshaw, Mar. 16, 1845, in Skinner, Letters.
62 See Skinner to Commodore Jones (RN), May 7, 1845, in Skinner, Letters.
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tion to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty had been for slavers to scurry
for protection under Brazil’s flag,63 they soon learned that they
had less to fear from the Americans than they did from British
illegal boardings. The old game of dual flags, dual logbooks, even
dual crews was resorted to, with the slaver running up either an
American or a Brazilian flag depending on who was after him. 64
The British government had signed the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty to avert such practices, yet the only thing it seemed to have
gained on the African coast was a few American cruisers more
interested in commerce than in the suppression of slaving. But
to their angry complaints the U.S. commanders remained im-
pervious:
The Flag which a vessel wears is prima facie, altho’ it is not con-
clusive evidence of her nationality. It is a mere emblem which loses
its character when it is worn by those who have no right to it. On
the other hand those who lawfully display the flag of the United
States will have all the protection that it supplies. Therefore when
a foreign cruiser boards a vessel under this flag, she will do it upon
her own responsibility. 65
The American commanders, then—avowedly on the Coast to protect
the U.S. flag from misuse—were not concerned about British actions
if the boarded vessel was flying the flag illegally. But if the vessel
was proved to be American, the U.S. squadron commanders
launched an immediate protest, which was often followed by a
stiff note from the State Department.66
If the Navy Department was acting to impede the effectiveness
of slave suppression on the African coast, its efforts were no less
effective than those of the American judiciary. The Law of 1820
The British, it is clear from this letter, were playing their own game of “dual
flags.” On the complaint of Captain Richard Lawlin of the U.S. merchantman
Madonna, Skinner accused the British of flying the American flag on patrol in
order to induce American ships to heave to to be searched. In this instance
the Union Jack was raised only after the Madonna had been boarded and
searched.
63 Brazil had no right of search treaty with Britain.
64 Foote to Gregory, Sept. 14, 1850, in F. Gregory, LSN, Oct. 11,
1849—June 25, 1851 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 105).
65 Foote to Hastings (RN), Apr. 17, 1850, in Gregory, Letters.
66 Such was the case of the boarding of the Roderick Dhu in 1843. Soulsby,
Right of Search, 104.
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required that a captured slaver must always be returned for ad-
judication to the port whence it had sailed. 67 It was quickly estab-
lished in these courts that “absolute proof” was required to des-
ignate a ship as a slaver, and that the only acceptable evidence
was the presence of slaves on board, since the equipment and
rigging used for the palm oil trade was often identical to that used
in the slave trade. It was an easy matter, therefore, for the Ameri-
cans to jettison their human cargo and thereby avoid prosecution. 68
Yet in spite of all the obstructions, it must be said that the United
States, for the first few years at least, was living up to the letter of
the Treaty. 69 In 1844 the sloop Saratoga was joined by the frigate
Macedonian
,
the brig Porpoise
,
and the sloop Decatur. The force
totalled 82 guns, two more than called for. The Treaty also em-
bodied the principle of joint cruising, but this was soon proved to
be impractical. To cover the entire West African coast with four
ships was asking a great deal of the Navy.
The British, whose squadron from 1843 to 1857 average nine-
teen ships and 148 guns,70 could cover the Coast more systematically
and thoroughly. Therefore, it was obviously impractical for the
Americans to cruise jointly in a few small areas and leave most
of the Coast free for the American flag. In addition, as will be
detailed later, the American ships were too deep-drafted to move
close-in to the slave-trading areas and pounce on the anchored
ships, yet too slow to apprehend the fast slave brigs and clippers
on the open sea. The British, naturally, were reluctant to cruise
jointly: they had faster, smaller ships—in many cases steamers
—
and their captains resented being held back to keep company with
the American laggards. In practice, then, the American and British
squadrons merely worked “in close cooperation,” a euphemism for
each going his own way, exchanging information only when they
67 DuBois, Suppression, 121. The reason was, DuBois points out, to ensure
that Southern slavers would face Southern juries.
68
J. R. Spears, The American Slave Trade (New York, 1900), Chapter 3,
passim.
69 1844 to 1847. See Appendix B.
70 United States Documents, Senate Executive Document No. 49, 35th
Congress, 1st Session, 15, 28, 29.
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chanced to meet. 71 Consequently in the late 1850’s, the British
began to detain vessels which claimed immunity under the Ameri-
can flag until an American cruiser appeared, but this practice was
immediately resisted. 72
IV
If the Americans complied with the terms of the Webster-Ashbur-
ton Treaty, they did so only for the first few years. After 1847,
for nearly half the years for which we have records, the Ameri-
cans failed to maintain their stipulated 80 guns on the Coast.73
And if they had complied with the letter of the law for a while,
they seldom complied with the spirit. While the British and
French were keeping upwards of twenty-five ships on the Coast,
the Americans seldom kept more than five. It is clear that there
was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Navy Department to
comply only technically with the Treaty by over-gunning a mini-
mum number of ships and sending them. Captain Cooper, com-
manding officer of the Yorktotvn
,
complained bitterly of this policy,
which at times led to dangerous consequences:
We have had a long and very disagreeable passage to this Island
[Porto Praya, Cape Verde Islands]. The present battery is much
too heavy for the ship, twelve guns would have made the ship much
easier and more efficient than the sixteen. . . . The ship rolls very
deep and returns with a quick heavy jerk straining the ship in every
part. We have not had since we left Boston, a dry plank in any
part of her . 74
But over-gunning was only part of the story. It seemed also as
71 Lloyd, Navy
,
178.
72 Cass to Napier, Apr. 10, 1858, in United States Documents, 35th
Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 49, 47-48.
73 See Appendix B. Because of maintenance problems, even these ships
were sometimes unavailable for duty even though shown on the roster. One
commander wrote: “The Squadron, for the last eight months, has never
consisted of more than three efficient vessels, mounting 48 guns; it is now
reduced to two, mounting 38. . . .” Skinner to Henshaw, Oct. 20, 1845, in
Skinner, Letters.
74 Cooper to Mason, Dec. 20, 1848, in B. Cooper, LSN, Nov. 22,
1848—Sept. 3, 1849 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 104). The Navy Department
had been aware of the numbers problem from the first. Commodore Perry had
written that the American ships were too few and the area too large for the
patrol to be effective. Perry to Henshaw, May 20, 1844, in Perry, Letters.
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if it were the policy of the Navy Department to send the wrong
! kind of ship to the Coast, and usually a decrepit one at that. While
the British furnished their squadron with small cruisers (good for
shallow coastal patrolling) and a large proportion of fast steamers,75
the American practice was quite different. As soon as he reached
the coast of Africa, Commodore Perry had to order the ship Con-
sort home because it was unseaworthy. 76 Two years later, Com-
: mander Bell, captain of the Yorktown
,
complained that both its
rigging and its hull were rotten. 77 In 1851 the United States brig
Bainbridge had to be sent back before its tour was up because its
sails were falling to pieces and the copper was coming off its hull,
causing it to leak dangerously. 78 The pattern soon became clear:
the Commodore was usually sent out in a spanking new ship, but
i his unfortunate juniors were often given what were fast becoming
! the deadwood of the Navy.
But not even the Commodore was safe at times. When the Con-
stellation, the flagship of the Squadron, left Boston in 1859, its com-
manding officer, Flag Officer Inman, had to turn back within a
; week because it was rotten and taking water as it rolled. But the
Navy neither replaced it nor patched it up. Loading sixty tons of
iron ballast in the Constellation, the Navy once again put it to
J sea! 79
The ships were not only in bad condition: they were also wholly
unsuited to their task. Slavers were pirates by law, and indeed
they had many things in common with them. One of these was speed,
which was the major weapon of both professions. Pirates needed
speed to catch up, but slavers needed it to get away. Since speed
and guile were their methods, slavers carried few guns and almost
never tried to shoot it out. When overhauled they would submit
S'
75 United States Documents, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive
I Document No. 49, 15-16.
76 Perry to Henshaw, Aug. 5, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
!
77 Skinner to Henshaw, Mar. 16, 1845, in Skinner, Letters.
78 Gregory to Graham, Feb. 16, 1851, in F. H. Gregory, Letters. These
conditions reported are not in themselves unusual, for these were the days of
c poor maintenance and corruption in the Navy yards. What is unusual is the
I percentage of such unseaworthy ships.
I'
79 Inman to Toucey, July 18, 1859, in W. Inman, LSN, May 28, 1859
—
Feb. 13, 1860 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 110).
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to an 8-gun schooner as readily as to a 44-gun frigate. 80 It was
obvious from the first to the squadron commanders that ten small
vessels could patrol five times as much coast as could the two
frigates which would answer the gun requirement. The British
realized this early, and manned their squadrons accordingly. The
American Navy, repeatedly made aware of the problem by its
commanders, never did. As early as September of 1843, the Secre-
tary of the Navy was told that the wrong kind of ships were being
sent to the Coast; 81 they were too slow, too unwieldy, and too deep-
drafted. Four years later the steady drumming of commanders’
protests had accomplished nothing. In 1846 one commodore wrote:
The Brigs Dolphin, Boxer and sloop Marion are not at all Cal-
culated for the service. They cannot sail sufficiently well to over-
haul a slaver, nor can the two brigs carry provisions for a sufficient
time to let them remain on a distant station for more than a very
limited period. If it be not intended to increase the number of
vessels on this Coast, I beg leave to suggest a change of the species
of force now employed, which would be better suited for this
particular service. The frigate is certainly too large for a cruizer
to chase small slavers in shore, and the coast being without harbors
make it necessary to anchor at inconvenient distances from the
land. 82
In 1855 Captain Mayo requested that the eighty-gun stipulation be
annulled and instead the United States send out a fleet of schooners
each manned by a junior officer and a crew of 20, mounting a pivot
gun. 83 In spite of all their entreaties, there was no hint of a
steamer until 1859. When Commodore Conover wrote to Secretary
Toucey: “I take the opportunity of submitting to the Department
my experience of the absolute inefficiency of this Squadron, com-
prised as it is entirely of sailing vessels, for any effectual suppres-
sion of the slave trade,”84 he was only expressing a sense of frustra-
tion of long standing. Yet it was three years more before the first
80
J. C. Fumas, “Patrolling the Middle Passage,” American Heritage, IX
(Oct, 1958), 7.
81 Perry to Upshur, Sept. 5, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
82 Read to Bancroft, Sept. 18, 1846, in Read, Letters.
83 Mayo to Dobbin, cited by Dallas, “African Squadron,” 52.
84 Conover to Toucey, Oct. 13, 1857, in T. A. Conover, LSN, June 9,
1857—Aug. 31, 1859 (WNAM, FM 89, Roll 109).
Papers in African History 103
steamer, the San Jacinto, appeared. There were never more than
four. 85
If equipping the African Squadron had been less than desirable,
the support of its was abominable. Commodore Skinner complained
in 1846 of the case of the Boxer. As usual its sails and rigging were
rotten—so rotten that on more than one occasion a sail had been
ripped from the masts into the sea. But even worse, it had been
discovered that the grape-shot loaded on the Boxer was twelve-
pound caliber, while her guns were nine-pounders. 86 In addition,
provisions sent out to stock the Squadron bases were often stored
incorrectly and carelessly, with the result that when they were
opened for use they were found mouldy, rotten, and alive with
insects. One commander wrote of his attempts to remedy the
problem:
I directed a quantity to be selected and passed through the oven,
which process, by killing the insects, and drying the bread, will
render it eatable. 87
The Squadron base was another source of frustration and
inefficiency. Porto Praya was chosen as the main supply and repair
base in the beginning because it was reasonably close to one of the
main haunts of the slavers, the Windward Coast around Liberia. 88
But it did not remain handy for long. As the British (even the
American commanders gave the credit to the British),89 forced
85 For a list of Squadron ships and commanders, see Dallas, “African
Squadron,” Appendix B.
86 Skinner to Bancroft, May 8, 1846, in Skinner, Letters.
87 Skinner to Bancroft, May 16, 1845, in ibid.
88 Another reason was that there was an American consul there, who would
aid in the Squadron’s fostering of trade along the Coast. Dallas, “African
Squadron,” 52-53.
89 Cooper to Mason, May 4, 1849, in Cooper, Letters. The Africans them-
selves were no less quick to discern between the English and other white men
along the Coast. Witness the story of one freed slave (originally from Bornu)
to an American Captain: “My years were eighteen. There was war. At that
time my mother died. My father died. I buried them. I had done. The Foulahs
[Fulani] caught me. They sold me. The Housa bought us. They brought us to
Tomba. We got up. We came to the Popo country. The Popos took us. To a
white man they sold us. The white man took us. We had no shirts. We had
no trousers. We were naked. Into the midst of the water—into the midst of a
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the slave trade farther and farther down the Coast the problem of
distance became acute. For a base to be 800 miles from the Gallinas
was bad enough, but by the late 1850 s most of the traffice had
moved to the vicinity of the Congo River mouth—2000-odd miles
from Porto Praya. The only concession made, in spite of repeated
entreaties to change the site of the base, was to put a small stock
of supplies at Monrovia. But this did nothing for the repair prob-
lem, and as we have seen, the ships were in constant need of repair.
In the mid-1840’s—in the relatively easy days of cruising, that is
—
the brig Truxton spent only 181 days cruising on station out of a
total West African tour of 468 days.90 As the distances increased,
a brig or sloop (which carried supplies for six weeks’ cruising at
best) had to turn around and go home for supplies nearly as soon
as she reached the Congo.
By the early 1850’s, the situation was so bad that commanders’
letters showed some exasperation. Commodore LaVallette wrote
that the British steamers were doing such a fine job in the
Bight of Benin that the trade was now almost wholly centered
between Cape Lopas and Loanda. Repeatedly he asked that the
base be changed to St. Helena, which was directly in the path
of the southeast trade winds. By such a move, he argued, the
cruisers could reach Loanda in ten days as against fifty from Porto
Praya. Moreover, he made a scathing denunciation of the choice
of Porto Praya in the first place:
Porto Praya is as unhealthy as any place on the coast. Its anchor-
age is unsafe. It furnishes very indifferent supplies of beef and
vegetables. The water is bad. The climate causes rot in the pro-
visions, and the moth is very destructive to clothing. The island
itself has a very inconvenient position as regards . . . being in a
region subject to tornados, almost constant rains, calms and currents
ship they put us. Thirst killed somebody. Hunger killed somebody. By night
we prayed. At sun-time we prayed. God heard us. The English are good. God
sent them. They came. They took us. Our hunger died. Our thirst died. Our
chains went off from our feet. Shirts they gave us. Trousers they gave us. Hats
they gave us. Everyone was glad. We all praised the English. Whoever
displeases the English, into hell let him go.” Quoted by W. F. Lynch to
J. C. Dobbin, Oct. 17, 1853, in United States Documents, 33d Congress,
1st session, Senate Executive Document No. 1, 335-36.
90 Furnas, “Patrolling,” 7.
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which present more obstacles to the navigation in making passages
from thence to Monrovia and back than are encountered on any
other point along the coast.91
But no action was taken. Only under Flag Officer William Inman,
the last Squadron Commander, was the problem partially solved.
Supply ships were stationed off the Congo to provision the cruisers,
enabling them to extend their cruises, not indefinitely, but at least
for several weeks. Inman’s record of prizes during his two-year
tenure nearly matched the combined records of all the commanders
who came before him.
In the face of such obstruction it is not difficult to see why duty
in the African Squadron was so thoroughly hated. Furthermore
weather and disease added a threat to life. The first man died on
Perry’s cruise to take up station.92 Scores died thereafter. Perry
spoke for many when he observed that it seemed that “the Almighty
had interdicted this part of Africa to the white race.”93 In 1844 there
was such an epidemic aboard the Preble that it had to be manned
by an almost entirely new crew from other ships.94 Unfortunately
the value of quinine was not appreciated until ten years later, so
that only the crudest measures were employed to keep fever down.
Perry ordered his sailors to keep in dry clothing and to build fires
between decks during the rainy season.95 After the Preble epidemic,
ships generally anchored well off shore, out of range of the
mosquito and hence the yellow fever and malaria.96 To meet the
shortage of men Perry added Africans, usually Kroomen, to his
crews. When the ships were relieved to return to the United States,
the Kroomen were simply transferred to the new ships.97
But such measures were totally inadequate: Perry’s fears were
91 LaVallette to Graham, Nov. 18, 1851, in LaVallette, Letters.
92 Perry to Upshur, lune 29, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
93 Perry to Henshaw, Jan. 4, 1844, in ibid. Two months later he asked to be
relieved because on the Coast “few constitutions can hold out longer than
eighteen months.”
94 Perry to Henshaw, Nov. 22, 1844, in ibid.
95 Barrows, Great Commodore, 173.
96
J. C. Furnas, The Road to Harpers Ferry (New York, 1959), 178. The
Preble had contracted the fever chasing a slaver upriver, anchoring for the
night near a swamp.
97 Skinner to Mason, Mar. 4, 1845, in Skinner, Letters.
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echoed and reechoed with greater vehemence by his successors.
One wrote:
In conclusion, Sir, I give it as my decided opinion, that this Ship
will be of no more service as a Cruiser on this coast, until she can
obtain an entire new crew of men who have not the seeds of that
scourge the African fever ready to sprout out on the slightest ex-
posure. . . ,98
Another called the African Station “cheerless and debilitating.”99
As the situation became more desperate, so did the letters. Com-
modore Crabbe admitted that they were “all desirous of leaving
this cheerless and health destroying station.”100 Like every single
other commander with the exception of Inman, Crabbe was anxious
to get home as fast as he could by whatever means, pleading
“pressing family affairs.”101 Commodore Mayo proved himself to
be an agile “name-dropper.” Since he had been Perry’s right-hand
man in many a battle, he argued, he thought it to be for the good of
the service that he be assigned Perry’s second-in-command in his
forth-coming Japanese expedition. 102
The junior officers and men of the Squadron were not in a posi-
tion to appeal so easily to Caesar. Court martials took up a great
deal of the commanders’ time. Duelling among the officers—even
in some cases between officers and men—was not uncommon.
Drunkenness was rife. Officers feigned sickness in order to escape
the Squadron. One officer, all recourse gone, abandoned command
of his ship and fled aboard a merchant vessel to the United
States.103
But even when the Squadron chanced to get such a conscientious
and energetic a commander as Flag Officer Inman, his efforts were
invariably frustrated by the Navy Department. Ships were not
replaced; bases were not furnished; prize crews sent to the United
States were not returned; steamers were few and far between.
98 Skinner to Bancroft, Mar. 4, 1845, in ibid.
99 Quoted in Skinner to Bancroft, Mar. 30, 1845, in ibid.
100 Mayo to Dobbin, Nov. 17, 1854, in Mayo, Letters.
101 Crabbe to Dobbin, Oct. 9, 1856, in T. Crabbe, LSN, Jan. 17, 1855
—
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102 Crabbe to Dobbin, Feb. 17, 1856, in ibid.
103 Perry to Upshur, Aug. 5, 1843, in Perry, Letters.
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Inman did his best—which was far superior to anything seen be-
fore—but at last he could stand the obstruction no longer. To Secre-
tary Toucey he wrote:
The African Squadron under my command has performed its whole
duty. I must be permitted to say, this has been done in the face
of positive discouragement from the Department. I have never
exceeded my instructions, yet I have been rebuked, by counter-
mand of my orders, in every case of transfer or appointment. No
commander-in-chief should be placed in such a position, nor the flag
of his country, thus discredited in his person. 104
Inman might have added another reason for his frustration. In all
the years since the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, not a single convic-
tion had been handed down by an American court against any
of the slavers taken by the American squadron. Captains and crews
went to jail only long enough to post bail—which was always so
low that they could easily afford to jump it—or to be acquitted
quickly on some technical flaw in the evidence against them. Not
one slave captain was executed for piracy under the Act of 1820
until Lincoln’s presidency. 105 When the slaver Casket was released
at New York after being taken there by a prize crew, a reprimand
was sent to the Squadron Commander for interrupting “lawful
commerce.”106 The bark Emily was seized in the late 1850’s on sus-
picion of slaving and then released, only to be caught red-handed
on the coast of Africa; but when it appeared at New York, it was
entrusted to a notorious slave captain who had previously been
acquitted in Key West in spite of convincing evidence as to his
guilt. 107
V
By the late 1850’s, a crisis was near over the suppression of
slavery within the United States. The Fugitive Slave Law had roused
the North, while to the South, slavery had become an institution of
positive good. The African Squadron was becoming something of a
political football. In the Senate, the slave interests used two different
104 Inman to Toucey, Apr. 14, 1860, in Inman, Letters.
105 Spears, Slave Trade, 219; Soulsby, Right of Search, 134.
100 Ibid.
107 DuBois, Suppression, 185.
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tactics. The first was to try to kill the Webster-Ashburton Treaty by
pressure and legislation. In 1854 Senator John Slidell of Louisiana, on
the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported to the Senate a bill to
abrogate Article VIII of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty because it
was expensive, fatal to the health of the sailors, and had proved
useless. This, and a measure to substitute life imprisonment for
the death penalty, were not enacted. 108 But the interests were more
successful in their attempts to undermine the Squadron by cutting
its appropriations. In 1853, for example, the requested $20,000 was
reduced to $8,000. 109
Meanwhile, the attitude of the Navy Department had not
changed. While he had finally seen fit to supply four steamers to
the Squadron, Secretary Isaac Toucey instructed his commodore,
as before, that the protection of American vessels against foreign
interference rather than the suppression of the slave trade was the
primary consideration. 110
The British, long disillusioned, were now losing their patience.
To them it was becoming clear that Squadron or no, the slave trade
was now being financed and carried on principally by the Ameri-
cans. 111 In spite of the addition of American steamers, one British
officer expressed what was probably the universal sentiment among
British officers when he wrote:
No vessel has been seen here for one year certainly; I think for
nearly three years there have been no American cruizers on these
waters. ... I cannot, therefore, but think that this continual
absence of foreign cruizers looks as if they were intentionally with-
drawn, and as if the Government did not care to take measures to
prevent the American flag being used to cover Slave Trade trans-
actions.
. . ,
1:12
Britain, because of the Crimean War, had reduced its squadron
los Ibid
,
183.
loo ibid.
no Toucey to Inman, July 6, 1859, in United States Documents, 36th
Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 2, 87-89.
in DuBois, Suppression, 162.
n2 Ibid., 186-87. And in truth, the yearly slave trade to America since the
arrival on the Coast of the U.S. Squadron in 1843 had more than trebled.
Ibid., 143.
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during the middle 1850’s, 113 but by 1858 it was back at strength and
determined to show that it meant business. That year saw the
British Squadron commence a series of seizures of suspected
American slavers; and instead of sending them under prize crews to
the United States, it burned them or disposed of them at Sierra
Leone. 114 When the American Minister protested this violation of
the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign
Secretary, coolly announced that if the Americans were derelict in
their responsibilities, the British would be forced to do their duty
for them. 115 Furthermore, the Royal Navy poured salt in the wound
by detaining several American vessels off Cuba. Public opinion in
the United States became thoroughly aroused. A group in the South
even demanded the repeal of all acts prohibiting the slave trade
acts; 116 while the United States Senate angrily passed a resolution de-
nouncing the British actions, prompting a stiff note of protest by
Secretary of State Cass. 117 Once again open conflict seemed
possible.
However, the solution of the issue was to be found not in war,
but in men. America had the laws and the machinery to stop the
slave trade; what it needed was the leaders who would use them.
And finally, it found two such men. The first was Flag Officer
William Inman; the second was Lincoln.
When Secretary Toucey had dispatched the steamers to the
African Coast in 1859, he had also sent a new Squadron Commander
to lead them. Whatever Toucey expected, he did not have to wait
long before he realized that he had appointed a man of Lieutenant
Paine’s stamp. From Inman’s first General Orders, it became obvious
that he meant to act. Soon he had deposited coal and secure supply
caches along the coast, provided supply ships to alleviate the
113 Van Alstyne, “British Right of Search,” 38.
114 United States Documents, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, House Executive
Document No. 7, 316-18, 400-14.
115 Clarendon to Dallas, Oct. 8, 1857, cited by Soulsby, Right of Search,
157-58.
116 The Commercial Convention at Vicksburg, Mississippi, on May 19, 1859.
W. J. Camathan, “Proposal to Reopen the African Slave Trade,” South Atlantic
Quarterly, XXV (1926), 410.
117 Cass to Napier, Apr. 10, 1858, United States Documents, 35th Congress,
1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 49, 52.
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cruising problem, and collected accurate charts of the Coast from
the British consuls and officers, forwarding them to Washington
for reproduction. While other commanders had stood in port,
complaining about equipment and disease, despatching requests for
relief, Inman wrote:
My vessels are constantly at sea. . . . The Flag Ship has been less
than a month in any port in marked contrast with any that
preceeded her. 118
The results were significant. Within less than two years of his
arrival on the Coast, Inman was able to boast:
It is but truth to say, that since I assumed this command, a check
upon the slave trade, by capture of slavers and intended slavers, has
been given by the Squadron, greater in number and effect, than
by the whole of the Squadrons combined that have preceded me.
No less than eleven vessels and two thousand seven hundred and
ninety-three (2793) slaves (the latter landed at Monrovia) have
been seized and sent to the United States. 119
But no one man in Inman’s position could stop the trade. He might
catch a dozen slavers a year; there were scores more to take their
places. And the fact remained that, after a short stay in New York
or some other port, the condemned ship with its crew might soon
again be on the Guinea coast.
While Inman was using his full powers at sea, for the first time
an American President was using his full powers to enforce the laws
which the Congress had provided. Execution of the slave-trade laws
in the United States were placed directly under the Secretary of
the Interior, who was given ample funds to prosecute the slavers.
Within a year, more slave-trade convictions were obtained than the
total for all the years since 1808. 120 Captain Nathaniel Gordon of
the slaver Erie became the first man to be hanged for piracy under
the long-dormant provisions of the Law of 1820. 121 After the
beginning of the Civil War, the Union blockade became in-
118 Inman to Toucey, Aug. 14, 1860, in Inman, Letters. Inman was never
one to hide his light under a basket. His letters total three times the number
normal for his tenure.
119 Inman to Welles, Mar. 6, 1861, in ibid.
120 DuBois, Suppression, 192.
121 Furnas, “Patrolling,” 102. The date of the hanging was Feb. 21, 1862.
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creasingly effective at stopping the slave trade at its ultimate
destination. In short, the trade after 1860 dwindled more because
of conditions in the United States than because of those on the
coast of Africa.
As the War continued and the Union reverses dominated the
headlines in London, President Lincoln became increasingly con-
cerned about the possibility that the British would come to the aid
of the Confederates. 122 Since this obviously would have been critical
for the Union, it seemed to Lincoln that it was high time for
mending fences. On March 23, 1862, the Secretary of State, Seward,
proposed that the two countries sign a right of search treaty. The
British jumped at the chance. The Treaty for the Suppression of the
African Slave Trade, which included everything the British had
sought to negotiate for the past fifty years, was signed fifteen days
later. Its terms included the mutual right of search, an equipment
article, and the establishment of mixed courts at New York, Sierra
Leone, and Cape Town. The Senate ratified it unanimously. 123
VI
The African Squadron did not survive the first year of the Civil
War. Flag Officer Inman, the last Squadron Commander, was re-
called in September of 1861, and the other ships soon followed; all
were needed for the Union blockade. The next year saw the
Squadron’s official demise, when it was merged under the command
of the European Squadron. 124
As an instrument of suppression of the slave trade, the Squadron
can hardly be termed a success. During its eighteen years on the
Coast, it had captured only twenty-four ships, liberating a total of
4945 slaves. 125 Remembering that Britain and the United States
were bound by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty to maintain the same
122 Indeed, it was an African Squadron ship which almost precipitated this
very thing. It was the San Jacinto, on return from Africa, which stopped the
British mail steamer Trent and removed the Confederate Ministers Mason and
Slidell in Nov. of 1861.
123 W. L. Mathieson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade 1839-1865
(London, 1929), 175.
124 R. G. Albion, “Distant Stations,” United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, LXXX (Mar., 1954), 268.
125 See Appendix D.
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minimum number of guns on the Coast, these figures are a sorry
contrast to the British effort. During the same period, the British
West African Squadron captured 595 slave ships, liberating 45,612
Africans. 126
The evidence suggests that the principal reason for the Squad-
ron’s failure lies with the Secretaries of the Navy, who deliberately
changed the Squadron’s prime mission from slave suppression to the
encouragement of commerce, and who (as all the commanders
intimated and Flag Officer Inman openly stated), thwarted its
efforts by giving it inferior ships and haphazard support. Until
Flag Officer Inman took command, the commanders’ letters to the
Secretaries dealt far more with the activities of the Squadron in
protecting trade, and aiding the American colonists in Liberia, than
they did with slave-catching. Most men tend to write what they
know their superiors want to hear: Commodore Perry could hardly
have believed that, as he wrote, there had been no American slavers
on the Coast for years. 127 Nor would it have been natural for
Captain Mayo to appoint consuls on his own unless he were sure
that his superiors would approve of such boldness.
Yet there is no evidence that the Squadron was consciously used
as an agent of political expansion. It is true that its ships regularly
stopped at Monrovia and aided the young republic, yet the United
States government was constantly opposed to giving Liberia its
official protection. Indeed, the United States did not even recognize
the Liberian Government until 1862—fifteen years after its establish-
ment. But as long as America was required by treaty to maintain a
squadron on the Coast, it is evident from the Navy Secretaries’
instructions that they intended to subordinate its stipulated purpose
to that of “protecting the American flag.”
Most of the Navy Secretaries during the period 1843-1861 were
not personally interested in stopping the slave trade. Of the nine
Secretaries who held office during the period, six came
South. 128 Of the three Northern Secretaries, only one.
126 For a listing of British captures, see Lloyd, Navy, Appendix
127 See note 45 above.
128 From Dictionary of American Biography, passim. The Navy
were: Abel P. Upshur, 1843-1844 (Virginia); David Henshaw,
(Massachusetts); George Bancroft, 1845-1847 (Massachusetts); John
from the
,
George
A.
Secretaries
1844-1845
Y. Mason,:
:
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Bancroft (who is perhaps better known as an American historian
than as a politician), actively supported abolition. The other two
were Southern sympathizers. David Henshaw of Massachusetts, who
served from 1844 to 1845, drew his political support from the
Tyler-Calhoun faction in the South, and was a close friend of many
slaveholders. 129 Isaac Toucey, although from Connecticut, was an
active supporter of slave interests. He had supported both the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854.
Indeed, it was suggested by a Congressional Report that Secretary
Toucey’s despatch of the streamers to the Squadron in 1859-60 was
prompted by his intention not so much to strengthen the Squadron
as to disperse the naval forces of the Union as the South moved
towards secession. 130
In conclusion: the obstructive attitudes of successive Secretaries
of the Navy before the Civil War made it impossible to achieve the
avowed objects of the African Squadron. 131 Although the Navy
played a notable part in preserving order on the Liberian coast, and
in protecting and encouraging American trade, the Squadron’s role
in the suppression of the slave trade was small, especially when
considered in relation to the cost in lives and money.
1848-1850 (Virginia); William B. Preston, 1850-1851 (Virginia); William A.
Graham, 1851-1853, (North Carolina); John P. Kennedy, 1853-1854 (Mary-
land); John C. Dobbin, 1854-1858 (North Carolina); and Isaac Toucey,
1859-1861 ( Connecticut )
.
123 Ibid., VIII, 563.
130 United States Documents, 36th Congress, 2d Session, House Report
No. 87, 1-6.
131 Two recent studies suggest additional factors: Warren S. Howard in
American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862 (Berkely, 1963), 42,
124-41, claims that many officers were inept “misfits” who spent too much time
in Madeira; Duignan and Clendenen in Slave Trade, 40-42, suggest that the
Navy was short of ships, and that American statesmen were suspicious of the
objects of the British squadron. However, both studies reject the frequent
charge—see e.g. Daniel P. Mannix, Black Cargoes (New York, 1962), 223
—
that Southern officers in the U.S. Squadron were to blame.
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APPENDIX B°
American Squadron—Total Number of Ships and Guns on the
Coast of Africa, 1843-1857
Year Vessels Guns
1843 2 30
1844 4 82
1845 5 98
1846 6 82
1847 4 80
1848 5 66
1849 5 72
1850 5 76
1851 6 96
1852 5 76
1853 7 136
1854 4 88
1855 3 82
1856 3 46
1857 3 46
° From United States Documents
,
Senate Executive Document No. 49,
35th Congress, 1st Session, 29.
APPENDIX C*
British African Squadron—Total Number of Ships and Guns
on the Coast of Africa, 1843-1857
Year Vessels Guns
1843 14 141
1844 14 117
1845 20 180
1846 23 245
1847 21 205
1848 21 208
1849 23 155
1850 24 154
1851 26 201
1852 25 174
1853 19 117
1854 18 108
1855 12 71
1856 13 72
1857 16 84
° From United States Documents
,
Senate Executive Document No. 49,
35th Congress, 1st Session, 28.
APPENDIX
D°
List
of
Slavers
Captured
by
the
American
Squadron
Vessel
Making
Name
of
Vessel
Date
Captured
Capture
Remarks
Uncas
Mar.
1,
1844
Porpoise
No
slaves.
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The idea of European settlement in the cool highlands of East
Africa played a major role in the theory and practice of Italian
colonial activity in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The
short-lived Italian project of establishing large numbers of settlers
in Eritrea thus occurred early in the era of the scramble for Africa,
indeed before the main period of white settlement in Kenya with
which it nonetheless affords interesting comparisons and contrasts.
Though the Italian experiment was a complete failure it is of con-
siderable historical interest as it provided one of the main reasons
for Italian expansion in this part of Africa, while fear of land ex-
propriation contributed largely in rallying the local population
behind the Emperor Menelik II and thereby in assuring his remark-
able victory at the Battle of Adowa in March 1896. The patriotism
of the Ethiopian people, particularly of the northerners in whose
country the campaign was fought, played an important part in
deciding the outcome of the war—a critical event in Ethiopian
history—and affords an example of national unity seldom equalled
in the chronicles of the land. 1 Besides ensuring the continued
independence of Ethiopia, the outcome of the war spelt disaster
for the Italian settlement schemes which though significant were
thus ephemeral.
I
Italian expansion in Africa may be said to have begun for prac-
tical purposes in February 1885 when Rear Admiral Caimi seized
the port of Massawa which had shortly before been abandoned by
the Egyptians on account of the Mahdist revolution in the Sudan.
After occupying the port the Italians began to move inland. They
were defeated by the Ethiopian commander, Ras Alula, at Dogali
in the coastal strip in January, 1887,2 but succeeded in the summer
1 C. Conti Rossini, Italia, ed Etiopia (Rome, 1935), 173-74.
2 A. B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London, 1901), 49; E. S. Pankhurst,
Eritrea on the Eve (Woodford Green, England, 1952), 38-39.
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of 1889 in making their way up to the plateau in a period of chaos
which resulted in part from the death of the Emperor Yohannes,
who had been killed while fighting against the Mahdists, and in
part from a cattle plague and famine of unprecedented propor-
tions.3 By the end of 1889 the Italians were thus in possession of
an extensive stretch of highlands which seemed climatically ideal
for Europeans to live in and contained considerable areas which
on account of war, famine and epidemics had at least temporarily
been abandoned by their inhabitants.4 The stage seemed set for
European settlement.
Though the existence of the Ethiopian highlands with their cool
temperate climate had caused the Swiss adventurer Werner Mun-
zinger to contemplate the possibility of settlement by Chinese as
early as 1875,5 the question of colonisation did not attain practical
significance until the Italians actually succeeded in bringing part
of the plateau under effective military occupation. Even in the first
phase of the occupation there was little talk of settlement as this
might not have accorded with the frequent professions of friendship
towards the people of the area. The Ethiopians, it should be em-
phasised, had a plentiful supply of fire-arms and had therefore
to be treated with caution. 6 General Baldissera, who occupied the
town of Asmara and the neighbouring plateau, was at the time most
anxious to avoid provoking popular opposition. Accordingly, he
issued a proclamation on August 2, 1889, in which he pardoned
criminals, promised to protect all existing interests and even called
on people who had earlier been deprived of their land to come to
him so that he could afford them justice. The proclamation de-
clared:
Cultivators, traders. Do not fear. The Government will be the
Government of Italy. Come: I will give you what belonged to
3 R. Pankhurst, An Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia
(London, 1952), 230-37.
4 R. Pankhurst, “The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1889-92," University
College of Addis Ababa Review , I (1961), 90-103.
5 E. Cerutti, “Considerazione circa l'Eritrea,” VExplorazione Commercial
(1892), 219.
6 See R. Pankhurst, “Fire-arms in Ethiopian History,” Ethiopia Observer
,
VI (1963), 135-80.
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your father. You who say that you had gulti, resti and shumet,*
and were dispossessed, come and let me know of this. . . . He who
has committed murder or robbery in the past is pardoned. He will
not be charged.
.... Woe to you who in the future make raids, rob the merchants
or fail to respect the law. You will be severely punished. I am a
Christian. Priests and lay persons continue in the religion of your
fathers. I have come to protect and enrich the country, not to
destroy it. I have fixed Thursday as the market day and the day
for audiences in Asmara. . . .
Do not fear; sell and buy. . . . He who is wronged come to me.
This is said by the General who represents the Government of Italy
in Hamasien.
(signed) Baldissera7
Notwithstanding such words, which might have been taken to
constitute a guarantee that traditional ownership of land would
be respected, there soon emerged a school of Italian thought which
took the view that the territory was ideally suited for European
settlement, that the Colony should be made to absorb at least part
of the massive emigration from Italy, that State and “abandoned”
lands should be put at the disposal of Italian colonists, and that
“native” land rights should be curtailed in the interests of white
settlement.
To understand this turn of Italian policy it is necessary to recall
that northern Ethiopia was at this time suffering from acute eco-
nomic difficulties unprecedented in its recorded history. The coun-
try had been ravaged by the fighting of 1875 and 1876 against the
Egyptians and by subsequent Egyptian-inspired banditry. A. B.
Wylde, previously British Vice-Consul for the Red Sea, describing
the province of Hamasien, observed: “Poor Hamasen! from 1873
to 1878, both years included, it had a bad time of it. This plateau
used to be called the Plain of the Thousand Villages. Not one-half
of them was now occupied, and some of them have only perhaps
five or six families living in them, while others are totally de-
serted.”8
* gulti and resti, forms of land tenure; shumet, political appointment.
7 A. Mori, Manuale di Legislazione della Colonia Eritrea (Rome, 1914),
I, 771; A. Omodeo, V. Peglion and G. Valenti, La Colonia Eritrea (Rome,
1913), 17n.
8 A. B. Wylde, ’83 to ’87 in the Soudan (London, 1888), I, 216.
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At the beginning of 1889, little more than a decade after that
account was written, an epidemic of rinderpest broke out which
swept away the great majority of the country’s livestock. The virtual
non-existence of plough oxen rendered cultivation almost impos-
sible, and an acute famine resulted in which the starving peasants
fell easy prey to cholera and small-pox. The population of most
parts of the country was decimated, while thousands of famine vic-
tims abandoned their homes and farms and made their way to the
coast in the hope of obtaining imported grain.9 The position around
Asmara at this time may be seen from the account of the British
traveller, Theodore Bent, who observed: “Civil war, famine, and an
epidemic of cholera, have, within the last decade, played fearful
havoc in Abyssinia, villages are abandoned, the land is going out
of cultivation. ... It is scarcely possible to realise without visiting
the country, the abject misery and wretchedness which has fallen
upon the Empire during late years.”10
These calamities, which may be compared with those which
preceeded European settlement in Kenya, 11 had profound political
and economic consequences. On the one hand they greatly dis-
organised the ancient Ethiopian State and reduced the possibility
of efficient resistance to Italian encroachments, while, on the other,
they produced extensive depopulation and provided apparent justi-
fication for Italian colonisation of abandoned or semi-abandoned
areas. The question of “abandoned lands,” which had its parallel
in British East Africa settlement history, was to dominate Italian
thinking for the next few years; it became a crucial matter after
July 1, 1890, when King Umberto of Italy decreed that the Italian
Government had assumed the right to make all the Colony’s laws,
including those relating to land tenure. 12
The idea of Italian settlement on the Eritrean plateau made rapid
progress. Almost everyone who learnt anything of the area was
impressed by its salubrious climate, which appeared ideal for
9 R. Pankhurst, “Ethiopian Famine,” 90-103.
10 T. Bent, The Sacred City of the Ethiopians (London, 1896), 11-12.
See F. Martini, 11 Diario Eritreo (Florence, 1946), II, 237.
11 L. S. B. Leakey, Man Man and the Kikuyu (London, 1952), 9.
12 Mori, Manuale, II, 95-97; L. Franchetti, Mezzogiorno e Colonie (Rome,
1950), 133.
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European colonisation, as well as the good opportunities for agricul-
tural development. It was generally believed that settlement
schemes were practicable and certain of success. On March 5,
1890—only 7 months after General Baldissera’s proclamation—the
Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Crispi, informed the Italian Par-
liament that settlement in Africa was part and parcel of Italian
policy. 13 A couple of months later on May 13, he gave the news
that farmers and capitalists from Italy would shortly be sailing for
the Colony. 14
Many Italians at this time were greatly influenced by the extent
of emigration from their country and by the feeling that emigrants
who settled in foreign lands not under the Italian flag were some-
how "lost” to Italy. The rate of emigration was, moreover, growing
rapidly, as may be seen from the following figures. No less than
2,207,331 persons had emigrated between 1876 and 1889. 15
Year Number of Emigrants
1876 108,771
1877 99,213
1878 96,268
1879 119,831
1880 119,901
1881 135,832
1882 161,562
1883 169,101
1884 147,017
1885 157,193
1886 167,829
1887 215,665
1888 290,736
1889 218,412
At first the Italian authorities thought in terms of giving Italian
colonists the land in large estates of 100 square kilometres, some-
13 Ministero degli Affari Estari, VAfrica Italiana al Parlamento Nazioruile,
1882-1905 (Rome, 1907), 204.
14 C. Matteoda, “II Pensiero dei Pionieri sulla Valorizzazione Economico-
agraria della Colonia Eritrea,” Atti di Primo Congresso di Studi Coloniali
(1931), VII, 332.
15 Commissario Generale dell’Emigrazione, L’Emigrazione Italiana dal 1910
al 1923 (Rome, 1924), 819.
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what in the manner which was to be practiced in the “white high-
lands” of British East Africa. Soon, however, the very different idea
of small farms for peasant cultivators gained ground. 16
II
An important role in the development of Italian settlement in
Eritrea was played by Baron Leopoldo Franchetti, who was put
in charge of Italian colonisation on June 19, 1890, 17 and who sub-
sequently became head of the Ufficio per la Colonizzazione
,
which
was set up on January 25, 1891. 18 A parliamentary deputy from
Umbria, and a man of considerable personal wealth, he was also
an energetic propagandist expounding his views in the Chamber
of Deputies, in journals of opinion such as the Nuova Antologia
and in his own pamphlet Vltalia e la sua Colonia Africana. 19
In the latter part of 1890, Franchetti established an agricultural
experimental station just outside Asmara. No fewer than 96 different
types of seed were sown, and in the following year two additional
stations were established, one at Gura in Akele Guzai and the other
at Godofelassi in Serae.20 Satisfactory results were announced which
were said to prove the practicability of white settlement, though a
later Italian writer claimed that the sites were geographically too
similar to each other to enable the formulation of a general view of
the Colony’s potential and that many of the experiments were
designed to prove the possibility of colonisation rather than to
ascertain which in fact were the best crops to grow.21 Bent, writing
16 Franchetti, Mezzogiorno, lx-lxi; See VAfrica Italiana . .
.
,
224.
17 Mori, Manuale, II, 90-91; C. de la Jonquiere, Les Italiens en Erythree I
(Paris, n.d. ), 187; Matteoda, “Pionieri,” VII, 335.
is Mori, Manuale
,
II, 220-22.
19 The pamphlet first appeared as an article: Franchetti, “L’ltalia e la
j
Sua Colonia Africana,” Nuova Antologia (Rome, 1891), 493, 498-509; Cerutti,
“Considerazione,” 222.
20 P. de Lauribar, Douze Ans en Abyssinie (Paris, 1898), 48-49; B. Melli,
La Colonia Eritrea (Parma, 1900), 52-53, 73-74; I Nostri Errori: Tredici Anni
in Eritrea (Milan, 1898), 133-38, 166-72; Franchetti, Mezzogiorno, lxxiii; A.
de G. Maistre, Contro la Politica Coloniale (Milan, 1888), passim; F. Virgilii, 1
“DairEmigrazione alia Colonizzazione,” Atti del Primo Congresso, VI, 188; [
Relazione Generate della R. Commissione d’Inchiesta sulla Colonia Eritrea
(Rome, 1891), 35-37.
21 I Nostri Errori, 133-35.
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a few years later, reported that experiments at Asmara had been a
“considerable success” as far as cereals were concerned, but that
the climate had not been as propitious as had been hoped for either
grapes or olives. Results at the Godofelassi station had “not been
very satisfactory,” and the olives sent out from Italy had been a
complete failure; experiments at Gura, on the other hand, had
proved a greater success than elsewhere.22
The thesis expounded by Franchetti and his followers of the
“colonialist school” was, very simply, that there was an abundance
of cultivatable land on the Eritrean plateau, and that at the existing
rate of Italian emigration it would be possible to absorb Italian
peasant emigrants for a period of two generations. He urged that
Italian emigration should be canalised into Eritrea, where settlers
should be given free land and credit facilities. He claimed that
Italian peasants would find no difficulty in acclimatising themselves,
and that the Italian military posts would provide them with
guaranteed markets. He therefore recommended that the Italian
authorities should increase their agricultural research to build up
a body of useful data, and that public lands should be measured
and taken over in the interests of settlement.23
The idea of Italian settlement which Crispi had propounded in
1890 was accepted by his rival and successor, the Marchese di
Rudini on May 5, 1891.24 It could therefore be considered a matter
above party at least as far as the greater part of the political
spectrum in Italy was concerned. The project took an important
step forward when the Italian Government appointed a Royal
Commission of Enquiry on March 11, 1891, which after visiting the
territory, produced a report on November 12, 1891.25 The Commission
was an influential body composed of a Senator, Guiseppe Borgnini,
five Parliamentary deputies Ferdinando Martini, Giulio Bianchi,
Conte Luigi Ferrari and the Marchese Antonino di San Guiliano,
and an officer, Lieutenant-General Nobile Edoardo Driquet.
Their report, throws some light on Italian land policy. It was
22 Bent, Sacred City, 20, 88, 206.
23 Franchetti, I’ltalia e la Sua Colonia Africana, 31, 34, 37, 39-40, 45;
Matteoda, “Pionieri,” 336-38; VAfrica Italiana, 259, 333, 354, 361, 365.
24 Cerutti, “Considerazione,” 222, 259-66.
25 Mori, Manuale, II, 231-33.
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entirely in favour of settlement: “The Colony of Eritrea is able to
serve in the future as the vent of part of Italian emigration, and
there is reason to hope that little by little it will be able to finance
itself.”26
The Commissioners recalled that Italy was short of capital, had
a dense and growing population with a consequent high rate of
emigration, and constituted too small a market to allow it by itself
to achieve adequate agricultural and industrial development. In
these circumstances, it was argued, the object of colonial policy
should be twofold: firstly, to obtain cultivatable land with a healthy
climate where Italian emigrants could better their position without
abandoning their nationality, and, secondly, to acquire secure and
permanent markets which would be advantageous to metropolitan
Italy. Study on the spot had convinced the Commissioners that the
Eritrean highlands were suitable for extensive settlement.27 They
had good soil, adequate rainfall and could yield plentiful agricul-
tural produce. The climate was cool and healthy and therefore
ideal for the permanent residence of Europeans. The plateau,
moreover, was relatively near to the coast, and, compared with
existing areas of settlement, such as Australia, South Africa and
Latin America, was not too far from metropolitan Italy. The
Eritrean plateau was therefore envisaged as one where Italian
agricultural labourers, then earning on average less than a lira a
day, would have the opportunity of transforming themselves into
peasant proprietors, while at the same time maintaining their
Italian nationality which they would be obliged to abandon if they
emigrated to other parts of the world.28
The Commissioners were also attracted by the fact that the
Eritrean plateau was sparsely populated; they had been led to
believe that the population had fallen by more than half in the few
years prior to their visit.29
Turning to the question of land ownership the Commissioners
urged the need for flexibility, a principle which they believed would
ensure an opening for Italian colonisation. They declared that
26 Relazione Generale, 204; Matteoda, “Pionieri,” VII, 336.
27 Relazione Generate, 6.
28 Ibid.. 12-40.
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property rights should ‘not be subjected to a system incompatible
with a rapid increase of agriculture and scientific colonisation,”
as “would certainly be the case” if the authorities attempted to
respect “all the laws and local customs” of the land, or introduced
“the rigid concepts” of the Italian civil code and the “ties and
fetters” of Italian law.30
Having thus devised a formula for land acquisition which would
have been impossible under either Ethiopian customary law or
the Italian code of law, the Commissioners proceeded to argue that
the Colony contained extensive State domains which could be made
available to Italian colonists. Enumerating the causes for the exis-
tence of such lands the report observed that some lands had always
belonged to the State and others had for one reason or another in
recent times reverted to it. The latter category comprised three
main divisions. Firstly, “lands formerly the property of clans and
villages, but abandoned by their inhabitants”; these lands, which
were said to include “some of the best in the Colony,” had, it was
claimed, passed into the possession of the State, “according to
Ethiopian law.” Secondly, “lands which had become the property
of the State through the extinction of the [land-holding] clan.”
Thirdly lands which had been confiscated by the Emperor Yohannes
or his local governor, Ras Alula, prior to the Italian occupation.
Elaborating on their claim that State and other land could be
taken over for purposes of settlement the Commissioners presented
a number of arguments which constituted little more than special
pleading in favour of expropriation. The report declared that
expropriation was part of the country’s tradition, for the Ethiopian
sovereign had always had “the power to do what he wished, the
subjects were obliged to obey him, and he was responsible only
before God for the injustices he committed.” The Commissioners
also claimed that Ethiopians “did not have a great attachment to
the soil or in general to the place of birth,” and that they therefore
“migrated easily.” An individual proprietor or tribe moved by the
Government for the latters own purposes would submit, they said,
“with resignation and perhaps even with pleasure” when the new
location was believed to be superior to the old. The report added
30 ibid., 156 .
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that the Emperors Yohannes and Menelik both frequently trans-
posed entire populations from one place to another, and had
carried out expropriations on a vast scale, leaving the proprietors
only such land as they could themselves cultivate.
The Commissioners’ final argument was that it would not be
difficult to find available land in a country where the density of
population was only about 4 inhabitants per square kilometre and
was tending to fall rather than to increase, and where the cultivat-
able land greatly exceeded not only the needs of the people but also
their possibilities of cultivation. The report concluded that land
legislation should be designed “to facilitate colonisation and the
progress of agriculture; in other words it must make easier the
passage of land into the hands of Italians, and, as between Italians,
of those who can cultivate it best.”
To achieve this objective the Commissioners recommended an
enquiry into the cadestrial register at the ancient Ethiopian city
of Aksum and into the archives of the monastery of Debra Bizen,
as well as an examination of the memories of the older generation,
with a view to establishing the location and extent of the State
domains of traditional times. The purpose of this enquiry was to
assist the authorities in preventing or eradicating the “usurpation”
of such lands by “natives,” and, when suitable, to place the land
at the disposal of Italian emigrants.
Since State lands even on the most flexible definition were pre-
sumed insufficient the Commissioners also recommended a policy
of confiscation, but urged that it should be carried out with great
caution, little by little, and with a minimum of publicity. They
claimed that in most cases no hardship would be involved for every
clan possessed much more land than it could use. Nevertheless they
again warned against recourse to ordinary legal methods, observing
that to use the expropriation laws of Italy, with their complicated
terms and formalities, would be a “massive mistake.” As for com-
pensation it should be given on the basis of individual circum-
stances, by payment in money, the provision of land in other parts
of the colony, or partial or total exemption from taxes.
The Commissioners also recommended that the authorities should
“facilitate in every way the acquisition by Italians of lands belong-
ing to the natives.” Up to that time, the report noted, Italian pur-
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chase of land had wisely been prohibited in the fear that specula-
tors would buy up extensive stretches of good land at minimal
prices and then monopolise them without cultivating them, a course
of action alike detrimental to the State and to bona fide colonists.
To avoid this danger the Commissioners urged the need to deter-
mine exactly which land should be reserved for future development
either by the State or by Italian farmers, and proposed that the
sale of lands by 'natives” to Europeans should not be considered
valid unless approved by the Government, the latter having the
right to refuse such authorisation or to insist on the modification
of agreements contrary to the public interest.
At the same time the Commissioners recommended that tradi-
tional systems of land tenure should be modified to facilitate the
purchase of land by Italians. The report pointed out that collective
ownership presented an almost insuperable obstacle to sales or
long-term concessions, as the consent of the entire village or tribe
was required before they could be made. The report therefore con-
sidered it necessary to encourage the emergence of a system of
private property “in order” as it said, “to remove a great obstacle
to colonisation.”
Finally, the Commissioners urged the need for compulsory land
registration, a proposal which clearly supplemented all their other
recommendations. 31
The Commissioners’ report, which virtually gave a blank cheque
to unlimited settlement and expropriation, had no small effect on
Italian colonial policy. Italian thought, as a study mission of the
Societa Italiana per il Progresso delle Scienze remarked in 1913,
was now dominated by three major assumptions all of which were
embodied in the report. Firstly, that the ownership of land in
Ethiopia was traditionally vested in the sovereign who could al-
locate it or appropriate it at will. Secondly, that State lands were
not needed by the inhabitants who cultivated them and that persons
who had abandoned their lands had thereby forfeited to the State
all rights of tenure. Thirdly, that the needs of Italian emigrants
necessitated and justified the placing of vast amounts of land at
their disposal.32
31 The above paragraphs are based on pages 178-86 of the Relazione
Generale.
32 Omodeo, Eritrea, 16.
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Though these assumptions largely passed unchallenged at the
time, they were open, as the Society Italiana observed, to the
gravest possible criticism.33 In the first place the sovereign’s tradi-
tional ownership of the land was largely theoretical; the basic
feature of the Eritrean plateau, as all authorities agree, was that
the greater part of the land was in one way or another vested in
the community and could not be alienated except in special cir-
cumstances. Thus the modern writer, S. F. Nadel, notes that family
ownership ( resti
)
“represents the paramount land title in Eritrea
. . . the people speak of resti as a ‘fundamental’ right and a sacred’
possession.”34 In the second place Italians contentions about State
lands were considerably distorted. Such lands had been devised
to supply the sovereign with provisions, but were nonetheless in-
habited by cultivators who lived on a share of the crop. The alloca-
tion of State lands to Italian peasant cultivators would therefore
necessitate the expropriation of already established Ethiopians,
who, though they might not have any theoretical permanence of
tenure, would, under the Ethiopian system, seldom or never have
been obliged to move. The Italian thesis that abandoned land
traditionally became the property of the State and could therefore
be used for settlement was also little more than a half truth. It was
true that such lands, if really abandoned, were said to revert to the
State; on the other hand the principle of clan or village ownership
was so strong that descendants could always reclaim their share
in ancestral property, even after the passage of many generations.
The question whether the land was in fact abandoned or to what
extent it was abandoned was, moreover, an important issue which
the Italians tended to ignore. Because of the temporary economic
dislocation and distress, many areas had been evacuated by their
inhabitants, a large proportion of whom had died, but in many
cases there were survivors who hoped to return as soon as they
33 ibid., 16.
34 F. Nadel, “Land Tenure on the Eritrean Plateau,” Africa, XVI ( 1946 )
,
1-22, 99-109; M. Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (London, 1948),
290-92; Balambaras Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Maskal, “The Land System of
Ethiopia,” Ethiopia Observer, I (1957), 290; Gebre Wold Ingida Worq,
“Ethiopia’s Traditional System of Land Tenure and Taxation,” Ethiopia
Observer, V (1961), 318.
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were again in a position to resume cultivation. To the Italians
these areas constituted abandoned lands, irrespective of whether
any survivors might still be alive. This view ran entirely contrary
to Ethiopian tradition which held that rights of ownership were
vested in the community and would not be alienated from any
descendants who might remain or return to the area even genera-
tions later. ( It may be argued that Italian awareness of these facts
prompted the report’s emphasis on the need to reject traditional
systems of land tenure.) In the third place the Italian argument
that settlers should be given all suitable land which might be avail-
able was based on the reiterated assertion that considerable land
surpluses existed. Though the economic difficulties of the period
had resulted in extensive depopulation, history was to show that
within a few generations Eritrea was to become an overcrowded
territory and that there was in the long run no room for extensive
foreign settlement.35
Italian opinion in the early 1890’s was in the main favourable
to the principle of settlement, the more so as the weaknesses in the
Commissioners’ case were not yet apparent. The journal VExplora-
zione Commerciale published an article in 1892 which revealed that
the famous German explorer, Georg Schweinfurth, had pointed out
that Eritrea was one of the colonies nearest to Europe and had
expressed the view that almost all the Eritrean villages possessed
more land than they needed. He believed that hundreds of Italian
families could be settled in the vacant land of every village, that
the villagers could be persuaded by tax exemptions to look upon
this with favour, and that Italian colonists could thus be introduced
into the area without the need for expropriation. Another German
author, Gerhard Rohlfs, was cited as stating that 100,000 persons
could live in the then largely uninhabited Ghinda valley.36
Ill
Settlement began in earnest in the latter part of 1893 when
stone houses were built at the foot of the Italian fort at Addi
Ugri, four kilometres from Godofelassi. In November and December
35 S. H. Longrigg, A Short History of Eritrea (London, 1945), 164-65.
36 Cerutti, “Considerazione,” 220-21.
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a band of 29 Lombard, Venetian and Sicilian peasants with 15
women and 17 children arrived. Each family received 20 or 25
hectares of land, agricultural implements, cattle and the necessary
provisions for the period prior to the first crop. These supplies were
made available on the basis of 3% loans of 4,000 lire per family,
and it was promised that families cultivating the land by their own
effort for five consecutive years would be given permanent tenure.37
Not long afterwards some 200 Italians were given land at Ghinda
on the edge of the plateau where they began cultivation of maize,
durra, potatoes, beans and gourds.38
Franchetti had sufficient funds to operate a modest settlement
programme. His annual expenses were as follows: 39
YEAR EXPENSES
1890-1 117,000 lire
1891-2 94,240 lire
1892-3 150,000 lire
1893-4 152,708 lire
Life in Eritrea, however, turned out far less satisfactory than
the settlers had been led to expect. The hardships inevitable in the
pioneering stage were intensified by the effects of the famine and
by incompetence in official quarters. There was an acute shortage
of all supplies. The livestock of the Colony having almost all per-
ished, it was necessary to import mules from Italy which though
unacclimitised to the country and therefore inferior to the native
animal, fetched fabulous prices which the settlers could ill afford.
In certain areas drinking water was not available and was therefore
shipped from Naples in special boats.40
Though the Italian Government and its local administration both
favoured colonisation, friction soon developed between Franchetti
and General Baratieri, the Governor of the Colony. The Italian
37 de Lauribar, Ahyssinie, 51; Franchetti, Mezzogiorno, lxxvi-lxxviii, 320,
403; 7 Nostri Errori, 133.
38 de Lauribar, Ahyssinie, 208; VAfrica Italiana, 174, 204, 335, 338, 503-04,
662, 710.
39 Franchetti, Mezzogiorno, 407n; de Lauribar, Ahyssinie, 52.
40 Ibid., 500-02; Martini, Diario, I, 201.
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officials were mainly military men with little knowledge of or
interest in agriculture, and seem to have been reluctant to make
any thorough surveys of the territory lest this aroused the opposi-
tion of the entire Eritrean population; expropriation was therefore
often on a haphazard basis. The pioneers moreover had been badly
selected. They included factory workers from Milan who were
unused to the countryside, old persons too inflexible to adjust their
way of life, and peasants from various parts of Italy who spoke
local dialects and did not feel any sense of unity or common pur-
pose. It is also said that Franchetti did not allow them sufficient
initiative. Unexpected natural calamities also had their effect in
destroying morale. The country, as we have seen, had just experi-
enced a severe epidemic of cattle plague, and many of the cows
imported by the Italians fell victim to it. Crops also suffered heavily
from hail and locusts. The settlers, furthermore, encountered great
difficulty in selling their produce as means of transport were
rudimentary and the market was very limited. Faced with such
unsatisfactory prospects and being in need of ready money a num-
ber of the settlers abandoned their land and took work with the
Italian Government which, because of the shortage of European
labour, was willing to pay higher wages than the average colonist's
anticipated earnings from the land.41
Wages, however, were by no means attractive, for as Bartolom-
mei-Gioli later observed, the abundance and low price of Eritrean
labour inevitably depressed the earnings of the unskilled Italian
labourer, though a certain racial differential was normal.42 The
typical wage for an Italian labourer, according to Powell-Cotton,
was one and three quarter to two dollars a day, as against a quarter
to three quarters for a “native.” These figures are confirmed by
both Martini and Bartolommei-Gioli.43 Finally there was no gain-
41 I Nostri Errori, 134-36, 167-70; Franchetti, Mezzogiorno, 283-310;
de Lauribar, Abyssinie, 49; VAfrica Italiana, 176, 225-26, 347, 454, 514-15,
519; F. O., Eritrea (London, 1919), 17.
42 G. Bartolommei-Gioli, La Colonizzazione Agricola dell’Eritrea, (Milan,
1903), 40.
43 P. H. G. Powell-Cotton, A Sporting Trip Through Abyssinia (London,
1902), 520; F. Martini, Diario, II, 133, III, 59; R. Paoli, Nella Colonia
Eritrea (Milan, 1908), 96-97; Bartolommei-Gioli, Colonizzazione, 39; R. Pank-
hurst, “Status, Division of Labour and Employment in Nineteenth and Early
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saying that an atmosphere of insecurity prevailed, for settlement
was being effected in the face of one of the best armed native
people of Africa. 44 This sense of insecurity could not be dispelled
until the Italians had made themselves masters not only of Eritrea
but also of nearby Ethiopia—as de Lauribar observed the work of
the plough could not really begin until the work of the gunpowder
had been completed.45
The difficulties of life in Eritrea made it impossible to settle any
large number of Italian women. Even as late as 1905 the Census
of that year recorded that the European population comprised
only 309 women over the age of 16 as against 1,684 men of the
same age. Of the men, 1,343, or 79.75%, were celibate, while only
94, or 30.42%, of the women were unmarried. 46 This disproportion,
coupled with the absence of a strong feeling of racial superiority
on the part of the Italians, led to the institution of the so-called
madame system where by many Italians took Eritrean women, almost
invariably Christians, to live with them. De Lauribar says that the
Italians tended to be enthusiastic about the Eritrean women and
praised their beauty, faithfulness and adaptability.47 There was
also a considerable amount of prostitution, particularly to meet the
demand of the Italian soldiers.48 A sizeable half-caste population
soon emerged, the existence of which tended to differentiate the
Colony from nearby areas of Anglo-Saxon settlement.49
Twentieth Century Ethiopia,” University College of Addis Ababa Ethnological
Society Bulletin, II (1961), 47.
44 Pankhurst, “Fire-arms,” passim.
45 de Lauribar, Abyssinie, 50.
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47 de Lauribar, Abyssinie, 294-95; Martini, Diario, I, 88, 220, 262-63, III,
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IV
The settlement policy which, as we have seen, had been can-
vassed with growing support since 1889, led in due course to legis-
lative action. Decrees were drawn up in the spirit of the 1891 report
to make vast areas of the plateau available to Italian colonisation.5a
An initial decree establishing the principle of State lands in Eritrea
was signed by King Umberto of Italy on January 19, 1893,51 and
a few months later on June 6 a Cadastral office was set up.52 On
August 26 Baratieri issued a decree forbidding anyone to occupy
abandoned land without authority from the Government. The
decree defined such land as territory whose inhabitants were no
longer in the area whether they had left it in order to emigrate,,
had been driven away by calamities, or had suffered expropriations,
at the hand of former kings.53
The policy of the Italian authorities at this time may be seen
from two important documents produced in April 1894: a report
by Franchetti on his hopes and achievements, and a directive from
Prime Minister Crispi to General Baratieri on the significance of
Italian settlement. Franchetti’s attitude was well summed up in the
report which he produced on April 2. Observing that Italy faced
a shortage of capital side by side with a surplus of labour he
reiterated that the best solution for his country’s difficulties was
to encourage working class emigration by making land available
in Italian Africa. In this way proletarian Italians could be turned
into land-owning farmers without unduly burdening either the
State finances or the capital resources of Italy. Experience to date,
he claimed, had shown that settlers could live on a small loan from
the Government and would be in a position to repay it after a
short period of time. The financial responsibility of the Italian
Government need not therefore be considerable, and was insignifi-
cant in comparison with the Colony’s military expenses, which
later would come to an end as soon as sufficient settlement had
been achieved.54 The presence of Italian farmers was essential, he
50 Omodeo, Eritrea
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argued, because efficient colonisation could only begin with the
production and supply of foodstuffs. Once these were available
trade would develop, conditions would become favourable for
capitalists to settle, and in due course artisans would move in to
meet the demand for their type of skill. The process of colonisation
would then be complete.55
Franchetti’s remarks revealed that a considerable change in the
situation had occurred since the report of 1891. At that time the
Commissioners had been urging that “abandoned” lands should
be declared State property, and, as we have seen, this had in fact
been decreed on January 19, 1893. Franchetti was now at pains
to ensure that the “natives,” who had now largely recovered from
the famine and were benefiting from the absence of hostilities,
should be prevented from “arbitrarily” returning to the “vast fertile
plains” which had been “reserved for Italian colonisation” by being
decreed state property. “It is indispensable,” he declared, “that
native cultivation should be forbidden in the areas destined for
Italian colonists. I know that at first sight it seems painful to place
obstacles to the cultivation of the land. But this impression dis-
appears when one realises that the obstacle to cultivation is only
apparent because the natives have not only the power to carry
their labour long distances to the uncultivated land at their dis-
posal, but are encouraged to do so.” He opposed even the temporary
grant of State land to the “natives” on the ground that it would
“create difficulties to future colonisation,” and added that unless
the “natives” were prevented from occupying such land it would
be impossible to achieve “a large Italian agrarian colonisation of
the plateau,” without which Eritrea would remain a merely military
Colony and a burden on the Italian State. Moreover he argued
that unless the resettlement of “natives” was firmly stopped nothing
would prevent them from pouring across the Ethiopian frontier,
in which case the docile population would become insubordinate,
even the native troops might be affected, and there would be a
danger of insurrection.56
Franchetti’s assertion that Ethiopians might cross the frontier
55 Ibid., 320 .
56 Ibid., 330-33 .
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to settle on “unoccupied land” requires comment. A significant
migration was undoubtedly at this time underway, prompted partly
by the great famine and partly by employment opportunities under
Italian rule.57 Wylde states that the Italians, who were short of
labour, encouraged settlers from across the frontier, while Powell-
Cotton claims that under Italian rule there was greater security
and lighter taxes. At all events there was, as Wylde says, a “steady
influx” of immigrants into the colony. Though the greater number
came from nearby Tigre, others, Bent says, were from Gondar,
Shoa and the Galla lands. This is confirmed by Martini, as well as
by the Duchesne-Fournet mission which encountered Eritreabound
migrants near Lake Tana.58 Efforts by the Ethiopian authorities
to prevent this movement seem to have been largely unsuccessful,
though Ras Makonnen then ruler of Tigre, was reported in March
1889 to have ordered the arrest of Amharas and Tigres found en-
deavouring to cross the frontier. The Ras is said also to have issued
a decree that people leaving, the country to become Italian askari
,
or soldiers, would be liable to severe punishment, including the
loss of their land ( resti and gulti).59 The influx of these land-
hungry migrants was naturally a source of alarm to persons like
Franchetti who wished to see all “unoccupied land” reserved for
European settlement. The Societa Italiana was nonetheless correct
in arguing that under the traditional system of tenure immigrants
from other parts of Ethiopia would never have been allowed to
obtain land at the expense of the local people.60
Explaining his settlement policy in greater detail, Franchetti
stated that each Italian family should be given 15 to 20 hectares
of land free on condition that it cultivated them with its own hands
for a minimum of five consecutive years. The purpose of this latter
57 Pankhurst, “Status,” 47.
58 Wylde, Abyssinia, 143, 263; Powell-Cotton, Sporting Trip, 520; Bent,
Sacred City, 20; Martini, Nell’Africa Italiana (Milan, 1896), 108-10; F.
Lemmi, Lettere e Diari d’Africa (Rome, 1937), 155; Paoli, Eritrea, 78; Fran-
chetti, L’ltalia, 35; Bartolemmei-Gioli, Colonizzazione, 32; VAfrica Italiana,
794-95, 821.
59 Martini, Diario, I, 599, 608, II, 107, 117-18; F.O. 403/177, Barnham,
April 25, 1892.
60 Omodeo, Eritrea, 55.
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provision was to guarantee the settlers’ seriousness of purpose and
ensure that the land was actually cultivated. Since most of the
farmers would be unable to provide for their transport or installa-
tion in Africa they should receive loans. An idea of the requirement
of an average household could be seen from the case of a typical
family, that of a Signor Gornati, which was composed of 4 adults
and 3 children between the ages of 4 and 12. Its expenditure for
the first year, including transport from Italy was slightly over
4,000 lire, made up as follows:
Transport
Agricultural equipment
Cattle
Provisions
Seeds
Housing
4,242.78 lire
978.73 lire
141.19 lire
1,147.50 lire
1,275.36 lire
100.00 lire
600.00 lire
The Gornati family’s expenses for transport and cattle being
somewhat on the liberal side Franchetti argued that 4,000 lire
should be taken as the average requirement for a family. 61
The cost of installing the settlers, he assumed, would tend to fall
as time went on. In the early stages the Italian administration
would be obliged to build housing for the colonists, but later im-
migrants would be able to find temporary accommodation with
those already established. Housing, moreover, was not a major
problem as simple dwellings could be constructed in 15 to 20 days
and tents could be used temporarily except during the rainy season.
The climate was such that no sheds were required for cattle. 62
Emphasising the importance of settler agriculture he argued that
the “natives” could only produce small quantities of provisions and
even these would be of poor quality. The Italian farmers would
therefore have to produce their own supplies and also those re-
quired by settlers awaiting their first harvest. Once agricultural
production was effectively underway immigration could rise in
geometrical proportion.
61 Franchetti, Mezzogiorno
,
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An increasing rate of production was, he considered, easily
possible. A single family using one plough could cultivate at least
5 hectares the first year. Experiments had shown that the average
yield per hectare was substantially more than 10 quintals, but even
on the basis of this figure the family could be assured a production
of 50 quintals or well above that required for food and seed for the
year ahead. In the second year the family could be expected to
bring a further 5 hectares under cultivation so that production
would rise to some 100 quintals, or at least twice the family's needs.
Production could be expected to go on rising until the entire farm
had been brought under cultivation. 63
Franchetti calculated that after the second harvest settlers would
be able to devote their produce to the repayment of debts. Because
of the difficulty of selling their crops the farmers might be expected
to prefer making payment in kind, but should be allowed to pay
in cash if they so wished. He proposed that 3% interest should be
charged on State loans, but was confident that the rate could later
be raised to 5%. Such conditions, he felt, should prove attractive
to philanthropic bodies, such as cooperative and other saving
banks. 64
Elaborating on this theme in the Italian Parliament on May 3,
1894, he declared that "the plateau with its fertile soil and abun-
dance of water can allow of, and amply reward, the labour of
Italian farmers. The simplest and most economical method [of
settlement] seems to be that of colonisation with farmers who must
become proprietors of the land accorded to them and who will
have the ability to pay back by installments the expenses incurred
by the State in establishing them."65
Crispi, who returned to power as Prime Minister in December
1893, gave these ideas his full support, and was well aware that
they could only be carried out effectively by subordinating Eritrean
to Italian interests. This is evident from a letter which he wrote to
Baratieri on April 28, 1894, which reveals that the principle of
emigration and settlement was far more a matter of State policy
63 ibid., 321-23, 403.
64 Ibid., 319-20.
65 Matteoda, “Pionieri,” 237; VAfrica Italiana, 324, 334, 358-59,
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than it was, for example, in British East Africa. Crispi observed
that the General “knew better than anyone else” that one of the
foremost aims of Italian colonial expansion was “to prepare a vast
field suitable for emigration,” a population movement which had
been “closed to other countries,” but was nonetheless useful for
“our commerce.” The letter went on: “The studies thus far made
and the efforts of the good Franchetti are sufficient to demonstrate
that this aim is both logical and practical. To attain it two things
only are required: time and patience.” Coming to the heart of the
question, he gave his backing to a ruthless solution of the land
problem in a series of sentences which combined a complete
disregard for Eritrean land rights with a scrupulous insistence on
Italian budgetary orthodoxy. He declared:
in order that the objective is not compromised we must be on guard
that native colonisation does not debar our own road and that we
are not swayed by an exaggerated scrupulosity when taking over
lands which must be in great measure considered res nullius and
available to the first occupier. Since it is not doubted that these are
also your ideas, I am certain that you will do everything to translate
them into action, assisting, that is to say, the establishment and
development of Italian colonies on the plateau, always, be it under-
stood, within the limits of the budget, and, on the other hand,
restraining native colonisation until it has been possible to direct
into those regions a spontaneous and vigorous current of national
[i.e., Italian] emigration.
The advantages which the security of Eritrea will derive from a
strong Italian population established at Asmara, Keren and other
convenient localities, well armed and well trained in the use of
weapons, a population which will have every interest in defending
the lands it cultivates and owns, will surely not escape you for whom
the political and military history of the different colonial powers has
no secret. 66
Baratieri was from the outset totally convinced of the desirability
of settlement. He accepted the thesis that “the land belonged to
the State,” his only reservation being that the authorities in
alienating land should take precautions to avoid producing an
“atmosphere of hostility among the natives .”67 Even before the
66 F. Crispi, La Prima Guerra d’Africa (Rome, 1914), 272-73.
67 O. Baratieri, Memoires d’Afrique (Paris, n.d.), 167.
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receipt of Crispi’s letter he had begun issuing a series of decrees
specifying areas of the Colony as State lands “reserved for coloni-
sation.” The first such area was announced on May 11, 1893, and
lay between the villages of Adi Bari, Godofelassi, Zabonena and Adi
Mongunti in Serae. 68 Later in the same year, similar decrees were
issued on September 18 in respect of the Mensa area,69 and on
December 2 for the Sambel area, as well as the territory of
Gheggiret village and the area of the military camp at Fort
Baldissera. 70
Decrees establishing State land and expressly reserving it for
colonisation were issued throughout 1894: an area near Himberti in
Hamasien on January 19,71 the allegedly abandoned territories of
Adi Are, Chileule, old Azerna, an area cultivated by the families of
the Mai Tsada bordering Adilai, the already State owned area of
Godofellassi, and four other places: new Azerna, Enda Maliel, Adi
Vlai and Amba Zerib on June 6; 72 a stretch of country, partly
belonging to the Bizen convent, between the rivers Laba, Wad
Gaba and Aidereso on June 12; 73 an area between the Massawa-
Saati road and the Iangus and Aidereso rivers on August 24;74 a
piece of land near Modacca and Scinnara on September 19;75 the
allegedly depopulated villages of Chinevale, Adi Ghedella, Adi
Zerentai Segherdale, Adi Baridi, Bet Mariam, Mefaliso, Adi Godor
and Adi Secche Assaarti, as well as “redundant land” belonging to
the villages of Daro Anto, Adi Adda, Zeban Ona, Adi Colon, Mai
Libus, Adi Casciai, Enti, Adi Godati, Ghesa Vasa, Ghesa Gobo, Adi
Gobo, Adi Sadi, Mai Armaz and Decmane on November 9,75
“abandoned lands” in the Barca valley on November 26,77 and the
“depopulated” village of Adi Consub and “redundant land” belong-
68 Mori, Manuale, II, 716.
69 Ibid., II, 854.
70 ibid., 832-83, III, 323-24.
71 Ibid., II, 854.
72 Ibid., Ill, 200.
73 Ibid., 215-17.
74 Ibid., 260-61.
75 Ibid., 266.
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ing to the villages of Gomoro and Adi Scimindui on December ll.78
Decrees establishing further State lands continued to be made
throughout the first half of 1895. On February 28 Baratieri signed a
decree listing 18 areas of State lands: Zazega, Wolkitba, Adi Conci,
Asega Sada Christian in Hamasien, the Scillele lands at Asmara,
Medri Zien and the Ad Zaul lands in Carnescim, the lands of Dega
Gabru, Demba Ghermet, Maldi Tsada, Wara, Deca Gebru, Deca-
mare, and Cheferes in Dembesan, the lands of Assaldait in Loggo
Cina, Resti Saada, Tamesghi and Emesese in Taccala, a part of
Serae, Resti Wod Eutabe in Adi Mawa and the lands of Lamsai,
both in Dubub, and the Ad Unnio lands in Akel Guzai.79 Lands
belonging to rebels were declared the possession of the State by a
decree on March 20,80 while the area of the Gura agricultural
station was classified as State land reserved for colonisation on
July 12.81
V
The Italian policy of expropriation inevitably had political
implications. As Margery Perham notes one of the first effects of the
occupation was that the upper structure of provincial administration
was swept away except in so far as the new administration allowed
favoured chiefs to hold their own estates.82 The province of
Hamasien for example, had been ruled by its famous governor, Ras
Aloula, who, as commander of the Ethiopian armies of the extreme
north, subsequently won great distinction in resisting Italian pene-
tration. Wylde, who saw Aloula’s administration at work in 1883, was
greatly impressed: he records that taxes were collected regularly
every six months83 and that "a good house and a full farmyard with
clean clothes and general prosperity did not entail an increased
taxation.”84 Like other provincial governors, the chief had been
given lands in the province the tenure of which was dependent on
his service. Thus Wylde mentions a “large farm,” as well as “several
78 Ibid., 327, 288-89.
79 ibid., 351-52.
so Ibid., 364.
si Ibid., 453, 361-63.
82 Perham, Ethiopia, 292; Martini, Diario, II, 237; Nadel, “Tenure,” 20.
83 Wylde, Soudan, II, 336.
84 Wylde, Abyssinia, 264 et passim.
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villages” which Aloula held for his soldiers. 85 After their occupation
the Italians seized Aloula’s house at Asmara and the whole of his
estates. Wylde, who visited the area again in 1896, reports that “for
nearly five years Ras Aloula had been anxious to get hold of Genera]
Baratieri, who had taken his houses, lands and property, not only in
the Hamasien but in Tigre as well; the only house that had been
spared was that in Axum. Because of the sacred nature of the town,
the Italians did not dare to plunder it, as they would have lost
the confidence of the entire Abyssinian people which they wished
partly to retain.”86
The Italian land policy led to widespread discontent among the
Eritreans. Wylde cites the shum, or chief, of one of the largest
villages in the Godofelassi region—an area selected, as we have
seen, for early settlement—as complaining bitterly. The chiefs
argument was that if Italy claimed the land by right of conquest it
might be said that
all private titles to landed property are invalid and no native has a
right to anything; but what the choum complained of to me was
that neither he nor the majority of the land-owners fought against
the Italians; on the contrary, they aided them under the idea that
they would be treated fairly and that their property would be
respected.
Wylde, travelling through the area, comments:
... I passed through the new Italian agricultural settlement and I
saw that they had the pick of the ground, and this was given to the
settlers from Italy, dispossessing those that had cultivated the land
formerly, and whose ancestors might have worked on it for
centuries. I have only given one isolated case in one district, but this
had been done in other parts as well.
Turning to the political, philosophical or moral aspects of the
problem, Wylde asked:
What confidence could the native be expected to have in a govern-
ment that started business on such a basis? . . . There is land in the
Hamasien sufficient for all, and had the government taken what they
required for fortifications and government offices nothing would
85 Ibid., 145.
86 Ibid., 220; Conti Rossini, Italia, 28; Bent, Sacred City, 18.
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have been said; and had they issued a proclamation that all the
natives should be allowed to retain their cultivated property on
having their claims registered, and also allowed grazing rights on
the mountains, no difficulty would have arisen, and the government
would have found that they had more territory than they knew what
to do with. Abyssinia, in spite of all it has gone through, still has a
very large population, and the people show a great vitality and have
large families, so it is impossible to wipe them out like the Australian
natives or New Zealanders. There is no reason that I can see at
present why the Christian population should diminish; on the
contrary, there is every prospect of their increasing in number under
a settled government; so the land question is one of the greatest
importance, and as long as the Abyssinians are treated in a fair and
equitable manner they will be found to make good and peaceful
subjects, and the reverse if treated badly. I think when the English
public learns the facts of our dealing with the land belonging to the
natives in Africa that they will be thoroughly disgusted, and I think
that the wholesale seizure of land that has taken place in some parts
is little removed if any from theft. I am sorry to use such a harsh
term, but nothing milder will meet the case; these lands are given
away to the first settler that comes along. ... I do not think the
Italian government are so much to blame, as they had a precedent
for it from what hitherto has been done by us in Africa; but I
consider it was dishonest and ill-advised and I am afraid that there
is a good deal of property held by people in Africa that the title-
deeds would not bear looking into . 87
The expropriation of monastery land had particularly serious
implications, the significance of which becomes apparent when one
remembers the highly religious character of the Ethiopian people.
The most serious evictions occurred at the famous convent of Debra
Bizen in Hamasien. Though Article IV of the Treaty of Uccialli,
which was signed on May 2, 1889, specified that the possessions of
the convent should remain the property of Ethiopia, the monks
were not spared. 88 Bent, travelling in 1893, noted that they had been
deprived of most of their lands “in return for a sum of money which
does not satisfy them.” The result, he adds, was that “in the whole
of their Red Sea colony the Italians have no more vehement
opponent than the monks.”89
87 Wylde, Abyssinia, 129-31.
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The various acts of expropriation had a profound influence on
the Eritrean people. As a report of the Italian Societa per il
Progresso delle Scienze noted, they “provoked the discontent of the
native population,” and induced an atmosphere of rebellion which
led in due course to war between the Italians and Ethiopians.90
The fact that many of the Eritreans possessed rifles and had the
support of well armed forces across the Ethiopian frontier made the
“land question” far more explosive at this time in Eritrea than in
the corresponding stage of settlement in a colonial territory such as
British East Africa.
The most striking manifestation of this discontent was the
rebellion of Dejazmach Batha Hagos, the chief of Akele Guzai, on
December 15, 1894. This event came as a considerable shock to the
Italians who regarded Batha Hagos as one of their most loyal
chief. So far from having a record of service to the Ethiopian
cause, he had fought against the Emperor Yohannes and Ras Alula
and had on one occasion sacked the town of Adowa. Italian
surprise at the revolt was intensified by the fact that its leader had
been converted to Roman Catholicism, the State religion of Italy,
and might therefore have been presumed more “loyal” than other
Eritreans. Italian writers, seizing on his conversion, which had been
effected by French Lazarists, argued at the time that the dis-
affection had been spread by missionaries jealous of Italian in-
fluence.91 No concrete evidence, however, was provided for this
assertion which was ridiculed by the French writer De la Jon-
quiere.92
The significance of the land question is apparent from the local
traditions as recorded by Kolmodin who relates that when Batha
saw the Italians gradually appropriate the land of Akele Guzai he
said to his brother Sengal, “let us rebel!” Sengal asked, “What
reason can we invoke for a rebellion against Italy?”, whereupon
Batha replied:
O my brother Sengal, do not be so stupid.
90 Omodeo, Eritrea, 15.
91 Martini, Diario, II, 188.
92 De la Jonquiere, Italiens, passim.
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When the white serpent has once bitten you
You will search in vain for a remedy against its bite.93
In the proclamation issued at the time of his rebellion, Batha
Hagos is quoted by Mantegazza as saying, “We curse the Italians;
they are taking our land.” These words apparently made a con-
siderable appeal to the populace. They were taken up by the
soldiers of Ras Mangasha of Tigre, who, seizing upon Batha’s
epigram, sung about the danger to be feared from the Italians:
“From the bite of the black servant one recovers; the bite of the
white serpent is fatal.”94
The rebellion was the signal for extensive fighting between the
Italians and Ethiopians which culminated over a year later in the
Italian defeat at Adowa. The Societa Italiana per il Progresso delle
Scienze, which put the blame for starting hostilities squarely on
Italian policy, claimed that Crispi’s guilt was not that he had lost a
battle but that he had provoked a war.95
Some years later, settlement policy and resultant expropriations
were held by Italians to have contributed to the failure of Italian
expansion. At a congress organised by the Italian Colonial Institute
in 1911, Agnese, Director of Colonial Affairs in the Italian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, observed that the “land question” was the most
delicate one affecting the colonial people, and drew attention to
Baldissera’s proclamation of 1889, which had promised the pro-
tection of traditional rights. Though Agnese agreed with the 1891
Commissioners’ thesis that State ownership of land was a “funda-
mental and basic principle” of Ethiopian tenure, he declared that
this did not justify seizure of land from people who cultivated it on
the basis of either acquired rights or traditional occupation. He also
attacked the old conception of “abandoned land,” arguing, more or
less along the lines followed in this paper, that surplus or aban-
93
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doned lands had existed during the period of war, cholera and
famine, but that “on the return of peace the villages were re-
occupied and the lands were no longer surplus/' Looking at the
question from a purely Italian point of view, he stated that the 1893
decree establishing State land and the subsequent acts of expropri-
ation had led to the “gravest inconveniences,” and cited the
observations of an Ethiopian who, while admitting serious defects
in the administration of his country, nevertheless expressed whole-
hearted preference for Ethiopian as against Italian rule, on the
grounds that the latter endangered the rights of ownership. “In
Ethiopia,” he declared, “we are maltreated, burdened with taxes and
without good justice; but we have the land and no one takes it from
us.
. . . The Italian Government in Eritrea is taking the land from
the inhabitants. We therefore prefer to remain here.”96
Others at the congress supported Agnese: Martini, speaking as a
former Governor of Eritrea, bluntly observed that populations
subject to Italian rule had rebelled, rallying to Menelik’s cause
because they had been robbed of the land. He cited the case of
the convent of Debra Mercurios near Adi Quala where 150 monks
had been rendered destitute and converted into “a real nest of
dangerous malcontents” and told the possibly apochryphal story of a
conversation between Menelik and Ras Tessema in which the latter
remarked that the people of the Ethiopian province of Tigre would
be hostile to Italy “because they know very well that the Italians
take the land.”97 Finally, C. Rossetti, another Italian expert on
colonial affairs, remarked that Eritrean residents in Khartoum had
complained to him that the Italian government has seized the
From 1895 on, there was much discord among officials and later
armed conflict with the Ethiopians. On February 21, 1895, Fran-
chetti resigned as controller of settlement,99 the result of a pro-
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longed dispute with Baratieri, who thereupon assumed responsi-
bility for settlement policy. On April 25 he issued a notice that
State lands would continue to be made available to Italian settlers,
but on different terms than before. Each family was to receive 8 to
25 hectares according to its size, the fertility of the soil, and the
type of cultivation. Such land, normally in temperate areas between
1,000 and 2,500 metres in altitude, would still be given on a
temporary basis for 20 years, tenure being rendered permanent as
soon as the holders had worked the land continuously for five years
with their own labour and had paid an acquisition fee of from 10
to 50 lire per hectare, payable at any time within the 20 year period.
Colonists were to be encouraged by a ten year exemption from
taxation. Would-be settlers were advised to arrive between October
and December, and were informed that the cost of establishing an
average family would be from 2,500 to 3,500 lire. No more assist-
ance, however, would be given in raising the money. On the other
hand, the Government promised to provide temporary lodging, but
expected colonists to shoulder certain responsibilities, including,
significantly enough, defence in time of emergency. 100
The statement all in all could hardly have been expected to
encourage many settlers. A family of prospective colonists was
invited to spend 2,500 or more lire, but was offered little in return.
As an anonymous Italian critic later observed: “What farmer in
Italy possessing such a sum would decide to emigrate? And if he
did would he wish to risk his life and savings in a country where
the results of European farming were still unknown? Would he not
prefer to go elsewhere?”101
Meanwhile in Eritrea itself the settlers became increasingly
anxious as the threat of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia
became more serious. There was some panic after the revolt of
Batha Hagos in December, 1894, and the fighting with Ras Man-
gasha which followed it. 102 Any chances of success which the
scheme might have had were destroyed when Menelik mobilised
for war in September, 1895. The Italian withdrawal from Makale in
December caused panic among the colonists. The Ethiopian victory
100 Ibid., 411-14, 447-48; I Nostri Errori, 178-79.
101 Ibid., 178.
102 Ibid., 171.
Papers in African History 151
at Adowa on March 1, 1891, transformed the situation, for as Wylde
says, “nearly all the Italian cultivators immediately ran away to the
coast/’103 Commenting on the settlement at Godofelassi as he saw it
immediately after the battle, he suggested that the Italians had in
fact achieved little to cause them to cling to the land. “The agri-
cultural settlement,” he says, “was a very poor affair, and the houses
built for the settlers were simply a copy of the ordinary Abyssinian
round-shaped, with the addition of a fireplace and a chimney. They
were neither clean nor sanitary, and their fittings were ill-
arranged. ... I looked in vain for good barns, storehouses and
cattlesheds. No vestige of gardens had been planted. The agri-
cultural implements were also mostly very poor, but I saw a fair
specimen of a light iron plough for two oxen which was a great
improvement on that used by the natives, and brought up the
ground quicker and better.”104
A minor but abortive attempt at settlement was made by a
Venetian Catholic society with the help of Father Michele, the
Apostolic Vicar of Eritrea, but the handful of would-be colonists
who arrived found that no preparations had been made for
them. There were no houses near the lands they had been allocated,
no agricultural implements, no cattle, no provisions, no armed
escort. The emigrants, who were unaccustomed to the conditions in
the Colony, were greatly depressed by the previous failures, and
decided to return home. 105
Italian settlement had in fact suffered a severe blow from which
it could not easily recover. This was underlined by an Italian
publication of 1898 which explained that the fields had been aban-
doned and allowed to deteriorate; the cattle, agricultural implements
and crops were either lost or stolen; the settlers, many of whom had
fled in panic and spent many months in the heat of Massawa, were
completely demoralised. 106 Though the end of hostilities removed
the immediate danger to security, the humiliation of the Italian
defeat maintained the despondency of the settlers. Morale was low
103 Wylde, Abyssinia, 131; Mantegazza, La Guerra, 284; de Lauribar, Abys-
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even though strict precautions were taken. As Powell-Cotton notes,
“no native, unless a soldier, was allowed to carry arms.”107
From the economic point of view, too, things were far from
hopeful. As Bartolommei-Gioli noted, the end of the war was
followed by a contraction in the market for agricultural produce.
The settlers also suffered from the fact that as the country gradually
recovered from the great famine the Eritreans began marketing
increased quantities of provisions at substantially lower prices than
those demanded by the Italian farmers with their higher standard
of living. 108 Little seems to have come of Bartolommei-Gioli’s own
idea of raising the land tax in order to reduce the profits of the
“native” and thereby to oblige him to restrict his holdings in areas
suitable for European cultivation and to move to lower and less
healthy areas. 109
The idea of settlement, though not officially repudiated, ceased
to dominate government policy as before. The officials entrusted
with the continuation of the scheme proved moreover less enter-
prising than Franchetti: they were bureaucratic in their methods,
ignorant alike of agricultural needs and local conditions, and were
too frequently changed. They made no attempt to ascertain which
areas were most suitable for colonisation in part, it is said, because
any comprehensive survey would have revived and intensified the
fears of the Eritrean population. 110
Above all the policy of land expropriation which had evoked
such bitter discontent was for the time being at least suspended.
The issue of decrees establishing State lands and reserving them for
colonisation had, significantly enough, been terminated at the
outbreak of fighting in the latter part of 1895. No expropriation
orders were made between July 1895 and May 1899; the only decree
relating to land in this period was one of March 31, 1897, which
provided compensation for the people of Bet Gabru who had earlier
been deprived of their lands in Scinnara,111 Decrees creating or
defining State land began to be issued again in May 1899, but no
107 Powell-Cotton, Sporting Trip, 435.
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longer made reference to the reservation of land for colonisation.
The post-war Governor, Martini, who took office on December 16,
1897, was, as we have seen, totally opposed to the land policy of
his predecessor and had no desire of reinstating it. In his diary,
which is a revealing document, Martini, noted as early as March
and April, 1898, that the seizure of monastery lands at Debra Bizen
had been "unjust” and the "greatest possible error.”112 In later
entries he ridiculed Franchetti’s ignorance of customary land tenure
and described the Bizen expropriation as a "foolish error,” the
effects of which had been “very injurious for us.” He added that
the confiscation of land belonging to the Debra Mercorios monks
was "unjust and unjustifiable” as well as stupid and damaging to
Italy. 113
The degree to which the colonisation plan had failed can be
judged from a report written on June 15, 1901, by the British envoy
in Addis Ababa, Thomas Hohler, in which he remarked that the
Italian colonists had left after the battle of Adowa but that “none
had since come to take their place.”114 Later he observed in his
memoirs that the Italians “seemed to be making no progress what-
ever” in Eritrea where there were "really no colonists and only a
few shopkeepers.” He added "The colony was not popular and the
officers only came to it attracted by the higher pay they received.
Again the officers are not popular: at one moment they will be
genial and familiar with their men, at another abusive, coarse and
tyrannical.”115
The low calibre of Italian personnel was in part due to the fact
that the Government of metropolitan Italy had largely lost interest
in the Colony. Theoretical approval for a policy of settlement was
voiced by the Foreign Minister, Tommaso Tittoni, on May 16, 1907,
but the need for "great caution” was also stressed—a clear recogni-
tion that the lesson of Baratieri’s mistakes had been learnt. The
speech argued that the ‘Test pieces of land,” if really unoccupied,
should be reserved for immigrants, but added: “if upon the expira-
tion of the leases which the natives at present hold we should send
Martini, Dario, I, 106, 119.
H3 Ibid., II, 29, 99, 226, 301, 407, III, 32.
H4 F.O. 403/313, Hohler, June 15, 1901.
ii® T. Hohler, Diplomatic Petrel (London, 1942), 59.
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them away from the land they now occupy, then the question
would become very serious and would assume a political character
... it is clear that any provision too lightly decided upon might
start a dangerous unrest in the Colony/'116
Two years later the question of land allocation was regulated by
the Italian Land Statute of 1909 (revised in 1926) which trans-
formed further land into Crown property or terre demaniali
(domanial lands). The application of this statue affected a large
variety of lands:—lands which were decreed Crown property for
military or economic reasons, or for reasons of public utility (e.g.,
building-land, roads, rivercourses, land needed for fortifications or
aerodromes, mines, quarries and forests); lands the old titles to
which were repealed for political reasons; and land to which no
clear native title existed. 117 The new statute represented a com-
promise between the desire of encouraging settlement and the fear
of provoking discontent as Baratieri had done a decade or so
earlier. Though the law did not envisage the extensive interference
with traditional rights proposed by the 1891 commission its applica-
tion tended once again to serve the interests of settlement. “The
regard for the Italian colonists,” writes Nadel, “often overruled all
other considerations, so that the expropriations exceeded the terms
of the Statute and became indistinguishable from expropriations
ad hoc. The banks of rivers are a typical instance: here it became
the established practice to regard as domanial, not only the river-
courses themselves, but also the land on the banks to a depth of
20-30 yards—land, that is, which is specially adapted for the Euro-
pean type of cultivation.”118
The urge to settle, however, had, as we have seen by now largely
evaporated. An Italian writer summing up the position in 1911
declared, “Italian colonial expansion is slow,” and added, “the civil
bureaucracy of Italy still blocks the way to those economic and
commercial reforms which are . . . desirable.”119
116 T. Tittoni, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy (London, 1914), 281.
117 Nadel, “Tenure,” 18-19.
ns Ibid., 19n.
119 A. Baldacci, “Italian Colonial Expansion,” United Empire (1911), 498.
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The failure of the settlement scheme, which had done so much
to arouse opposition to the Italians, may be illustrated by official
figures. These reveal that Italian emigration to all parts of the world
rose steadily between 1890 and 1905 as shown in the following
table: 120
Italian Emigration, 1890-1905
Year Number of Emigrants
1890 217,244
1891 293,631
1892 223,667
1893 246,751
1894 225,323
1895 293,181
1896 307,482
1897 299,855
1898 283,715
1899 308,339
1900 352,782
1901 533,245
1902 531,509
1903 507,976
1904 471,191
1905 726,331
Though Italian emigration between 1890 and 1905 thus totalled
no less than 5,822,222 persons the number of Italians who had gone
to Eritrea were infinitesimal and even fewer, as we have seen, had
remained there. The Eritrean Census of 1905 showed that the total
European population amounted to only 3,949. 121
No less remarkable was the fact that out of 1,617 adult male
Europeans there were only 62 persons classified as agriculturalists
as against 834 military, 349 in industry and 219 in commerce. The
detailed occupational break-down was as follows: 122
120 L’Emigrazione Italiana dal 1910 al 1923, 819.
121 Relazione sulla Colonia Eritrea, I, 46, 50.
122 Ibid., 50; Omodeo, Eritrea, 46.
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European Occupational Pattern in Eritrea, 1905
Occupation Males Females
Agriculture 62 —
Industry 349 18
Commerce 219 10
Domestic service 6 9
Public administration 86 1
Military 834 —
Teaching 1 4
Culture 11 19
Professions 49 1
Without profession 54 261
The number of settlers was in fact steadily declining. In 1902
there had been 126 colonists of whom only 36 cultivated more than
5 hectares, the total area under cultivation being only 1,524 hectares.
By 1913 the number of settlers had fallen to 61 and the extent of
cultivation to 1,146 hectares. 123
The statistics of colonisation reveal that the idea of settlement,
which had inspired Italian expansion and provoked substantial
popular resistance by the local inhabitants, had been almost entirely
unsuccessful. The failure of the policy of Franchetti and of those
who followed in his footsteps was symbolized in 1904 when a com-
mission of agricultural labourers was sent to Eritrea from Romagna
to investigate possibilities of settlement. Ascending the slopes of
Ghinda, one of the men indignantly exclaimed, “Romagna shall
never come here.”124 Though the Italian Government never re-
nounced its policy of settlement the practical difficulties of colonisa-
tion were such as to prevent its realisation on any significant scale.
At the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century Eritrea was
the home of only a handful of Europeans, a mere fraction of them
engaged in agriculture, even though it had been the subject of
attempts to create a colony of settlement from the 1880’s onwards.
It was left to Mussolini, in this respect a disciple of Franchetti, to
attempt to solve the Italian population problem in Africa. Italian
settlement in Eritrea was again attempted in the 1930’s, but this
movement also was of too short a duration to have an effect com-
parable to that of colonization in a settler country such as Kenya.
—
123 Ibid., 58n.
124 F. Coletti, Dell’Emigrazione Italiana (Rome, 1911), II, 137.
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The British government did not give full attention to the problem
of the slave trade from East Africa until the years after the ending
of this trade from West Africa. 1 In the early seventies the Govern-
ment decided that a new treaty was necessary with the Sultan of
Zanzibar, replacing the treaty of 1845 between Britain and Zanzibar,
so as to forbid the exportation of slaves from his dominions on the
African mainland. It had been shown that greater effort was neces-
sary in policing the waters adjacent to the Sultan’s territory.
This decision to end the sea-borne slave trade led to plans for
the building of freed slave centers in the Sultan’s dominions some-
what similar to those already existing in West Africa. It was hoped
that such settlements would serve both to improve the lot of the
rescued Africans and to work against the continuance of the slave
trade. The subject of this paper is the progress of the Church
Missionary Society (C.M.S.) establishment near Mombasa which
was founded as the result of these hopes.
The Church Missionary Society had established the first Protestant
mission station in East Africa, near Mombasa, in 1844.2 Included
among its early members were the well-known exploring mis-
sionaries,
J.
L. Krapf,
J.
Rebmann and James Erhardt. The C.M.S.
efforts were not successful, however, and the mission in time was
all but abandoned, Rebmann alone representing the Society for
many years.
He was not able to cope with the difficulties of the situation. A
1 For British policy, see R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa,
1856-1890 (London, 1939), 152ff.
2 For the early years of the mission, see Eugene Stock, The History of the
Church Missionary Society (London, 1899), II, 125ff; J. Lewis Krapf, Travels,
Researches, and Missionary Labours during an Eighteen Years’ Residence in
Eastern Africa (London, 1860); R. C. Bridges, “Krapf and the Strategy of
the Mission to East Africa, 1844-1855,” Makerere Journal, V (1961), 37-50;
Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London, 1952), 5-9.
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British official visited Rebmann at Rabai, near Mombasa, in 1864;
the missionary then had spent eighteen years on his station. The
official found the mission in decay. Rebmann himself was in poor
health and seemed to have lost his spirit from the long period of
apparently fruitless missionary labor. It was reported that many
years before he had decided it was “a moral impossibility” for the
local Africans to accept Christianity, and thus he had given up try-
ing to convert them. Rebmann’s energies were then devoted to
building, but his progress was so slow that his work decayed before
it was finished. 3 The C.M.S. officials were aware of this situation
and had an explanation for their allowing Rebmann to remain in
East Africa: “The chief inducement with the Committee to continue
the Mission is the hope that Mr. Rebmann’s linguistic labours may
lay the foundation of future evangelistic success. . . .”4 These hopes
were never fully realized.
This rather sad picture was to change in 1873 as a result of a
British diplomatic mission to act against the slave trade carried on
in the Sultan of Zanzibar’s dominions. Sir Bartle Frere5 was the
leader of this mission. It was clear that if he were successful, slaves
taken from illegal carriers would have to be landed somewhere.
The C.M.S. considered that this situation provided for a revival of
their position at Mombasa. Members of the mission held discussions
with Frere before his departure for Zanzibar; they felt that he had
intimated to them that their station would become a principal depot
for the landing of captured slaves. 6 The mission was partly correct
in this assumption. Frere had demonstrated interest in stations for
freed slaves even before he was designated to negotiate with the
Sultan of Zanzibar. Following a suggestion of Livingstone, he
incorporated in a memorandum to the Foreign Office the idea that
a settlement of freed Africans would be “a powerful agent in the . . .
3 Playfair to Bombay Government, Apr. 9, 1864, Foreign Office (F.O.)
84/1224, Public Record Office, London; Rebmann to Hamerton, Nov. 27,
1854, Zanzibar Museum.
4 Venn to Pelly, May 24, 1865, E-46, Zanzibar Archives. ( Hereafter, Z.A.
)
5 For the background to this mission, R. J. Gavin, “The Bartle Frere Mission
to Zanzibar, 1873,” The Historical Journal, V (1962), 122-48.
6 Hutchinson to Tozer, Jan. 16, 1873, Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.)
Archives.
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direction of commerce and of civilisation” for East Africa; Frere
made no specific reference to missions, however.7 The Foreign
Office was receptive to this suggestion and instructed Frere to
report on the probable disposal and custody of future freed slaves
in East Africa. 8
This decision was the apparent result of discussions going on in
Britain concerning the previous policy of landing captured slaves
at such places as the Seychelles and Mauritius. Protests against
this policy, as somehow leading to the exploitation of these Africans,
were rising in the late 1860’s and led to some public meetings
concerning the subject. 9 Thus the Foreign Office was ready for
Frere to conduct a study to remove any stigma that Britain was
using the former slaves for the benefit of her colonial settlements.
Frere arrived in East Africa in January 1873, where he soon
visited most of the important centers on the African coast. He
inspected the mission stations then in operation—the Boman
Catholic Holy Ghost Mission, 10 the Universities’ Mission to Central
Africa, the C.M.S. and the United Methodist Free Churches Mission.
The Roman Catholics, located in Zanzibar and Bagamoyo, received
the highest praise for their work. The Protestants did not fare so
well. Frere said of the C.M.S. : “It has been longer at work, with
less apparent result, than any mission on this coast.” Frere, how-
ever, still held that all the missions had a role to play; he thought
that freed slave settlements could be founded in the Sultan’s terri-
tory with no fear for their safety, and that they could support any
number of slaves. An additional point in the favor of this plan was
the fact that the missions would not require the direct support or
7 Frere memorandum dated Aug. 26, 1872, in F.O. 84/1386. For Living-
stone’s ideas, Sir Reginald Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey (London,
1945), 223.
8 Granville to Frere, Nov. 9, 1872, F.O. 84/1385. The C.M.S. wrote Frere to
press this point, while the Bishop of Winchester spoke publicly of an estab-
lishment of freed slaves in the area. See Hutchinson to Frere, Dec. 19, 1872,
C.M.S. Archives, and the Bishop’s speech as reported in The New York Herald
of Nov. 17, 1872.
9 Stock, History, III, 74-76. See also reports of meetings in The New York
Herald of Nov. 17, 1872 and May 23, 1873.
10 For the Holy Ghost Mission, see Norman R. Bennett, Studies in East
African History (Boston, 1963), 54-75.
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the supervision of the government. 11 In a preliminary plan, Frere
instructed Kirk, British representative at Zanzibar, to send what
slaves he could to the missions, particularly the Holy Ghost Fathers
and the U.M.C.A., with a few for the C.M.S. and the Methodists.
He also recommended that the government contribute a share of
the cost of such a step as far as children were concerned. 12
Frere incorporated his sentiments in a full report to the Foreign
Office on the freed slave problem. 13 He thought that any settlement
should meet six conditions: (1) security and freedom for the slaves
landed; ( 2 ) possibility for the slaves to maintain themselves by their
own labor without any permanent burden to Britain; (3) education
of all slaves able to receive it; (4) proximity to a climate the slaves
were accustomed to; (5) freedom for the slaves to aid in the forma-
tion of other “free, self-sustaining communities”; (6) all to be
accomplished at “no inordinate expense to the English Treasury.”
With these conditions, Frere decided that any potential station
had to be located near the area of the original capture of the slaves;
he concluded that this eliminated all places but Zanzibar and the
opposite coast. Thus Frere recommended the dominions of the
Sultan where he had proved to his satisfaction that no hindrances
would be placed before missionary societies engaging in such
work. 14
But the missions in Zanzibar itself did not meet all of Frere’s
conditions—for the rest, stations on the coast were necessary. He
mentioned a series of possible posts from Somaliland to the Por-
tuguese settlements, recommending the utilization of the four mis-
sions that already had stations established on that coast. He noted
that most of them were planning future expansion; he suggested
that a £5 subsidy for each slave given would be a great aid to
this development. Of interest to the theme of this paper is the
11 Frere to Granville, Mar. 25, 1873, F.O. 84/1389.
12 Frere to Granville, Apr. 3, 1873, enclosing Frere to Kirk, Apr. 1, 1873,
F.O. 84/1390.
13 Included in Frere to Granville, May 7, 1873, F.O. 84/1391.
14 The U.M.C.A. and Holy Ghost Fathers had already received limited
numbers of slaves and had experienced no difficulties. See Gertrude Ward,
Letters of Bishop Tozer (London, 1902), 81ff; U.M.C.A., Zanzibar Diary,
1864-1888 (in possession of the present Zanzibar U.M.C.A. Mission), entry of
Sept. 16, 1864 and ff.
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fact that only the local C.M.S. representative, of all the missionaries
consulted, opposed Frere’s plans. Rebmann, who now was against
introducing “anything like an industrial or worldly element into
the teaching or action of the mission,” had no interest in the
scheme. Events had passed Rebmann by, however, and his days
in East Africa were almost over. To Frere, there was little reason
to pay attention to him since his way of life had robbed him of
all influence in the area. Frere said: his “holy life of ascetic self
denial and indifference to all worldly enjoyments and employments
. . . have had the usual effect of exciting admiration, without secur-
ing the imitation, of the people around him.”15
John Kirk in Zanzibar gave full support to Frere’s ideas. Previ-
ously, in 1871, he had reported to the Foreign Office the need for
a new location, perhaps “somewhere on the coast, possibly not an
English possession but certainly under our administration,” as a
place from which to control the busy land slave trade. He admitted
that the Rritish would have problems in securing the right place
for this establishment, but he recommended freed slaves be landed,
since the “depositing [of] them at Aden or Seychelles to be treated
worse than slaves” was no proper method of disposal. 16
The C.M.S.
,
therefore, at the end of 1873 decided to send rein-
forcements to Mombasa to revive their mission and to prepare it
for the reception of freed slaves—even though the Foreign Office
had made no commitment to land any there. Two missionaries,
J.
Sparshott and W. Chancellor, and their families, arrived in Novem-
ber 1873 to take up this work. They found Rebmann nearly blind
and arranged, after some difficulty, for his return to Europe. Spar-
shott, the leader of the new group, found little to encourage him
in the attitude of the British officials in Zanzibar. Kirk said only
that “he will think of us if any [slaves] come in his way.”17 Kirk
then returned temporarily to Europe; his replacement, Prideaux,
was a little more favourable to the C.M.S., but he made any possible
15 See the enclosures in the despatch listed in footnote 13 for mission views
on freed slaves.
is Kirk to F.O, Mar. 20, 1871 and July 19, 1871, E-61, Z.A.
17 Sparshott to C.M.S., Dec. 12, 1873, C.M.S. Archives. Kirk’s attitude
came from a visit to the station in November 1873; he was unimpressed with
its development.
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disposition of slaves conditional on the ability of the mission to
prove that they could support them. 18
The missionaries prepared for slaves in spite of this initial dis-
couragement. They soon began to experience problems common
to other mission stations in Africa resulting from their assuming
jurisdiction over Africans, sometimes as the result of a failure of
local government officials to act, but often for little other reason
than their own short tempers. As a consequence, the first of a long
series of difficulties for the mission, the British officials, and the
administration of Zanzibar occurred. Sparshott assaulted a native
who refused to stop what the missionary considered an unjustifiable
disturbance. Immediately afterward a group of soldiers came from
the Sultan’s governor at Mombasa to surround his residence. All
ended well in this instance with the payment of a small sum to the
injured African. More important, however, was the fact that Spar-
shott saw nothing reprehensible in his actions; he wrote home
that he often acted in this manner, and that “on one or two
occasions caught a fellow a good stripe with a stick.”19 This attitude
of disregarding the Sultan’s officials would bear bitter fruit for the
C.M.S. in the future.
Sparshott and his associates soon demonstrated another tendency
that characterized the C.M.S. in East Africa—the inability of fellow
missionaries to work together in peace. Sparshott, and others later,
apparently were willing to meet and to overcome any handicap
to spread their religion but that of controlling their own impulses
in relation to each other. Rebmann was the first problem; he
delayed leaving and soon had the two new missionaries taking
opposite sides as to his future. While he remained, Rebmann op-
posed all the new plans of the C.M.S. He had decided that conver-
sion of the Africans was impossible for the present, at least until
“the natives have been taught the whole of Old Testament his-
18 Prideaux to C.M.S., Feb. 10, 1874, E-64, Z.A.
19 Sparshott to C.M.S., Jan. 8, 1874, C.M.S. Archives. Sparshott did not
neglect to mention that such difficulties with the governor boded against the
future success of the C.M.S. plans for freed slaves. See H. B. Thomas, “The
Death of Dr. Livingstone: Cams Farrar’s Narrative,” The Uganda Journal,
XIV (1950), 120, for another notice of Sparshott’s ill-treatment.
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tory.”20 While Rebmann remained, all forward progress of the
mission came to an end.21
The arrival of an experienced missionary to take command at
Mombasa stopped this bickering for a time. W. Salter Price, who
had served at the C.M.S. center at Nassick, in India, where former
African slaves were trained, landed in East Africa in late 1874.
He had instructions to build up a new mission station that would
offer industrial training to Africans and to develop the old center
of Rabai as a Christian village.22 The death of Livingstone, with the
effects this had in Britain, apparently was a main stimulus to this
sending of Price with money raised through the renewed interest
in missions.23
Price was appalled at the state of the mission, describing it as
“at the lowest ebb whilst outwardly everything had an air of dirt
and dilapidation.” He also noted that the British officials in Zanzi-
bar remained little interested in sending any slaves to the mission.24
Prideaux in Zanzibar in fact wrote home to oppose the entire idea
of a freed slave station in East Africa. He praised the Seychelles,
and, referring to slaves previously given to missions, said, “it is
impossible to deny that so far as the amelioration of the freed
African is concerned, those institutions have been practically fail-
ures.” Therefore, since he had no specific instructions concerning
his behavior to Price, he merely introduced him to the Sultan and
then left him on his own until word came from Britain.25
Price went directly to work to improve this situation. His first
task was to secure land outside of the city limits of Mombasa for
the creation of a settlement for the freed slaves yet to come.26
20 Sparshott to C.M.S., May 21, 1874, C.M.S. Archive; Kirk to F.O., Nov. 6,
1873, E-63C, Z.A.
21 Chancellor to C.M.S., Aug. 6, 1874 and Sept. 29, 1874, C.M.S. Archives.
22 Stock, History, III, 83. Interestingly enough, Frere in his depatch of May
7, 1873, given above had noted that an East African mission for freed slaves
needed a man like Price of Nassick.
23 E. C. Dawson, James Hannington (London, 1887), 308.
24 Price to Hutchinson, Nov. 19, 1874, C.M.S. Archives. Price and Spar-
shott soon quarrelled and the latter was recalled. See Price to Hutchinson, Jan.
4, 1875; Price to Wright, received Feb. 22, 1875: ibid.
25 Prideaux to F.O., Jan. 2, 1875, E-71, Z.A.
26 The C.M.S. had wished new land from the start and had instructed
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Good land was found in possession of an Arab willing to sell, but
it became apparent that the owner feared persecution from the
Wali, or governor, of Mombasa for dealing with a Christian. Price
had anticipated such problems, applying to the Sultan at an early
date for permission to buy land. He reported, “I am most anxious
to do nothing calculated to give offense to the authorities, however
unreasonable and annoying their requirements may be.”27 This
was a rare attitude among C.M.S. missionaries.
The sale was delayed by local fears and the absence of John Kirk
in Britain.28 When he did return, the Sultan gave full approval and
assurances when Kirk pointed out the British-Zanzibar Treaty of
1845 permitted establishments by British subjects.29 Kirk was
prepared to help the C.M.S. more actively because of talks he had
had with their officials while in London; the C.M.S. officials felt
that this visit presaged more active government aid in the future.30
This assumption was correct since Kirk on his return promised to
send slaves, asking Price how many he could handle.31
With this approval, and with the purchase of the necessary land,
the C.M.S. was ready to go forward. 32 Price asserted they could
accept 250 slaves at once, plus any number of slaves in the follow-
Sparshott to secure it. There is no report of any action by Sparshott, See
Hutchinson to Kirk, Dec. 22, 1874, C.M.S. Archives.
27 Price to Kirk, Feb. 23, 1875, E-69, Z.A.; Price to Hutchinson, June 14,
1875, C.M.S. Archives.
28 Prideaux did not get along with the Sultan and advised Price to await
Kirk. From Price’s “Journal,” entry of Feb. 13, 1875, ibid.
29 Kirk to Price, Mar. 22, 1875 and Apr. 28, 1875, ibid. The Sultan later
made this statement with reference to land-holding on the coast: “His High-
ness
. .
. said that he denied all right of native tribes within his power to
hold property in land, that the land was crown land, and the native had no
right to sell. That he would give the land you [some Methodist missionaries]
had bargained for and reserve to himself the right of compelling the people
to refund the money that had been taken under what he called false pretences
by parties that had no power to sell.” Kirk to Wakefield, Mar. 5, 1877,
E-73, Z.A.
30 Hutchinson to Price, Feb. 12, 1875, C.M.S. Archives.
31 Kirk to Price, Mar. 17, 1875, ibid.
32 For the final details of the land question, Price to Kirk, Apr. 7, 1875,
ibid.; Price to Kirk, May 13, 1875, E-69, Z.A.
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ing year. He noted that he preferred children, but would take all
ages for the moment.33
Slaves were soon sent to the mission. Over 250 slaves, about 180
of them children, arrived: the C.M.S. work had finally begun.34 The
missionaries quickly learned, however, that great problems would
arise from their efforts to deal with Africans that had little previous
contact with western civilization. Price noted that they could work
with the children satisfactorily, but that the adults were “a lot
of idle savages, and until they can be made to understand their
position and our kind feelings towards them we shall have some-
thing to do to keep order.” He sent an immediate request for more
Europeans for work on the station.35
In addition, the inevitable problem of jurisdiction over Africans
located on the mission arose. The missionaries had to deal with
“several cases of crime and evil conduct”: they decided to enforce
their own concept of the law. They faced cases involving murder
and the enticing of mission people away by local Swahilis. But
Price realized that he might be breaking the law, since the area
of the mission was in the territory of Zanzibar. He wrote Kirk
for advice.36 Kirk replied at once that Price had to go through the
local judicial system. There was an approved practice, Kirk stated,
whereby a mission could act to regulate its internal affairs, but
this was all. Any case involving corporal punishment had either
to be sent to the Sultan’s court or to receive the advance approval
of the Consul.37 Price accepted this decision, releasing the few
individuals he then held in prison.38 No serious harm had been
done; if the mission had continued to act in this way, much future
friction would have been avoided.
The landing of the former slaves at Mombasa also raised the
33 Price to Euan Smith, Aug. 16, 1875, C.M.S. Archives; Price to Holm-
wood, undated 1875, E-69, Z.A.
34 Price to Hutchinson, Sept. 22, 1875, C.M.S. Archives; Euan Smith to
Price, Aug. 30, 1875 and Sept. 18, 1875, E-70, Z.A.; Euan Smith to F.O.,
Sept. 20, 1875, E-72, ibid.
35 Price to Wright, Oct. 5, 1875, C.M.S. Archives.
36 Forster to Wright, Oct. 5, 1875, ibid.; Price to Kirk, Oct. 9, 1875, E-70,
Z.A.
37 Kirk to Price, Oct. 18, 1875, ibid.
33 Price to Kirk, Nov. 21. 1875. ibid.
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question of their exact status. In early 1875, Sparshott appeared
to have the impression that they were British subjects.39 This matter
had been raised in East Africa at least as early as 1870 when the
Consul at Zanzibar had requested a decision from the Bombay
Government since Kirk and Seward, both then officials in Zanzibar,
regarded freed slaves as subjects.40 Later references indicate that
the reply was negative; Kirk answered the C.M.S. in 1875 that
he could not give former slaves his full protection since they would
then be on a par with British subjects.41 Thus the mission appeared
to have no course but to follow the Muslim rules of law for regula-
ting their major problems.
To resolve the problem of Muslim jurisdiction, the C.M.S. had
worked from the beginning of its renewed interest in East Africa
to secure the appointment of a British Vice-Consul for Mombasa.
They hoped he would be a member of their mission, even propos-
ing he work without cost to the government.42 In 1876 the mission
pushed firmly for what they considered a legitimate claim, with
Price suggesting an additional step:
The recognition of our colony as British soil under the protection
of the British flag would no doubt be a great step towards the
suppression of slavery in East Africa. As it is the existence of our
colony is now widely known, and the number of poor slaves who
come to us for our protection from many quarters ... is increasing.
The decision as to one’s duty in these various cases is often pain-
fully embarrassing; the dictates of humanity say one thing, the
miserable laws of the country say another. We try with God’s help
to do the best we can under the circumstances, perhaps stretching
a point or two in favour of the poor slave. . . . 43
The C.M.S. decided on positive action before the Foreign Office
had made any decision, hoping to influence it to act. Captain W.
39 Sparshott to Prideaux, Jan. 16, 1875, E-69, ibid. In the 1850’s a recent
writer notes that inhabitants of Sierra Leone were regarded practically as
protected subjects. See C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its
Rulers (Oxford, 1961), 56.
40 Churchill to Bombay Government, Sept. 13, 1870, F.O. 84/1325.
44 Kirk to F.O., Dec. 25, 1875, E-72, Z.A.
42 Price to Euan Smith, July 16, 1875, E-72, Z.A.; Euan Smith wrote to
F.O., July 26, 1875, ibid., favoring this plan.
43 Price to Hutchinson, Mar. 1, 1876, C.M.S. Archives. The problems of
slaves fleeing to the mission will be discussed below.
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Russell, a former naval officer, was appointed independent lay
|
superintendent of the mission in April 1876; his instructions openly
stated the hope he would soon be Vice-Consul.44 Once the appoint-
ment was made, the C.M.S. wrote to the Foreign Office to request
: that Russell be designated a Vice-Consul; his salary was to be £400
a year, the Society requesting the Government to pay about one-
half of it. 45 The outlook appeared favorable for this step since,
at the same time, Kirk sent home a report backing the plan, al-
though he pointed out that any C.M.S. official would have a delicate
task in resolving the problems of a Christian community on Muslim
soil.46 No immediate action was taken, however, in spite of con-
tinued C.M.S. urging; they even offered to release Russell from
their service so that he might be a full-time official.47
All these importunities came at the time of a minor crisis in
Mombasa. A new decree against the slave trade by the Sultan had
created some unrest; 48 the activities of the mission added to it.
The threat to the C.M.S. came from their harboring slaves fleeing
from nearby owners. When the owners came after their property,
they were seized. The result was a petition sent to the Sultan
blaming Price, “for where as he formerly turned away any slave
that took refuge with him from his master, now he harbours him
and when they [the African Christians] find a slave in irons they
release him.” The Sultan’s governor, who had tried unsuccessfully
to settle this, came out particularly hard against the mission: “these
negroes are arrogant, finding themselves supported by the Mis-
sionaries and reckless as to consequences.” The intervention of Kirk
ended the difficulty; he was hopeful all had learned a lesson for
the future.49
44 Instructions ... to Captain W.F.A.H. Russell, Apr. 25, 1876; Wright
to Price, June 1, 1876; ibid. For details on Russell, Register of Missionaries . . „
and Native Clergy from 1804 to 1904, ibid.
45 Lister to Kirk, May 4, 1876, enclosing Hutchinson to Derby, Apr. ?,
1876, Q-15, Z.A.
46 Kirk to Derby, May 5, 1876, F.O. 84/1452.
47 Hutchinson to Kirk, Aug. 21, 1876, C.M.S. Archives. Oliver, Missionary
Factor, 82-83, points out that the C.M.S. must have expected greater govern-
mental aid than they were to receive.
48 See Coupland, Exploitation of East Africa, 224-29.
49 Kirk to Derby, June 7, 1876, with enclosures, F.O. 84/1453. The Nassick
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These events caused Kirk to reflect on the projected plan for
a C.M.S. member as Vice-Consul. He noted that such an official
would have to preside over his own mission people if similar
disputes recurred. Kirk then came out openly against the scheme.
He said he would favor it only if the British government lacked
funds for alternative action, “but in that case the Consul will be
a small advantage to any but the Society whose servant he is.”50
The Foreign Office also reacted strongly to this affair. One official,
Wylde, noted that legal moves against Price could be avoided, but
he had to be informed of “the necessity of behaving in as concilia-
tory a manner as possible towards the authorities and people by
whom they are surrounded.” Lord Derby agreed, and then demon-
strated his general attitude to the C.M.S. Wylde had recommended
that the Government counsel the mission to stop all interference
with domestic slavery. Derby replied that Wylde was right, but
that they should not mention this since “we cannot trust these
people not to use any such advice against us if they see their way
to gain popularity by it.” He added, “And they are sure not to
take the advice.”51 Thus no Vice-Consul was appointed and Zanzi-
bar law continued to apply to the mission residents.
While the C.M.S. attempted to get a Vice-Consul for Mombasa,
it also worked to receive a subsidy from the Government, as Frere
had recommended, for the care of freed slaves.52 Kirk favored a
subsidy for all missions in East Africa, and recommended £5 a
slave. In return, each mission would be expected to accept slaves
at the shortest notice.53
Christians, brought from India, were long a problem to the mission. Price,
with prior experience, usually worked well with them, but others took an
uncharitable view. Sparshott called them “the very dregs of society, a shame
any dishonour to Christianity.” See Sparshott to Wright, May 21, 1874, C.M.S.
Archives. See also a later letter from some of these Africans stating their side
of the problem—David, Semler and others to C.M.S., Feb. 28, 1881, ibid.
so Kirk to Derby, lune 21, 1876, F.O. 84/1453.
51 Notes on Kirk to Derby, lune 7, 1876, ibid. See also Notes on Kirk to
Derby, fune 27, 1876, ibid.
52 Derby to Kirk, May 4, 1876, F.O. 84/1451; Hutchinson to Kirk, Apr. 7,
1876, C.M.S. Archives.
53 Kirk to Derby, May 5, 1876 and lune 20, 1876, F.O. 84/1453. Kirk
also recommended an advance of £500 to the C.M.S. for building, etc.
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Foreign Office officials were divided on this. Wylde, as he had
previously, gave his support to the proposal. Lister concurred; he
was worried over the remarks made about sending freed slaves
to British colonies as laborers. Pauncefote also agreed. Derby,
however, was not convinced. He said: “I do not like what is in
effect subsidising these Missions. It is a thing we have never done.”
Pauncefote met this by observing: “Is it not rather paying them
for services performed and reimbursing them for expenses incurred.”
Lister in spite of his general agreement did not wish to forward
the matter to the Treasury at that time; Derby accepted this
evasion, and there the problem remained for some time.54
Kirk therefore had no alternative. He considered the missions
could receive no more slaves without a subsidy; he thus sent many
new slaves to Natal where there was a great demand, and where
there were proper regulations for their care. He continued to write
the Foreign Office, however, that the Zanzibar area was the best
location for these slaves.55
Price returned to England during this period; he there stressed
the problem of caring for slaves without support from the Govern-
ment. He reported that there were 380 freed slaves at Frere Town,
about 250 of them adults. The estimated cost of putting an adult
slave in a condition to support himself was £5; this did not take
into account the cost of operating Frere Town. The children cost
£3 a month until the age of fifteen. Thus Price felt that the Govern-
ment should be asked to contribute £2,420.56 Russell continued to
press similar demands on Kirk, but the British official could do
nothing more.57 The mission then appears to have dropped the
matter for a time.
Frere Town, therefore, had to carry on its early development
54 Notes on Kirk to Derby, May 5, 1876 and June 20, 1876, ibid.
55 Kirk to Derby, Sept. 21, 1876, F.O. 84/1454. For disposal of slaves in
1877, see Kirk to Derby, Sept. 14, 1877, F.O. 84/1486. Wylde noted on this
despatch that a subsidy of £5 a slave was cheap compared to the Sierra
Leone costs of £5,000 a year.
56 Price to C.M.S., Jan. 25, 1877, C.M.S. Archives. For a slightly different
estimate of the numbers at Frere Town, Kirk to Derby, Jan. 10, 1877, enclos-
ing Russell to Kirk, Jan. 4, 1877, F.O. 84/1484.
s? Russell to Kirk, Jan. 4, 1877; Kirk to Russell, Jan. 10, 1877, E-73, Z.A.
Kirk to Russell, Jan. 20, 1877, C.M.S. Archives.
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with no British official present and with no financial support from
the government. Captain Russell tried to cope with this difficult
situation. He saw that subjecting the young slaves to religious
teaching alone was not producing the desired result. He tried
to have them do physical work for part of each day and he planned
to move the surplus population from Frere Town to develop the
older center of Rabai. After initial help, it was hoped that those
sent would become self-supporting.58
Two problems blocked Russell's attempts at efficient organiza-
tion of the mission—friction among the C.M.S. representatives and
lack of discipline in the Nassick Christians. Russell found the
Africans unruly and decided to found a prison to check the dis-
order resulting from cases of adultery, wife beating and other
episodes. This perhaps necessary effort to maintain order caused
trouble with an ordained member of the mission. He seemed to
desire that the station be run on the lines of a police state: anyone
guilty of a so-called immoral act was to be imprisoned at once,
even if proof were lacking. Russell would not submit to this inter-
pretation, always insisting on an investigation. 59 Russell also relied
heavily on the Nassick Christians; he called them the “backbone
of the colony” and treated them almost as he would Europeans.
Another member of the mission refused all contact with Russell
over an incident arising from Russell’s viewpoint. 60
All concerned were probably somewhat in the wrong on the
above issues. Russell tried to be fair to all, but the African Chris-
tians were clearly out of hand. Kirk visited the mission in March,
1877, after the missionaries reported the local population was about
to attack them. The rumor was untrue; Kirk became very annoyed
at the unnecessary trip. He observed the disorder at the station
and commented very adversely against it: “I learned to my dismay
that there existed a want of discipline and subordination among
58 Russell to Hutchinson, Jan. 1, 1877; Russell to Wright, Oct. 9, 1877,
C.M.S. Archives. The Rabai scheme did not succeed, partly due to the early
return of Russell to England. See Russell to Wright, Dec. 23, 1877; Handford
to Wright, Feb. 20, 1878, ibid.
59 Russell to Wright, Jan. 1, 1877, ibid.
60 Russell to Wright, June 21, 1877; Praeger to Wright, Mar. 29, 1877
and Apr. 21, 1877, ibid.
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the leading Christianised negroes far more dangerous than an Arab
attack would have been to the welfare of the settlement.” All in
all, Kirk considered the mission had gone into decline since the
departure of Price. 61
Before any improvement could be attempted, Russell was forced
to return to Britain. The problem was left to the new lay super-
intendant,
J.
Streeter, who was to lead the C.M.S. into difficulties
nearly fatal to its position in Mombasa. He found the lack of dis-
cipline very irritating and took direct action to end it. After trying
to make a group be quiet one evening (they answered that they
were discussing the Bible!) he had an African “tied to a cocoa-
nut tree and given two doz. with a hide whip.” Streeter appeared
delighted that this method had the desired effect. 62 No reaction
followed from London or Zanzibar, so Streeter continued in his
approach to Christian discipline.
At the same time, the problem of local slaves fleeing to the
mission for protection became acute. One aspect of the problem
was the presence of a settlement of runaway slaves near Mombasa. 63
Members of this African group wanted to build on mission grounds.
Streeter formally refused permission, but this order clearly was
not his real desire. 64 Immediately the former slaves started to
enter the mission settlement in small groups. Streeter decided to
take no action, and to make no report to Zanzibar, but he wrote
home that difficulties were inevitable. 65 The missionaries were not
really worried, however. One African evangelist, Jones, stated
expressly that all slaves fleeing to them came on the understanding
they would not be protected if their masters came after them.
He noted that no masters had yet come. 66
Kirk to F.O., Mar. 3, 1877, Q-18, Z.A.; Russell to Hutchinson, Mar.
29, 1877, C.M.S. Archives.
62 Streeter to Wright, May 22, 1878, ibid.
63 Such instances were not isolated. In 1873 the Sultan’s forces attacked,
but failed to dislodge, a similar settlement near Pangani. Kirk to F.O., Dec. 8,
1873, E-55, Z.A.
64 Streeter to Wright, Aug. 10, 1878, C.M.S. Archives.
65 Streeter to Wright, Nov. 7, 1878, ibid.
66 Jones to Wright, Oct. 10, 1878, ibid. Jones played an important role at
the Mombasa mission; see the brief biographical details in Jones to C.M.S.,
June 30, 1893, ibid.
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Troubles were not long delayed. About 100 slaves fled from their
nearby Giriama masters; the owners became “rather incensed,” and
several came to demand their return, or at least a cash settlement.
The slaves had integrated themselves into the Rabai community;
the missionary there, Binns, refused to let force be used to secure
their return. He was told that the Giriama would come in force
and he began to fortify his settlement.67 Streeter saw the danger, and
admonished Binns, but he took no real action. Inevitably there
was a crisis. A group of Giriama came to reclaim their slaves by
force when Streeter was absent; they had aid from the Wali of
Mombasa. Only the danger of a Masai raid drew the group away
in time to keep the peace. 68
These episodes caused the Wali to protest to Kirk and the Sultan.
Kirk wrote to Streeter to obey local law, but the missionary was
ready to defy him, albeit discreetly. He wrote to his superiors
that he would do as little as possible to prevent any refugees from
entering, declaring that he would surrender none of them.69 Kirk
was aware of the potential dangers of this course of action, but
he could not compel the C.M.S. men to act. He pointed out that
the Sultan had force to compel them to follow the laws of the
land, and that he (Kirk) would do nothing to protect their station.
Kirk considered that he could only advise them to remove all
the slaves before any armed force arrived. 70 The mission merely
reported his decision home with no comments.71
The matter seemed to pass satisfactorily from a danger point.
Kirk arranged a discussion between the Wali and Streeter, with
apparently good results. Kirk was satisfied. 72 Streeter was also
pleased, reporting that the Wali and he were “good friends.” But
his attitude was unchanged: he claimed that he had done no
67 Binns to Wright, Oct. 5, 1879, ibid.
68 Streeter to Wright, Oct. 1, 1879, ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Kirk to F.O., Ian. 9, 1880, Q-24, Z.A. Kirk had a similar problem in
Zanzibar with slaves fleeing to him. He never gave them shelter, though he
often delayed their owners while they fled. See William P. Johnson, My
African Reminiscences (London, 1898), 38.
71 Binns to Wright, Feb. 3, 1880, C.M.S. Archives.
72 Kirk to F.O., Nov. 12, 1879, Q-22; Kirk to F.O., Feb. 7, 1880, Q-24, Z.A.
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wrong, and even though he had violated local laws, that “what
this country wants is a lawbreaker—then a law maker/’73
This attitude of civil disobedience brought the mission into
difficulties again in 1880. In June there was fear of a general slave
outbreak in Mombasa. A large number of the “better class of slaves”
left the city to hold a three-day meeting nearby. The owners,
apparently, did not know what had been discussed and feared
future developments; the missionaries agreed. One said, “It looks
to us like the dawning of an insurrection among the more intelligent
slaves.”74 The mission stood to be in the center of any disturbance
since it was reported to the station that all the slaves of Mombasa
would go there if troubles began. The townspeople also heard this
rumor, and in the opinion of the missionaries, began looking for
an excuse to attack the station before any general outbreak
occurred. 75
In time, news of this unrest reached Zanzibar through letters to the
Sultan, though Kirk had received no reports from the missionaries
on their position. But he had learned from English visitors to Mom-
basa that the missionaries carried arms and spent every night in
fear of attack. These reporters said that only the authorities of
the Sultan had kept the local population in check. Kirk also heard
that the apparent cause of the renewed feeling against the missions
was the killing of an Arab’s servant by Africans living on mission
grounds. All this information was somewhat unclear, so Kirk
decided to investigate. 76
When the Consul’s party reached Mombasa, they found that
the missionaries feared an attack by the town and that the town
feared the incitement of their slaves by the missionaries. The pres-
ence of the party was calming, allowing Kirk to conduct a
thorough investigation. 77 He explained to the Foreign Office that
in the past the fugitive problem had been less acute since these
slaves were owned by tribal Africans, not by inhabitants of Mom-
73 Streeter to C.M.S., Jan. 30, 1880, C.M.S. Archives.
74 Menzies to Wright, lune 18, 1880, ibid.
75 Menzies to Wright, Sept. 22, 1880, ibid.
76 Kirk to F.O., Sept. 22, 1880, Q-24, Z.A.
77 Kirk to F.O., Oct. 19, 1880, ibid. The following paragraphs are taken
from this despatch.
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basa. He recalled that he had helped Streeter and the African
leaders to agree to let those already in the mission remain, but to
accept no more. The missionaries had violated that agreement; in
addition they began to give refuge to Mombasa slaves. The mis-
sionaries never denied the right of an owner to recover a slave, but
they would give no aid. Since at Rabai, the main place of refuge,
there were 200 armed Africans subject to no controls, the back-
ground for Arab grievances was obvious.
So tensions began to increase between Arab and missionary.
The Wali often said he was ready to defend the station, but the
distance of the missionaries from Mombasa made for scanty protec-
tion from a surprise attack. While affairs were thus delicately bal-
anced, Streeter took a step that could have precipitated war. When
he heard of a possible slave rising he decided not to ask for aid
from Zanzibar. Rather, he made a large white flag bearing the
word “freedom” (in Swahili) and kept it in open view in his
residence. Then he let reports spread that if the insurrection
started, he would raise it as a sign for all the rebels to gather
at the station. 78
This was the situation when an incident took place. At Rabai,
armed groups were patrolling the area to keep a watch for Arab
owners. They murdered an unarmed Arab and some of his party
for plunder; the Arab was known as a peaceful trader. No report
was made to the Wali by the missionaries, although they learned
of the affair and buried the Arab. Eventually the Africans im-
plicated in the murder were surrendered to the authorities for
trial. The townspeople, however, held that the Europeans were
fully responsible. An armed attack on a group of fugitive slaves
living outside Mombasa in a Methodist center followed. It appeared
that the C.M.S. would be next.
At this time Kirk’s party arrived. Their investigations proved that
the murder had occurred as described above. They learned that
runaway slaves had been received “wholesale” and had been al-
lowed to integrate themselves entirely with the mission Africans.
Streeter freely admitted that he hoped for a slave rising. Kirk could
take only one decision. He told the mission that if they participated
78 The flag was still on display during Kirk’s visit. See note 79.
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in a rebellion, they would not find a Mombasa mob against them,
but rather the forces of the Sultan. Britain would not oppose the
Sultan. Kirk then advised the mission to warn the Africans to flee
before the owners came, concluded other disputes, and left Mom-
basa.
Kirk was satisfied with the results of his work. He wrote to the
C.M.S. in Britain explaining his condemnation of the mission as
the only alternative to war and ruin. He did not neglect to men-
tion the fact that the missionaries accused each other of having
caused these difficulties. 79
The C.M.S. authorities came to the defense of their Mombasa
settlements. Basing their viewpoint on information received from
the missionaries in East Africa, they felt compelled to answer Kirks
charges that the mission knowingly harbored fugitive slaves in
violation of local law. The C.M.S. commented on the difficult task
it had assumed as an aid against the slave trade, mentioning the
little support they received from the Government. This latter point
included a charge against Kirk: he was said to neglect his duty
by not paying frequent visits to troubled Mombasa. Thus, the
mission directors asserted, it was no wonder that its missionaries,
left virtually alone, took measures for their own protection—includ-
ing Streeters flag. The defense closed with the words of one of
the missionaries at Mombasa as an explanation of their action: “We
are Englishmen as well as Christian missionaries and cannot con-
sent to fold our hands and see poor miserable wretches ill-used
and put to death for no other crime than running away from savage
masters.”80
The Zanzibar officials reacted strongly to the Society's charges.
But they were willing to let them pass and accept the new C.M.S.
resolve to avoid difficulties in the future.81 The Foreign Office
79 Kirk to Hutchinson, Dec. 13, 1880, C.M.S. Archives; Kirk to F.O., Nov.
14, 1880, Q-24, Z.A.
80 Lister to Kirk, Feb. 8, 1881, enclosing Hutchinson to Granville, Jan. 14,
1881, N-24, ibid. For one of the Mombasa missionaries’ views, Binns to C.M.S.,
Jan. 18, 1881, Precis Book, C.M.S., Archives.
81 See notes on Lister to Kirk, Feb. 8, 1881, cited in footnote 80; Kirk to
F.O., Mar. 28, 1881, enclosing Kirk to Sultan of Zanzibar, Mar. 19, 1881;
Kirk to F.O., Apr. 4, 1881: Q-25, Z.A.
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reacted similarly, advising Kirk that the Sultan’s authority should
be so strengthened
. . . that British Missionaries should not be
tempted by motives of humanity to interfere in matters with
which they should have no concern”82 Stability and order, not
wholesale and rapid emancipation of slaves, were the objects of
policy.
With the above problems settled, it might have appeared that
this most troublesome mission would give the harassed officials
some peace. This was not the case. News that could have re-
sulted in a major scandal for the mission reached Zanzibar. A British
official, Holmwood, had to be sent to investigate charges of the Wali
of Mombasa that Streeter had chained and “brutally beaten” an
African, and had imprisoned an Arab.83 There was no question of
guilt, since a letter from Streeter followed the charges, admitting the
action. The missionary reported giving the African five strokes
—
“which is my well known rule”—to make him confess. The treat-
ment of the Arab was also admitted. 84
Although it was evident that Streeter had “totally mistaken his
position and grossly exceeded his powers,” the investigation had to
go on. Holmwood visited the African concerned, and with the Wali’s
aid, compiled a list of all those beaten or imprisoned in the past
three years. This action was necessary since the Wali and the Afri-
can had drawn up formal charges against Streeter. While Holmwood
conducted this investigation, he received a petition from the inhabi-
tants of Frere Town protesting against specific instances of Streeter s
enforcement of ‘law.” He learned that Streeter had stripped a wo-
man to the waist, giving her about twenty-five stripes; he saw a man,
flogged a year previously, who still presented “a frightful appear-
ance” from sixty strokes administered by three men. The missionaries
tried, but failed, to block these discoveries by intimidating mission
Africans who wanted to testify.
Not unnaturally, Holmwood and his aide, Byles, a naval officer,
were shocked. According to one missionary, when Holmwood
82 Lister to Kirk, May 31, 1881, N-24, ibid. The Foreign Office arranged
with the Admiralty for frequent visits by the Navy to Mombasa; Pauncefote
to Kirk, Mar. 1, 1881, ibid.
83 Kirk to Holmwood, June 30, 1881, N-24, ibid.
84 Streeter to Kirk, June 18, 1881, C.M.S. Archives.
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viewed the scars of whippings, “he broke out and sternly rebuked
Mr. Streeter in a most unbecoming manner before all the people.”
To Kirk, Holmwood stated, “persons inflicting such injuries are
unfit to be entrusted with the charge of human lives.” Byles summed
it up in his report as “a disgrace to the honour of Englishmen.”
Holmwood, however, despite his personal feelings, acted to save
the name of the mission—and of England. He told Streeter he
could no longer act in this manner, but did not make any formal
charges; he merely sent the evidence to Kirk for final decision. The
attitude of the missionaries to these events is best expressed by
this comment on the investigation and Holmwood’s course of
action: “there was nothing in the conduct of the Mission we desired
to hide or hush up.” Streeter added: “I don’t deny that I am at
fault but all here agree with my proceedings and it has had the
best effect on our community.”85
Kirk reacted as Holmwood had done. He instructed Holmwood
to settle the affair out of court to “save the Mission the scandal
of a serious criminal trial.” Otherwise, Streeter might have been
tried under the Indian penal code which had stringent rules on
mistreatment. Holmwood thus secured a letter from Streeter al-
legedly admitting his guilt (Holmwood interpreted a Streeter letter
in this fashion although Streeter did not really admit his faults),
plus apologies and compensation to the Africans injured. Holm-
wood needed to apply pressure for this type of settlement, but once
concluded it was accepted by the Sultan, with the expectation
that Streeter would be recalled.86
All the implications of this affair for a Christian mission, plus
the political dangers involved, were not grasped by the missionaries.
One described Holmwood’s labors as “a one-sided investigation
most unfairly conducted.” Another added that the Africans were
85 Menzies to Stock, July 12, 1881, ibid.; Kirk to F.O., July 1, 1881, July
20, 1881 and July 21, 1881, both with enclosures; Kirk to F.O., July 25, 1881,
enclosing Streeter to Kirk, July 12, 1881 and Streeter to Holmwood, July 12,
1881, Q-25, Z.A. For an outside report of another instance of beating mission
Africans, G. A. Fischer, Mehr Licht im dunkeln Welttheil (Hamburg, 1885),
59.
88 Kirk to Brownrigg, July 11, 1881, N-27, Z.A. See Kirk to F.O., July 20,
1881, Q-25, ibid, for his charitable explanations of Streeter’s deeds.
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as children, requiring some form of punishment.87 Streeter reacted
in the same way, trying to justify all of his actions to the Society.88
The C.M.S. leaders in Britain were pushed to action by the
Government. Granville described the incidents as “unjustifiable and
unwarrantable” and stated that the Mombasa mission should have
an entirely new staff. He added that the Government could not
continue to lend support to an organization that mistreated the
subjects of a friendly power. 89 The Foreign Office, however, ac-
cepted Kirk’s ruling and took no action against the Society. When
the missionaries at Mombasa learned that the Society planned to
accept the Government’s advice, including the removal of Streeter,
they demonstrated their continuing lack of awareness of the prob-
lems involved, blaming all on a supposed anti-missionary bias on
the part of Holmwood.90
Kirk returned to Britain at this time, where he joined in dis-
cussions by the C.M.S. concerning the future of the mission. He
recommended the sending of a special agent to Mombasa to repair
the damages caused by Streeter.91 The C.M.S. agreed, appointing
W. Salter Price to return to his former post. He was given the
Foreign Office recommendation that all the staff should be sent
home. He planned to confront them with the Foreign Office state-
ment and let them make their own decision.92 When he reached
Mombasa, Price was appalled at what he discovered; he described
two or three of the cases of mistreatment as “too bad almost to
think about.”93 When he discussed the complicity of the other
missionaries in Streeter’s excesses, he found they denied all knowl-
edge of them (one called them a “surprising revelation”); Price,
87 Menzies to Stock, July 12, 1881; Taylor to Stock, July 12, 1881, C.M.S.
Archives.
88 Streeter to Stock, July 12, 1881, ibid.
89 Lister to C.M.S., Oct 21, 1881, Precis Book, ibid.
90 Menzies to Wigram, Dec. 6, 1881, ibid. News of the affair did reach the
press; see the account in L’Afrique Exploree et Civilisee, IIIme annee ( 1881-
1882), 130, for example.
Kirk to F.O., Nov. 5, 1881, F.O. 84/1601. Kirk noted on this meeting:
“You can hardly conceive how ignorant these people are on matters that deeply
concern their own officials.”
92 Price to Wigram, Dec. 14, 1881, C.M.S. Archives.
93 Price to Miles, Jan. 24, 1882, ibid.
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on learning of Streeters imperious character, accepted their
claims.94 Price told his superiors that he regarded the affair as
concluded, and proceeded with the ordinary work of the mission.95
He appeared to act with his usual efficiency, since the British
Consul soon noted that all was going well at Mombasa.96
This happy situation did not last. In April, 1882, the Wali of
Mombasa found it necessary to complain to the Sultan against the
conduct of Price and his people. He charged that “they never cease
to injure poor people residing in this town and seduce their slaves
and entice them. . . .” He said he had requested that they follow
the agreements worked out by the British officials, but to no avail.
The Wali became so aroused that he threatened to use troops
against them.97 Price reported at the same time that the mission
was almost in a “state of siege” since the Wali had blockaded the
settlement, threatening to fire on anyone attempting to enter.98
The then British Consul, Miles (Kirk was in Britain), was very
surprised at this new episode. He at once called the Wali and
Price to Zanzibar to settle the dispute. The Sultan, as usual under
British influence, took a lenient view of the affair, allowing it to
drop when Price agreed to take measures against receiving fugitive
slaves.99
Another problem dealt with at this time was the fugitive slave
settlement at Fulladoyo, near Mombasa. This village had been
founded due to the efforts of an African educated by the Methodist
mission. He became an independent evangelist, eventually forming
I
a settlement in Giriama country. These former slaves, at one time
estimated as numbering from 600 to 700, had constant relations
with the C.M.S., with some coming to the mission to settle. Price
94 Ibid.; Menzies to Wigram, Jan. 2, 1882; Taylor to Wigram, Jan. 3, 1882,
ibid.
95 Price to Hutchinson, undated, ibid.
96 Miles to Granville, Feb. 10, 1882, F.O. 84/1620; Miles to Granville,
Apr. 6, 1882, with encolsures, F.O. 84/1621.
97 Muhammad ibn Suliman to Sultan of Zanzibar, May 21, 1882 and May
22, 1882, N-14, Z.A.
98 Price to Miles, May 20, 1882, ibid.
99 Miles to Granville, May 31, 1882; with enclosures, and June 24, 1882.
F.O. 84/1621. Granville noted: “The Sultan has shown great forbearance and
good temper in this case.”
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told the Sultan how difficult it was to stop this, but informed him
the mission would in no way recognize any responsibility for
protecting them. This disclaimer was accepted. The Arabs destroyed
Fulladoyo in 1883, which solved the problem temporarily, but
the fugitives later regrouped to cause new trouble for the British. 100
Price proved no more able or willing than other missionaries
to stop the flow of fugitive slaves onto mission grounds. The trouble
broke out anew at the end of 1882. Consul Miles had to visit
Mombasa to conclude a temporary agreement. 101 As previously,
the agreement was not upheld.
At this point in the history of the Mombasa mission, a general
evaluation of progress was undertaken by the C.M.S. It was not
difficult to see that the mission had not worked out as planned. A
primary aim of the founders of the settlement had been to make
it self-sufficient. A missionary now reported: “Frere Town has been
proved beyond a doubt to be incapable of becoming self-support-
ing.” This caused great problems since the Africans in the mission
had to secure a living. There seemed no prospect of this. The solu-
tion recommended was, if all efforts to provide local work failed,
to move the Africans elsewhere. 102 Rabai was the obvious place
available for these Africans. The C.M.S. officials in London rec-
ognized this, but were unwilling to act. They maintained that the
Society had undertaken special responsibility for the freed slave
center at Frere Town; at Rabai they had only the usual duty to
spread Christianity. Thus, although they might prefer to move to
the superior location of Rabai, they considered they could not
abandon Frere Town. 103
Kirk also took part in this discussion. He informed the C.M.S.
that it was time to appoint an important church official to the
mission and to retire the office of lay superintendent, since the
recent appointment of a Vice-Consul for Mombasa made this post
100 Price to Miles, Jan. 23, 1882, Parker to Lang, Dec. 21. 1886, C.M.S.
Archives; Miles to Granville, May 31, 1882 and June 24, 1882, F.O. 84/1621.
101 Miles to F.O., Mar. 30, 1883, E-78, Z.A.; Kirk to Granville, Apr. 27,
1884, F.O. 84/1644.
102 Handford to Lang, Jan. 23, 1884; Shaw to Lang, Nov. 22, 1884, C.M.S.
Archives.
103 Lang to Shaw, Feb. 29, 1884, ibid.
i
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unnecessary. 104 Kirk harshly said: “The fact is that Frere Town now
ought to become a mission, it has ceased for years to receive fresh
slaves and there is no prospect of any captures.” The C.M.S. agreed,
and in June, 1884, announced that a bishop was to be appointed
to head the mission in East Africa. 105
But as this discussion went on, the problem of fugitive slaves
erupted again. The C.M.S. in London asked a missionary, Shaw,
to explain a sentence in one of his letters: “The owners know that
if they are cruel the slaves will run away to us and get protec-
tion.”106 Shaw answered merely that the missionaries did not en-
courage slave action and that they did refer all known cases to the
Wali. He added that since land adjacent to the mission was open
to all, the problem could not be avoided. The Vice-Consul, he
continued, knew of it and had made no complaints as long as
official channels were utilized for disputes. 107
The missionaries claimed that Kirk was aware of their actions,
but his reports show he considered the mission harbored slaves in
spite of their denials.108 He made it quite clear to the C.M.S.
directors that he did not approve of their actions. In August, 1884,
he told the Society that Rabai was “made up chiefly of runaway
slaves and notwithstanding all the missionaries there say to the
contrary, many of these are from Mombasa town itself.”109
Despite this attitude, the British officials began to send captured
slaves to the mission again: in November, 1884, over 160 were
landed. 110 More came in December. Kirk’s seeming reversal was
explained by his statement that he wanted the C.M.S. to accept
them or “he shall be compelled to hand them over to the French
mission and that both on religious and political grounds he pre-
ferred handing them over to our English Mission.” The religious
factor had never prevented Kirk from giving slaves to the French
104 Kirk to F.O., Jan. 26, 1884, E-83, Z.A., for the sending of Vice-Consul
Gissing.
105 Kirk to Cust, Mar. 16, 1884; Lang to Lane, June 13, 1884, C.M.S.
Archives.
106 Lang to Shaw, Feb. 29, 1884, ibid.
107 Shaw to Lang, Apr. 14, 1884, ibid.
108 Kirk to F.O., May 31, 1884, E-83, Z.A.
loo Kirk to C.M.S., Aug. 4, 1884, C.M.S. Archives.
no Handford to Lang, Nov. 26, 1884, ibid.
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before; a political decision resulting from the friction between
France and England in Africa was obvious here. 111
The first C.M.S. Bishop, James Hannington, arrived to meet this
situation. He was upset at some aspects of the mission, calling the
missionary living quarters luxurious, while the station hospital was
“about equal to a pigstye,” but, in general, praising the accomplish-
ments of the missionaries. 112 But the C.M.S. did not have the new
Bishops leadership for long. He soon set out on his famous trip
to Buganda, where he was killed by order of the Kabaka,
Mwanga.113
Another blow to the C.M.S. followed the death of Hannington,
when Handford, lay director of the mission, was arrested in Zanzi-
bar after attempting to disappear into the African quarter with an
African woman. As an African missionary noted, this was the crime
for which Handford had driven many African Christians from the
station. 114 Aside from the moral effect, this episode deprived the
station of one of its effective leaders during a time of need.
At this late date an old problem was resolved. The renewed land-
ing of slaves caused the C.M.S. to press again for financial aid from
the Government. They asked for £5 each for slaves. Kirk supported
the request; the Foreign Office complied. In July, 1886, a grant of
£1,545 was given for the 309 slaves received between 1 January,
1884, and 1 April, 1886. 115 The other British Protestant missions
received similar grants; the French Catholics did not. 116
A new Bishop, Parker, came out to succeed Hannington in mid-
1886. He had instructions to improve one major fault of the mission:
the schools were not turning out trained teachers for mission work
in spite of the many years of trial. 117 Before he began working to
111 Handford to Lang, Dec. 1, 1884, ibid. See Bennett, Studies, 68.
112 Hannington to Wigram, Feb. 9, 1885, ibid.; Dawson, Hannington, 325.
113 Oliver, Missionary Factor, 104.
114 Jones to Lang, Oct. ?, 1886; Lang to Shaw, Apr. 19, 1886, C.M.S.
Archives. Kirk to F.O, Apr. 8, 1886, F.O. 84/1777.
115 Kirk to F.O., Jan. 8, 1886 and June 30, 1886, E-93, Z.A.; Lister to Kirk,
Nov. 26, 1885, with enclosures, E-86, ibid.; Hutchinson to Lister, Nov. 20,
1885, F.O. 84/1744; Lister to Kirk, Mar. 24, 1886, E-91, Z.A.
116 Bennett, Studies, 68.
117 Lang to Parker, June 29, 1886, C.M.S. Archives. In 1885, a missionary
reported 189 pupils. See English to Lang, Aug. 1, 1885, ibid.
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improve this, Parker voiced his strong disapproval of another aspect
of the mission. His main concern was evangelization, so he said:
“It cannot be right for us to create a community of paupers and
then support them all with money subscribed for the conversion
of the heathen.” The problem was that the small Christian African
community depended entirely on mission funds for survival, since
the Christians could not support themselves while living in Frere
Town. 118 A previous despatch from London anticipated this com-
plaint: the directors said it was the duty of the C.M.S. to continue
receiving slaves as in the past, and to support them when neces-
sary. 119 Parker did not play a significant role in removing the above
faults since he too soon went inland to die on the shores of Lake
Victoria. 120
While attempts at reform were blocked by the deaths of the
Bishops, the problem of fugitive slaves continued to cause trouble.
In June, 1887, consular officials found it necessary to investigate
C.M.S. fears of an attack. The fears were groundless, but Arab
resentment caused by the fugitive question was evident. A new
agreement was concluded: Arabs wishing to search the mission for
slaves required a pass from the Wali. 121 It was no doubt hoped
that he would keep tempers on both sides down by cautious action.
Perhaps this continuing difficulty, with the others above men-
tioned, caused the missionary, Shaw, to say at the end of 1887:
“There is a deadly atmosphere here (spiritually) and I can assure
you that I have very little hope of our people here, the more I
know of the place and the people the more sick at heart I feel.”
Shaw blamed much of this on the so-called bad influences that
surrounded the mission, but his view gave no hope for change.122
118 Parker to Lang, Dec. 21, 1886; Shaw to Lang, Dec. 9, 1886, ibid.
119 Lang and Fenn to Shaw, Nov. 4, 1886, ibid.
120 See Stock, History, III, 420.
121 Holmwood to Lang, pine 13, 1887, with an addenda of June 18, 1887,
C.M.S. Archives; Berkeley to Holmwood, pine 24, 1887, in Holmwood to
F.O., July 10, 1887; Macdonald to F.O., Nov. 16, 1887, E-99, Z.A. For a
missionary view, Shaw to Lang, June 30, 1887 and Aug. 19, 1887, C.M.S.
Archives.
122 Shaw to Lang, Dec. 24, 1887, C.M.S. Archives. A statistical note for
the end of 1887, “Statistics of the Eastern Equatorial African Mission,” listed
446 African Christians at Frere Town and 1817 and Rabai. In ibid.
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And the problems did not cease. One slave owner visited Rabai
under terms of the pass agreement. He was met at the outskirts
and advised to return. No other owner then dared to try. The con-
sul, MacDonald, inquired aout this; Binns, the missionary in charge,
admitted that he had no power to compel obedience. He reported
that Rabai was practically independent, with its own armed groups.
MacDonald then visited Rabai without warning. He talked to W.
Jones, the African missionary, 123 and in general was very impressed
with the organization of the place. The Africans lived together
by tribes and ran most of their own affairs. There was obviously
no way to prevent them from harboring fugitive slaves without a
large regulatory force. Thus the Consul accepted the mission prom-
ise to do all possible to discourage the violation of local law. 124
In an attempt to resolve all problems, the C.M.S. decided to send
W. Salter Price again to Mombasa. The consul, Euan Smith, had
just visited C.M.S. headquarters in London, where he dwelt upon
the fugitive problem: orders to stop this “mistaken kindness” were
an important part of Price’s instructions. 125 Price arrived in East
Africa in March, 1888; he went at once to the Wali to assure him
the mission would cooperate on fugitives. 126 If the C.M.S. was
really determined to resolve the fugitive problem, Price might have
been their best choice, but one has to remember that he himself
had been unable, or unwilling, to end this source of unrest during
his earlier period of office. There soon were complaints against
him from Arab owners.127
The solution of this problem now took on particular significance.
The Imperial British East African Company assumed administra-
tion of the coastal area from Wanga to Kipini for the Sultan in
1888. Then a period followed when the IBEA had to be very care-
ful not to excite a general rising of the local population, especially
123 Hannington had praised him for working “exactly as an experienced
European.” See Hannington to Wigram, Mar. 2, 1885, ibid.
124 MacDonald to F.O., Feb. 13, 1888, E-107; see also Churchill to Euan
Smith, May 25, 1888, E-104, Z.A.
125 Lang and Gray to Price, Feb. 21, 1888, C.M.S. Archives.
126 W. Salter Price, My Third Campaign in East Africa (London, 1890),
125.
127 Ibid.. 85. 105.
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since an outbreak against the similar German takeover of the Tan-
ganyika coast had occurred in August. 128 Price seemed fully aware
of the problems of the new situation; he pointed out to Euan Smith
that he would have to keep the mission clear of all ties to the
political activities of the IBEA since the mission would be the first
place to be attacked if a rising occurred. 129
This reserve did not of course mean that the IBEA and the
mission would not cooperate. The Company soon invited the mis-
sion to establish stations on its route to the interior and the invi-
tation was accepted. 130 This cooperation had definite limits, how-
ever. The missionaries appreciated the order that a successful
company would bring to East Africa, but they also feared the effect
that the Company would have on their African Christians by em-
ploying them away from missionary controls. Arrangements were
made to regulate recruiting for the Company, but the problem was
never satisfactory settled since the Christianity of the African Christ-
mas seemed too fragile to survive separation from the station. 131
The IBEA avoided all local troubles, by “paving their way with
dollars,”132 and by paying close attention to local wishes. This meant
that the old sore of fugitive slaves had to be solved. Mackenzie,
director of the Company in Mombasa, considered that fugitives
were accepted on the mission stations on the “most frivolous
pretext,” and consequently the successful operation of his policies
was endangered. He reported that a meeting of the Arab com-
munity had been held before his arrival. The Arabs had decided to
ask Mackenzie to abolish the mission. They justly could not under-
stand why the mission should hold fugitive slaves, their former
128 For these events, see Fritz Ferdinand Muller, Deutschland-Zanzibar-
Ostafrika (Berlin, 1959), 357 ff.
129 Price to Lang, Sept. 5, 1888, Sept. 15, 1888, Nov. 28, 1888; Price to
Euan Smith, Sept. 15, 1888, C.M.S. Archives.
130 Mackenzie to Price, Nov. 13, 1888; Price to Lang, Nov. 20, 1888 and
Dec. 19, 1888, ibid.
131 Shaw to Lang, Sept. 25, 1889, ibid.; Price, Third Campaign, 152, 167.
For a revealing episode on outside labor for African Christians, see John C.
Willoughby, East Africa and its Big Game (London, 1889), 33. Willoughby
found the former slaves so regulated by the mission that he concluded they
“had only left one form of servitude to embark in another.”
132 Price to Lang, Dec. 10, 1888, C.M.S. Archives.
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property, while the British spoke against slavery. Mackenzie was
able to get this resolution quashed before it was made public, but
he had to take action to meet Arab protests. With General Mathews
(the Sultan’s representative),133 and Arab officials he visited Price
to state their case. Price considered the Arabs had "absolutely no
cause for complaint”; he agreed, however, to allow a commission to
investigate Rabai, promising to give up any fugitives located there.
Price also consented to an IBEA official being appointed to watch
over Rabai in the future. 134
This move had the full support of the Consul, Euan Smith. 135
Price, although he consented to the investigation, was unhappy at
the decision, particularly over the inclusion of Mathews. He held
him to be "hostile to missions and missionaries.” Euan Smith met
these hesitations by stating that the Arabs appeared to have just
cause for complaint, and that if no solution by cooperation could be
achieved once and for all, the mission had to prepare for the
imposition of rules “of an exceedingly drastic and stringent char-
acter.”136
Price had no choice; the investigation began. He did his best
to ensure a report favorable to the mission, writing to Jones "to
make a clean sweep of the settlement” before the commission
arrived. A crisis occurred. Jones reported there were more fugitives
present than he had estimated, that many were Christians who
refused to leave, and that they were preparing, with the aid of their
friends, to defend themselves. Jones concluded that he had lost all
control of them.137 To Price, this was a "revelation”; he now esti-
mated there were several hundred slaves there instead of the thirty
133 For his career, Robert Nunez Lyne, An Apostle of Empire (London,
1936).
134 Mackenzie to Euan Smith, Oct. 18, 1888, with addenda, in Euan Smith
to Salisbury, Oct. 22, 1888, F.O. 84/1910; Price, Third Campaign, 182 ff. For
the official account of the investigation, P. L. McDermott, British East Africa
or IBEA (London, 1893), 22 ff.
135 Euan Smith to Price, Oct. 14, 1888, C.M.S. Archives.
136 Price to Euan Smith, Oct. 16, 1888 and Euan Smith to Price, Oct. 17,
1888, ibid. Price was not convinced. He noted on this despatch, “Col. E.S.
does not know him [Mathews]. He writes of us as ‘those d—d missionaries’.”
137 Price to Lang, Oct. 24, 1888, ibid.
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or forty he originally thought to find. 138 Price warned Mackenzie of
this dangerous situation and the IBEA official met the new problem
with great skill. He asked the Arabs, who were unaware of the
exact numbers there, to adopt a new solution, suggesting that he
(Mackenzie) arrange for the redemption of the slaves. The Arabs
agreed. Mackenzie did this on Price’s revised estimate of the
number of fugitives; the commission was to determine the exact
number for the settlement. 139
The commission found Price’s estimate to be incorrect; 933
fugitives were reported at Rabai (plus 488 at the other Protestant
stations in the area). Euan Smith, on learning this, placed full
responsibility on the mission, and supported all of Mackenzie’s
efforts to satisfy the former Arab owners. The fact that 480 of the
fugitives had been on C.M.S. property less than two years, and 623
less than three years, demonstrated exactly the amount of regulation
imposed by the mission in spite of all promises. Price was crushed;
he could only repeat that this was ‘nothing less than a revelation”
and that his orders had not been carried out as strictly as he
intended! 140
Effective regulations, so long avoided by the C.M.S., now went
into effect against fugitives. The director at Rabai appointed
African officials to supervise entry of outsiders and notices expelling
unauthorized persons were posted. 141 Price still did not face the
facts of C.M.S. responsibility; he complained to Mackenzie that his
reports gave the impression that the mission had knowingly broken
the law and now acted to redress it only under compulsion! 142
138
“Memo of Runaway Slaves at Rabai,” Nov. 3, 1888, ibid. Price unfairly
placed the blame on Jones, claiming he had always given him strict orders
against fugitives.
139 Price, Third Campaign, 194-97.
140 Ibid., 220; Euan Smith to Salisbury, Nov. 20, 1888, enclosing Mackenzie
to Euan Smith, Oct. 26, 1888, Nov. 9, 1888, Nov. 15, 1888, Price's Memo of
Nov. 3, 1888, Price to Euan Smith, Nov. 15, 1888, Price to Mackenzie, Nov.
14, 1888, F.O. 84/1910.
141 Price to Barness, Dec. 26, 1888; Price to Euan Smith, Jan. 14, 1889,
C.M.S. Archives.
142 Price to Mackenzie, Jan. 14, 1889, ibid. Price’s fears were of course true.
H. P. Anderson noted on a despatch from Euan Smith that the trouble was
due “to the duplicity of the missionary agents about the runaway slaves. They
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The problem of the discovered fugitives was ended when
Mackenzie arranged for the Company to obtain “freedom certifi-
cates,” at a fixed rate, for the slaves. On January 1, 1889, 1422
fugitives were freed from all the Mombasa area; 900143 were from
Rabai. The total cost was £1,372.16.5. Mackenzie, however, con-
sidered that he had acted beyond his powers in arranging this
costly solution; he requested that the C.M.S. or its friends bear part
of the cost. The directors of the Company agreed and suggested
that the Government, the missions, and the Company each pay
one-third. 144 Although Price protested against C.M.S. involvement
in paying a share of costs, 145 a joint agreement was eventually
reached: the Government paid £800; T. F. Buxton and other
friends of the various missions, £1,200; the Company paid the
balance— £1,372.16.5. 146
The old problem seemed settled. The slaves were officially free
and were allowed to remain on mission grounds. With this came a
strict instruction from the Foreign Office: the missions were to
refuse more fugitives “without making any exception.” If the
missions violated this rule, it was “done at the risk of the person
giving the shelter.”147 Even this directive did not succeed in
obtaining cooperation from the C.M.S. Mackenzie learned that two
new slaves had found refuge at Frere Town; he had to go there
with their owner to free them before any additional trouble
occurred. 148
acted in direct disobedience to the Society’s order.” Note on Euan Smith to
Salisbury, Nov. 19, 1888, F.O. 84/1910.
143 Price claimed only 643 were the responsibility of the C.M.S. See Price’s
“Memo No. 2 on the Runaway Slave Question at Rabai,” Jan. 29, 1889, C.M.S.
Archives.
444 Buxton to C.M.S, Dec. 21, 1888; Mackenzie to C.M.S, Dec. 21, 1888,
Precis Book, ibid. Mackinnon to Salisbury, Feb. 18, 1889, F.O. 541/29.
145 Price’s “Memo”—citation in footnote 143.
146 Report of the Directors of the Imperial British East Africa Company
(I.B.E.A. ), June 1, 1889, in Sanderson to Portal, Aug. 20, 1889, E-115, Z.A.;
for slightly different figures, McDermott, 1BEA, 30. For a criticism of this
solution, Margery Perham ( ed. ) , The Diaries of Lord Lugard ( London, 1959 )
,
I, 56.
147 Lister to Euan Smith, Feb. 1, 1889, E-114, Z.A.
148 Mackenzie to Euan Smith, Mar. 13, 1889, in Euan Smith to Salisbury,
Mar. 20, 1889, F.O. 84/1977. For Price’s views of this action, Price to Lang,
Mar. 13, 1889, C.M.S. Archives; Price, Third Campaign, 311.
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Thus the basic source of difficulty for the mission over the years
with the local population was at last settled. 149 The C.M.S., after
denying for years responsibility for causing the unrest, was found
culpably negligent in the matter. The IBEA and Mackenzie demon-
strated “wisdom and judgement” and in doing so possibly saved the
C.M.S. from the consequences of its disregard for local law and
sentiments. 150
Price left East Africa for the last time in March 1889. He was
replaced by Bishop Alfred Tucker who was to give real direction
to the C.M.S. mission in East Africa. 151 Even though the fugitive
problem appeared finished, the new leader had many long-standing
problems to solve. The mission teachers found it impossible to keep
their boys in order; 152 the African Christians from Bombay remained
a source of disorder; 153 and all plans for industrial training had
failed. 154 In sum, the educational aspect of the mission was almost a
complete failure. 155
Plans for improvement were formulated even before Bishop
Tucker arrived. The successor to Price at Frere Town, Dr. Stephen
Pruen, an experienced East African missionary, 156 presided over a
meeting of the resident missionaries in May, 1889, to decide what
course to follow. They recommended expansion of the industrial
training offered to mission Africans and increased training of
teachers. 157 A decision was made to start these improvements with
149 The fugitive problem at Fulladoyo (see above) was settled also. See
Euan Smith to Salisbury, Feb. 24, 1890, enclosing Mackenzie to Euan Smith,
Feb. 12, 1890; Euan Smith to Salisbury, June 14, 1890, enclosing Lugard
to Euan Smith, June 9, 1890, F.O. 84/2059. Also, Perham, Lugard Diaries, I,
61 ff.
150 Euan Smith to Salisbury, Feb. 7, 1889, F.O. 84/1976.
151 This story is recounted in Alfred R. Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda
and East Africa ( London, 1908 )
.
lo2 England to Lang, May 11, 1886 and June 9, 1886, C.M.S. Archives.
153 Shaw to Lang, Feb. 11, 1886, ibid.
154 Binns to Lang, Dec. 19, 1887; Price to Lang, Apr. 10, 1888; Price,
“Information and hints for Dr. Pruen,” Aug. 25, 1888, ibid.
155 See Price’s bitter letter to Lang of Sept. 5, 1888, ibid. In 1889-1890 there
were only about seven African teachers at work. See Pruen to Lang, Aug. 9,
1889; Binns to Wigram, Sept. 17, 1890, ibid.
156 His experiences in the interior are in part recounted in his, The Arab
and the African (London, 1891).
157 Pruen to Lang, May 17, 1889, C.M.S. Archives.
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resources collected at the mission; 1,000 rupees were raised from
the resident Africans. 158
These steps did not stop dissatisfaction at Frere Town’s progress
in matters of training by the time of Tucker’s arrival. 159 Before he
could attempt a solution, however, he learned of three fugitives
settling at Rabai in spite of all that had gone before. Tucker
questioned Jones closely about this and found that there were
actually over one hundred new fugitives living there. To avoid a
major upset the Bishop made a public declaration of this and took
steps to have them earn their freedom by work. Then Jones was
informed that any other discoveries of this kind would result in his
expulsion from the mission. 160 The incident passed without re-
percussion.
Tucker then, after dealing with C.M.S. affairs in the interior,
began a serious evaluation of the Mombasa mission. He first decided
that Frere Town would surely decline when the government stopped
delivering slaves since it had no good agricultural land. He
suggested that the mission refuse to accept any but five- and six-year-
old slaves. To them would be added young Africans from interior
stations so that Frere Town would develop into an educational
center. Tucker considered this the only feasible step since few
slaves of any kind were now received from the Government. 161
Next the Bishop made a more thorough report of all aspects
of the mission. It was a devastating study.162 He reported that
eighty-three boys were housed in the mission dormitories. They had
practically no supervision when out of school. The fact that twenty
boys slept in an area fourteen feet by six feet accounted for the
many acts of immorality he discovered. The seventy girls in their
dormitory were in a similar condition. He summed up his attitude
on the dormitories with this statement: “In their present condition
158 Pruen to Lang, May 24, 1889, ibid. An African elder said of this: “But
when you [Pruen] go a new secretary will come, and will stop all we are
trying to do.” Pruen admitted this statement to be just.
159 See Binns to Lang, Dec. 7, 1890 and Feb. 27, 1891, ibid.
160 Tucker to Gould, luly 9, 1890, Fitch to Tucker, July 4, 1890, ibid. For
Lugard’s comments, Perham, Lugard Diaries, I, 233.
161 Tucker to Lang, Apr. 5, 1892 and May 16, 1892, C.M.S. Archives.
162 Tucker to Wigram, fune 3, 1892, ibid.
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they are not merely a disgrace to the Church Missionary Society
but to Christianity itself.” He added that one missionary, Binns,
described the girls’ dormitory as little more than “a feeder for the
ranks of prostitutes.” Tucker’s evaluation of the 485 adult Christian
Africans was in a similar vein.
The Bishop concluded that the C.M.S. at Frere Town had been
largely a failure, and that major changes were required. His
recommendations were in line with those made earlier—to make
Frere Town an educational training center for children (after a
thorough overhaul of the dormitory system).
The resident missionaries supported their bishop. They noted
their “regrets that Bishop Tuckers report is in the main correct”;
they asked that no more slaves be landed by the Government.163
They later added: “With these facts before them your Cte can but
report that they consider Frere Town to have failed to attain any of
the objects for which it was established. 164
Bishop Tuckers anger subsided somewhat. In 1892 he changed
his description of the dormitories from “a disgrace to Christianity”
to “far from creditable to the C.M.S.,”165 but he did not change his
views. Tucker, in fact, became very upset when he saw that the
London officials of the C.M.S. did not seem to share his views of
the lamentable state of affairs at Frere Town. 166 Tuckers plans for
a training center were put into operation in 1894,167 and the period
of Frere Town as a center for freed slaves was over. 168
The record is clear. The hopes of the C.M.S. and its supporters
for a settlement similar to those founded on the West African coast
for freed slaves never materialized. The C.M.S. had a difficult task,
their center being established in an area outside of direct British
control, but the same conditions were met more successfully by
the Holy Ghost missionaries at Bagamoyo. The C.M.S. was never
163 Finance Committee (Mombasa) Report, Nov. 2, 1892, ibid. For one
missionary’s dissenting view, Binns to Wigram, Nov. 7, 1892, ibid.
164 Finance Committee’s Report on the State of Frere Town, Nov. 19, 1893,
ibid.
165 Tucker to Lang, Aug. 14, 1892, ibid.
166 Tucker to Lang, Aug. 31, 1893; Tucker to Baylis, Sept. 26, 1893, ibid.
167 Tucker to Stock, Aug. 21, 1894; Tucker to Baylis, Sept. 26, 1894, ibid.
168 For an incomplete estimate of slaves received between 1875-90, Smith
to Baylis, Apr. 18, 1893, ibid. The figure given is 921.
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able to meet the problems involved and to live in harmony with the
legal rulers of the land. The responsibility for this discord appears
to rest almost entirely with the mission. Though they hoped for
more support from the British government than they received, this
lack of support was apparent at an early date, giving the mission-
aries full opportunity to adapt to local regulations. Under the law
of Zanzibar, civil and religious obligations were clear, but the
missionaries, who recognized the authority of the Sultan in some
things (i.e., as on the power to regulate land sales), refused to
accept the regulations relating to slavery. Their task in Mombasa
was to educate and Christianize liberated slaves, not to give aid
and succor to fleeing slaves. But they decided to give this assistance,
even if they lacked the physical power to make it effective. In so
doing they went against local British policy and against that of their
parent body in England. With their European ideas of slavery, and
of African life in general, the result was understandable, but their
actions still must be judged as conduct unworthy of visitors on
foreign soil by permission of the ruling government.
VIII.
Missionaries as Chiefs
and Entrepreneurs:
Northern Rhodesia, 1882-1924
by
ROBERT I. ROTBERG
Assistant Professor of History and Research Associate, the Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

In many areas of Africa, Christian missionaries were the vanguard
of the West. Not unexpectedly, they organized themselves and their
activities in peculiarly Western ways. They brought new techniques
of material advance and social control and thereby introduced
Africans to other Western ideas and practices in addition to the
doctrine of Christianity. As gradual as it may have been, this
process of transferring Western skills and knowledge also brought
about a reorganization of indigenous society and polity. Trade
goods encouraged new material demands; roads and bridges made
communication and labor migration more common. And sadly for
those who wished to preserve traditional life, more rapid change
became a continuing and sequential process. Once missionaries
established themselves, built stations, and ensured their ties to the
outside world, there could be no cessation. Missionaries became
major agents of change and, for a time, holders of considerable
authority; moreover, they became more and more enmeshed in a
temporal and secular network of their own creation . 1
This involvement took place in two major ways. First, they
became concerned intimately with the ordering of the lives of
Africans. In addition to those campaigns of exhortation against
“sinful” customs which they carried directly to the rural villagers,
missionaries gathered Africans at central stations and exerted
considerable control over daily behavior. Unlike most of the early
freed-slave villages in East Africa, however, missionary centers in
Northern Rhodesia were less often models of Western development.
Whatever the intentions of their founders, they appear to have
served more simply as centers in which Western ways could be
demonstrated and, in many cases, they provided for missionaries a
1 This essay, and the larger study of which it forms a part, is based on
research which was generously supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the
Rhodes Trust, the Beit Fund, and the Colonial Social Science Research
Council.
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reliable corps of tribesmen to whom the menial, but necessary, tasks
of any Western community could be devolved.
Missionaries spent long hours engaged in those secular activities
which, albeit without forethought, contributed so crucially to
eventual African participation in the Western economy. They
opened stores and traded widely. They kept accounts, ran postal
services, and participated in that myriad of pursuits necessary to
Western life in a remote and isolated part of the world. The
“natives” were introduced to the ways of the white man—to his
evangelical predilection for thrift and hard work and to his pen-
chant for clothes, particularly the bright calicos. Africans discovered
that they were rewarded for copying the white man’s speech, habits,
and economic thought. Whereas preferment and status had pre-
viously come by exploit, by magic or mysticism, or simply by
ascribed rights of lineal succession, the new order conferred prestige
on the basis of special modes of achievement.
The following missionary bodies were active in Northern Rho-
desia between 1882 and 1924: London Missionary Society (LMS),
Paris Missionary Society (PMS), Primitive Methodist Missionary So-
ciety (PMMS), Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS),
United Free Church of Scotland (CS), White Fathers (WF),
Society of Jesus (SJ), Dutch Reformed Church of the Orange Free
State (DRC), South Africa General Mission (SAGM), Plymouth
brethren (PB), Brethren-in-Christ (BC), Church-of-Christ (CC),
and Seventh-day Adventists (SDA). Each kindly gave me full
cooperation and access to relevant materials.2
I
Wherever missionaries went in Central Africa, they soon ap-
preciated the difficulty of transmitting Christian dogma by exhor-
tation alone, and they therefore devised measures to increase their
daily influence. They started schools and hospitals. They also
organized villages dependent upon the missionary and responsible
2 The material available is great in quantity, rich in quality, and virtually
unused. The treatment in this paper is, however, necessarily selective. Refer-
ences to “Diary,” “Letters,” “Logbook” and “Notebook” are preceded by
the name of the mission station concerned.
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to him. The missionary became a temporal governor. 3 He ruled and
directed numerous Africans who had seen fit to renounce traditional
authority and to adhere to the new order. For a time his power
was absolute and unchecked. Consequently, the system developed
its own abuses, and only with the assumption of settled territorial
administration by a secular government did it fall into disuse.
During its active life, however, it was perhaps the most important
institution making for substantive change.
All missions in Northern Rhodesia were involved, at some time,
in direct government. At Luanza, Johnston Falls, Kaleba, and
Chitokoloki the Plymouth Brethren administered villages; at Kalene
Hill they even controlled a series of Lunda, Lovale, and Ovimbundu
settlements within five miles of the mission station. 4 Near Magwero
the Dutch Reformed Church early gathered Africans around the
mission and governed them strictly. 5 White Fathers, Jesuits, and
Seventh-day Adventists all did the same in their own fashion. 6
The Paris Missionary Society and the Primitive Methodists were,
however, unable to induce other than school boys to stay perma-
nently with them. 7 At Chisalala, Musonweji, and Kaba Hill, the
South African General Mission was similarly unable to exert that
control to which it aspired. 8
3 For a comparative analysis, see Ruth Slade, English-Speaking Missions in
the Congo Independent State 1878-1908 (Bruxelles, 1959), 164 ff. See also
Roland Oliver, The Misisonary Factor in East Africa (London, 1952), 51.
4 Personal interviews: Chief Kanganja (Lumingu Village, June 24, 1959);
Ffolliot Fisher (Hillwood Farm, June 25, 1959); William Lammond (Johnston
Falls, Sept. 16-17, 1959); Mrs. George Suckling (Chitokoloki, June 30, 1959).
See also Stanley R. Coad, Dec. 20, 1922, in Echoes of Service (Mar., 1922),
63-64; Daniel Crawford, Thinking Black (London, 1913), 324-27, 445-47. But
see Slade, Missions, 127.
5 Personal interview: Ella Botes (Magwero, Apr. 13, 1959).
6 Czarlinski to Parry, Nov. 15, 1920; Chikuni Letters, 1911-1925; Campion
Papers, Campion House, Salisbury; Torrend, diary, Diocesan Office, Lusaka,
Nov. 8, 1918, Jan. 24, 1919. Personal interview: L. Etienne (Chilubula, Sept.
2, 1959); M. A. Prokoph, “Chikuni 1905-55,” The Catholic Teacher, IV (Sept.
15, 1955), 8-18.
7 Minutes of Synod Meeting, Aug. 22, 1904, at Kanchindu Mission; Picker-
ing to Lea, Apr. 30, 1901, Lea Papers (MMS) archives, London. Personal
interview: John R. Shaw (Lusaka, Jan. 22, 1959).
8 Melland to Wilson, Apr. 4, 1919; Harris to Middlemiss, Oct. 9, 1917;
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The Universities’ Mission to Central Africa (UMCA), particularly
at Chipili, developed villages on the East African pattern immedi-
ately it commenced activity in Northern Rhodesia.9 The mission
drew its labor from these villages and ruled them paternally. As
late as 1917, capitaos were enjoined to settle all disagreements, to
investigate all applicants for residence in the villages and to report
them to the priest, and to guard particularly “against people who
have chucked or been chucked by other missions.”10 The UMCA,
like other societies, extended its rule to the countryside as often as
possible; it set about rationalizing Christian communities and other
centers. William Deerr frequently intervened to settle conflicts
between warring villages and to impose peace “for the good of
all.”11 Punishment for failure to conform to mission regulations or
doctrine usually took the form of corporal punishment, tempered
at Msoro with humor, or dismissal.
[Two villagers] the previous night having missed roll-call, orgied at
Manokola and arrived with the milk, were condemned to serve on
the road gang under Manoel, for a week. As a merciful concession
they were not chained . 12
But the UMCA system of government, like that of other missions,
finally broke down under the weight of its own bureaucracy and
upon a realization that Christian influence was not being furthered
to any appreciable extent by minor theocracies. At Chipili this
divestment came only in 1922, when Charles Leeke ordered villagers
to disperse themselves as best they could to the surrounding
Harris’ report in Middlemiss to Faithfull, July 1, 1916, all in South Africa
General Mission (SAGM) papers, Wimbledon; Musonweji Diary, July 11,
1923; Harris to General Missionary Committee, May 20, 1913: “. . . it appears
the Government do not recognize Dr. Watney as headman [of the village near
Kaba Hill].” Hamilton, report of a deputation, 1926, SAGM papers.
9 See Monica Wilson, Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa (London, 1959),
166; Oliver, Missionary Factor, 58-65, 73.
10 Chipili Diary, i, May 31, 1917.
11 Chipili Diary, i, May 8, 1913, May 10-12, 1917; see Mapanza Diary,
Feb. 9-10, 1914, 160; Central Africa, 1914, 247-49; Henry Faulkner, June 2,
1922, Echoes, Sept., 1920, 208-9; See May to Laura, May 5, 1919, May
Papers, London (privately held).
12 Ranger, Msoro Logbook, ii, Feb. 2, 1924. See also Fort Jameson Diary,
Feb. 6, 1912.
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countryside. He retained a small compound for servants and school-
boys, and was clearly relieved to remove the mission from details of
daily administration. 13
Only the London Missionary Society (LMS) carried the village
system, organized so tentatively elsewhere, to its logical conclusion.
Unique circumstances forced it to begin governing Africans; once
established, this government simply grew. In 1887, David Jones
realized that his ministry, to be successful, must be a settled one.
Local Mambwe and Lungu, long fearful of Bemba and Arab
raiding parties, were accustomed, moreover, to live in well-
protected stockades. 14 They had welcomed the LMS as protectors,
but they had refused to live with their new rulers until the mission
built proper fortifications and demonstrated a capacity to resist
incursions. 15 Stockades were therefore constructed by the mission
at Kawimbe and Niamkolo in 1890, and this tardy and piecemeal
approach increasingly meant a growth in the mission’s exercise of
temporal control over the lives of Africans.
The LMS at first did not appreciate all the advantages inherent
in a system of village government. Gradually, however, its members
transformed a means for protection into a means for rigid and
uncompromising control. Such control permitted the mission to
consolidate its local influence and to ensure a steady attendance of
children and adults at school and service. Villagers were compelled
to attend church at specified times and to send their children,
regularly to school. When Jones moved to Kawimbe, for example,
he insisted upon the obligation of Africans to attend Sunday
services faithfully, and to work “cheerfully” on behalf of the
mission. 16 Those everywhere who did not comply were punished by
13 Chipili Diary, ii, 9-25, Jan. 31, 1922; Central Africa, 1922, 270-72.
Gerrard Todd Pulley, personal interview (Oxford, Apr. 25, 1960).
14 William Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy (Manchester,
1958), 13, 72 ff.; Lionel Decle, Three Years in Savage Africa (London,
1898), 296.
15 Swann to Thompson, Feb. 26, 1890, Central Africa (CA) viii/l/a; Jones to
Thompson, Apr. 15, 1891, CA viii/3/c; Aug. 30, Sept. 19, 1890; CA viii/2/a,b;
archives, London; Sharpe to H. H. Johnston (H.M. Commissioner and Consul-
General in British Central Africa), Dec. 17, 1892, FO 2/54, PRO.
16 Jones to Thompson, Sept. 16, 1891, CA viii/4/b; Hemans to Thompson,
Apr. 13, 1904; both in LMS archives.
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the missionary. Paid employment was restricted to Africans who
were members of the special towns. Indeed, after the threat of
Bemba invasions was eliminated, employment seems to have be-
come the primary incentive for the continued residence of Africans
within mission-run villages. 17
Missionaries of the LMS defended the system at length:
. . . we cannot depend on gathering the people together for the
purpose of telling them our message or of getting the children
into our schools. If we lose control of our villages we may lose
our people and the work of years would be undone . 18
Another missionary wrote:
Without full control of the villages the children would not come to
school; the people would not attend Sunday services; the villages
would be thoroughly corrupted; missionaries would often be, as
in the early days [before villages], without servants; if called upon
hurriedly to go on a journey it would be impossible to get men
[as carriers]; in cases of emergency ... it would be impossible to
get them [to help]. . . . 19
The missionaries concluded that they could only hope to make an
initial impression within their villages. Not until such villages
flourished could they expect a spread of evangelical influence to the
rural areas.
The LMS made stringent laws to regulate their domain. Villages
were to be kept clean; no villagers were to use the village enclosure,
or his own hut, or the huts of others, for “improper purposes.” No
loaded guns were permitted. Guns were not to be fired within the
17 When there were still fears of Bemba invasions missionaries armed
villagers so “as to inspire them with confidence, without in the least disturb-
ing the prevalent impression respecting us that we will fight only in self-
defence. . . .” Jones to Thompson, July 23, Aug. 27, 1892, CA viii/6/a; LMS
archives.
18 May to Thompson, Nov. 9, 1898, CA x/2/a; see Minutes of Tanganyika
District Committee meeting, Oct. 12-23, 1898, CA x/2/a ; LMS archives.
19 Hemans to Thompson, Nov. 2, 1898, CA x/2/b; LMS archives. For
example, “The Bishop had left behind an invalid whose life he had saved,
and at his request a messenger arrived to take him to hospital at Fort Jameson.
As no Ansenga could be found to carry him, I filled my water-bottle and went
to Kapunula to help carry him myself. The dogs! Ran into the bush, lied, and
.everything else.” Ranger, Msoro Logbook, i, May 8, 1918.
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villages. All children were enjoined to go to school. Villagers were
compelled to attend church on Sunday and holidays.20 Infractions
were punishable by flogging, by road work without pay, or by the
forfeit of hoes and spears. Drunkenness, adultery, stealing, black-
mail, ordeal by poison, attempted murder or murder—were punish-
able by whippings or heavy fines.21 Where there was no standard
penalty, or where the accused did not readily admit his misdeed,
the missionary heard the cases as prosecutor, defense attorney,
judge, and jury together. After decision was rendered and sentence
pronounced, he became gaoler and welfare society director. Mis-
sionaries simply assumed all the functions of government.22
Like Deerr at Chipili and most others throughout the country, the
LMS missionaries came to be regarded as chiefs. The village system
destroyed the authority of the indigenous leaders and induced them,
even before the imposition of a secular administration, to regard
the white man as superior and all-powerful.23 African teachers
arrogated positions as sub-chiefs and imposed missionary “law” as
thoroughly as possible in the countryside.24 When indigenous chiefs
realized that their own rule was being undermined, and conse-
quently attempted to retaliate, missionaries acted forcibly to restrain
them. Tafuna was defeated and imprisoned when he opposed the
mission in 1891. Near Kambole two minor chiefs tried to persuade
their former subjects to quit the mission by confiscating the people’s
supply of grain. Percy Jones of the LMS sent several men to retrieve
20 Minutes of Tanganyika District Committee meeting, Oct. 12-22, 1898,
CA x/2/a; LMS archives.
21 See lones to Thompson, Dec. 4, 1898, viii/2/c; LMS archives.
22 “Many a little Protestant Pope in the lonely bush is forced by his self-
imposed isolation to be prophet, priest, and king rolled into one—really a very
big duck, he, in his own private pond.” Crawford, Thinking Black, 324-25.
23
“The native chiefs are today powerless and can demand no obedience
from their people. . . .” Hemans to Thompson, Nov. 2, 1898, CA viii/2/b;
Deerr made his villages promise to hold him as chief. Central Africa, 1916,
149-50; 1920, 63; 1913, 115, 141-45; Personal interviews: Lammond (John-
ston Falls, Sept. 16, 1959); Mrs. Buckley (Motherwell, Oct. 29, 1958); Mabel
Shaw (London, Nov. 17, 1958); Doke (Kafulafuta, July 8, 1959); Mwinilunga
District Notebook, 163; Slade, Missions, 125.
24 Leonard Kamungu, during his two years at Msoro, was always regarded
as a chief: Msoro Logbook, Jan., 1911, and Mar. 13, 1913. Thompson to
Thomas, Sept. 22, 1894, CA xxv, 500; LMS archives.
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it but “the chief’s gate was shut in their faces and they were
defied.” Therefore, W. Harwood Nutt armed his men and “got the
goods away” after punishing the recalcitrant chiefs.25 Very few of
the missionaries ever concerned themselves about such diminution
of indigenous authority. Those who did, either applauded it, or
believed the risks attendant upon lessening chiefly power were
adequately compensated by the importance of the labors carried on
for and by the mission within the special station villages: “.
. . work
carried on in native villages is not to be compared with the work
prosecuted in our own.”26
Before the directors of the LMS in London had any reason to
suspect such a consolidation of power, their missionaries were
unquestioned rulers of a large part of Northern Rhodesia. Even
after the establishment of a settled administration at Abercorn, the
LMS continued to rule many African men, women, and children.
Individual missionaries suspended the teleological ethic and moved
swiftly to excesses endemic in any such system of control un-
mitigated by firm control over policy. Just as the village system, and
its attendant assumption of rule, elsewhere in Africa did inevitably
result in an imposed and personalized code of law and the rigid
means of enforcing it, so in Northeast Rhodesia did the LMS find
it necessary and right to run its mission stations and villages, and
even the surrounding areas, with as sure and hard a hand as a
medieval lord his demesne. When it gathered Africans within a
stockade, conflicts arose which ordinarily would have been settled
within the indigenous system. Hence the mission found it had to
impose its own rule, to ensure care and maintenance of essential
works, to appoint new subordinate authorities, and generally to
rationalize the entire locale in such a way as to have it function
as a happy and integrated whole. Minor baronies had existed in
Africa, but the LMS developed a mode of secular rule in Northern
Rhodesia which went beyond any which were experienced else-
where.
The system made extensive use of force and corporal punishment.
Missionaries themselves administered whippings with a citoki
25 Nutt to Thompson, July 25, 1895, CA ix/3/c; LMS archives.
26 Ibid.
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made from cured hippopotamus hide. “In one of our stations at this
moment there are half a dozen long strips of thick hippo-hide
hanging from a tree, with heavy weights, being cured for the
abominable practice in the hands of the missionaries of the LMS,
of horsewhipping the natives, in accordance with the necessity of
their positions.
. .
.”27 Beatings, thrashings, and innumerable minor
punishments were all part of the mission’s method of keeping order
to attain spiritual goals.28 They were not alone, of course, in further-
ing their position among Africans by rendering corporal punish-
ment. Traders, travelers, and administrators were hardly ashamed
of administering the citoki when chiefs, servants, or passersby mis-
behaved or showed them less than the expected deference.29 Mis-
sionaries were simply acting as white men throughout Africa have
often behaved when confronted with “outright disobedience,”
“simple malfeasance,” or “irresponsibility” on the part of weaker
and essentially “subject” people.30 Missionaries, however, also
punished as Christians, in furtherance of spiritual callings, and
they did not confine punishment simply to children or servants.
The prevalent system and its excesses were rarely questioned
before they were challenged by James Mackay, an older missionary
27 Purves, in Mackay to Thompson, Aug. 6, 1898, CA x/2/c; LMS
archives.
28 Even before there were villages, missionaries saw little reason not to
beat Africans for theft or other disreputable actions. David Jones believed:
“.
. .
any one that understands the African’s character knows he must be
well looked after or he will take all sorts of advantages . .
.
Jones to
Thompson, Feb. 22, 1888, CA vii/3/b, LMS archives. See also Coillard to
Jessie, Nov. 4, 1891, Coillard Papers, folios 1878-1891, National Archives, Salis-
bury; A. J. Hanna, The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia
(Oxford, 1956), 27-37; Oliver, Missionary Factor, 59-60.
29 Val Gielgud, a district officer, was able to give only ten cuts to an African
who misbehaved because of the “ill-timed appearance” and disapproval of
Colin Harding, the Administrator of Barotseland. “In punishing him I was
not acting as a government official, but simply as a white man who had to
establish and sustain the prestige of his race among a wild community. . . .”
Gielgud to Codrington, Nov. 21, 1900, A/3/8/1, North-East Rhodesia (NER)
archives, Lusaka.
30 This is not meant to constitute a value judgment. Missionaries had no
natural right to expect obedience or to compel patterns of Western behavior.
They did so, however, and excesses ensued.
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who had previously served the LMS in Madagascar.31 His own
accusations, and the angry admissions and explanations in mitiga-
tion offered by his colleagues, serve to summarize the unexpected
predicament in which the LMS and other missions in Northern
Rhodesia found themselves. It was accepted by all concerned that
mission villages had been responsible for road making, good schools,
a large congregation, and a certain degree of prosperity. On the
other hand, the system took time and energy which should have
been devoted directly to evangelical objects. It tended to prevent
a “right understanding on the part of the natives of the real nature”
of the missionary endeavor.
The frequent administration of corporal punishment by the mis-
sionary often exercise [d] a most baneful influence upon his personal
character and tendfed] largely to prevent the spiritual progress of
the mission. 32
Dr. Mackay’s indictment continued:
First, the missionary as chief appears to us a mistake because of
the moral influence of the position of the man himself; secondly,
it creates friction between members on a station, and thirdly the
fact of having a merely nominal head or chief makes it difficult
or even impossible for the natives to understand that the companions
of the missionary in charge, whoever he may be, are other than his
headman. . . .
The fact of having as a missionary society to take magisterial charge
of a station, is . . . not conducive to a right understanding on
the part of the natives of our real intentions regarding them, if
they are at all able to understand these beneficient intentions, or
are taught them, they are in this mission at any rate able to be
immediately nullified by the necessity of our having to inflict pun-
ishment. In fact instead of being regarded as the white men who
carry to them the good tidings of God’s love . . . we are known
and feared. . . .
31 Mackay, a senior member of the LMS’ Madagascar medical staff, had
been refused permission to return there by the French government unless he
agreed to obtain a French medical diploma.
32 Minutes of Tanganyika District Committee Meeting, Oct. 12-22, 1898,
CA x/2/z; Purves early thought missionaries should not become chiefs, but
he was overruled by others. “I . . . therefore have disputed the right of Dr.
Mather to act as Law Maker and fudge without appeal. . . .” Purves to
Thompson, Oct. 2, 1894, CA ix/2/e; LMS archives.
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. . . the spiritual side of the work seems almost necessarily quite
subordinate to the material. 33
Missionaries were prepared to justify the punishments that they
had meted out. John May pleaded that he had only seen Charles
Benjamin Mather use the whip once, when watchmen had been
caught smoking. “For such flagrant disobedience they received a
well-deserved punishment and never tried the same thing again.”
After Mather s death, May averred that he himself had only used
the whip twice. On the day of Mather’s funeral May had given
orders that no guns were to be fired. The orders “expressly given”
were “expressly disobeyed” and May had the various offenders
thrashed. On another occasion a suspected murderer was whipped
severely before being sent on to Abercorn, where the British South
Africa Company administration placed the suspect in chains for a
month.34
Percy Jones claimed that he had only administered the citoki six
times—all in necessary circumstances—during his months at Kam-
bole. For a case of suspected adultery he beat both parties. He
also used the whip for drunkenness, on a man who broke a boy’s
arm during an argument, on one for using another’s hut as a lava-
tory, to punish a man for firing a gun with intent to wound,
and for one case of “repeated disobedience.”35 Later, when Jones
was at Niamkolo for a year, his whippings included those for
drunkenness, use of poison ordeals, adultery, theft, a “bad case
of blackmail,” and again for “repeated disobedience.”36 Another
missionary was accused of forcing boys who could not swim into
the water, of beating a man who would not sell him a gun, and
of using a cricket bat to punish a man who displeased him in a
game.37
33 Mackay to Thompson, Aug. 6, 1898, CA x/2/c; LMS archives.
34 May to Thompson, Nov. 9, 1898, CA x/4/c; LMS archives.
35 Percy Jones to Thompson, Oct. 27, 1898, CA x/4/c; LMS archives. The
problem of excreta seemed to be common. At Kafulafuta the South African
Baptist missionaries were always worried about improper use of huts. See the
Kafulafuta notebooks 1912-20, at Kafulafuta Mission.
36 Jones to Thompson, Oct. 27, 1898, CA x/4/c; LMS archives.
37 Hemans to Thompson, June 5, 1899; Mackay to Thompson, July 6, 1899,
CA x/3/d; LMS archives.
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The society’s directors condemned these abuses of excessive
authority when they were at last brought to their attention. “The
Society’s missionaries,” they said, “are not in future to take any
responsibility in passing sentences or administering punishment.”38
The directors presumed that the Company’s administration was
ready to govern fully and thus to obviate the need for further
mission control.
As soon as there is a fixed and responsible authority in the govern-
ment of country, the religious teachers ought not to have anything
further to do with the administration of justice.39
In fact, the local representatives of the LMS in Northeast Rhodesia
had for some time simply acquiesced in the continued exercise of
temporal authority by missions. They had expected a certain
amount of cooperation and a division of responsibility between
the two spheres.40 After the board’s pronouncement, however, and
following its own growing personal disillusionment with certain
of the missionaries, the administration began to demand that mis-
sionaries cease the exercise of physical punishment. As indicated
by Percy Jones’ flagrant insistence upon beating adulterers himself
despite the administration’s wishes and those of his own board,
the LMS missionaries relinquished their prerogatives only with
reluctance. 41 Robert Laws reported as late as 1905 that missionaries
were still exercising authority by means of the whip, and urged
the LMS board to direct this energy into more desirable channels.42
The Board cautioned its missionaries once again:
38 Thompson to May, Dec. 24, 1898, CA xxvii, 102-04; LMS archives.
39 Thompson to Mackay, Feb. 17, 1899; CA xxviii, 168; LMS archives.
40 Thompson to Carson, Mar. 29, 1895, CA xxvi, 116-18; LMS archives.
41 Jones, in extenuation, pleaded: “In a country . . . where so called magis-
trates can carry out any course which seems to suit their nature, it behooves
the missionaries, as the only friends the hapless native has, [sic] to stand up
against cruelty, adultery, injustice, and murder.”: Jones to Thompson, May 28,
1899, CA x/3/b; LMS archives.
42 Laws said none of the missionaries had professed knowledge of the
Board’s directive of 1898 curtailing missionaries’ temporal powers. Laws to
Thompson, May 29, 1905; Hanna, Beginnings, 50, seems to conclude that it
ceased then, but such could hardly have been so. See also “I have flogged
my own houseboy, but this is my own business.” Wareham to Thompson, Jan.
4, 1905, LMS archives.
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. . . under no circumstances is flogging to be resorted to by the
Society’s missionaries as punishment of adult natives, and ... it is
not advisable that a missionary should, in any case, take the law into
his own hands by inflicting penalties. . . .43
Slowly the LMS relaxed its control over mission villages. Excesses
tended to be more infrequent, and younger missionaries were loath
to continue practices which had been condemned so roundly by a
visiting deputation and by their own directors.44 The administration
was also more zealous in protecting its own rights, but the most
important reason for the cessation of missionary punitive powers
was a real diminution in the demand for stockades and protected
villages.45 The mission could hardly demand unquestioned fealty
once mobility had increased and it no longer remained the sole
source of protection, employment, or advancement.
II
The increase in temporal control coincided with a rapid growth
in missionary economic involvement. Exercise of considerable mis-
sion entrepreneurial initiative came inexorably, yet at the same time
in ways unintended. Deviation from single-minded religious efforts
resulted from a double-barreled missionary economic problem:
“financial support from home was often somewhat precarious and
slow in arriving, while, on the other hand, they were continuingly
conscious of the pathetic conditions of the native populations. . . Z’46,
Christianity, as introduced by the missions, resulted in the stimulation
of new wants, the inculcation of a desire to work and the introduc-
tion of new agricultural skills, crops, and equipment. As the system
worked in many parts of Rhodesia, the theory of salvation almost
appeared to be: If you wished to qualify for an Evangelical heaven,
43 Thompson to McFarlane, Apr. 7, 1906, [my italics], CA xxxiii, 486,
LMS archives. Oliver accepts W. P. Livingstone’s date of 1904 for this state-
ment, but the records are contradictory. Oliver, Missionary Factor, 59.
44 Wilfred McFarlane, in a letter to the author, Apr. 21, 1960.
45 At first there was a devolution of temporal powers to appointed head-
men and other functionaries, but even this arrangement was later dropped.
Robertson et al. to Thompson, Aug. 11, 1904; LMS archives.
46 Arthur H. Cole, “The Relations of Missionary Activity to Economic
Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, IX (Jan., 1961),
124.
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you covered your nakedness, possessed your own goods (often
purchased from the missionary), and labored energetically in the
Lords earthly vineyard.
The transmission of Western entrepreneurial ideas proceeded in-
directly, but nevertheless effectively, from the examples of mis-
sionary economic endeavor in Northern Rhodesia. Missionaries were
zealous and industrious; they inculcated those Western social
attitudes which were conducive to thrift and hard work and they
introduced technological advances which contributed to higher
output and dependence upon Western markets. Higher consump-
tion of Western material goods was regularly encouraged. “Progress”
and “uplift” were concepts implicitly introduced into the fabric
of indigenous society together with the otherwise solely spiritual
content of Christianity. By so doing, missionaries accustomed Afri-
cans to Western ways of life and prepared them gradually for a
more total participation in the European economic and social
framework.47
In Northern Rhodesia economic activities went hand-in-hand
with evangelism. From the first, Africans associated missions with
trade goods as much as with the gospel. Mission stores stocked
calico and ornaments and later sold every conceivable commodity
from dresses and shoes to soap and candy. With increasingly more
widespread use of coin, station shops burgeoned. Trading led to
large-scale production of direct benefit to the local standard of
living. Missions developed agricultural, wood-working, or process-
ing schemes dependent upon free or inexpensive mission labor
and upon the heavy exercise of mission influence.
Trading on the part of missions began before there were any
well-organized supply routes to Northern Rhodesia. Missionaries
themselves ordered supplies in bulk from abroad and shipped them
by a tortuous combination of sea and land transport and, ultimately,
by human porterage. When local payments could only be remitted
with trade goods, missionaries had to make provision for such sub-
47 For an instructive discussion, see Godfrey Wilson, An Essay on the
Economics of Detribalisation in Northern Rhodesia, i & ii (Livingstone, 1941
& 1942). For missionary contributions to the development of markets in
Northern Rhodesia, see my “Rural Rhodesian Markets,” in Paul J. Bohannan
and George Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa (Evanston, 1962), 581-600.
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stitute money by conveying it from overseas along with their own
essentials. Africans also tired of calico alone and soon demanded
an opportunity to obtain Western clothes and accouterments of
all kinds. The transition to a fully developed economic program
was therefore easy once demand had been whetted. By about 1905,
missions even ceased to require stocks of cloth as pay-rolls, and
instead issued wages in silver.48 Yet their obligation to provide
goods readily did not, they felt, diminish, for Africans still expected
them to cater to a demand for those Western products which the
missions themselves had encouraged.
Missionaries soon realized that proceeds from stores and similar
commercial activities could constitute important profits and thus
could reduce dependence upon overseas funds and could mollify
those directors who were concerned about high expenditures and
small returns (in the form of souls saved). For those missionaries
who depended for sustenance upon irregular contributions more
than upon funds from an organized society, the temptation and the
need to maximize profits was of course great. In other cases, men
who found their taste for missionary life jaded could cheerfully ra-
tionalize being preoccupied with trade, accounts, or particular func-
tions as shopkeeper and entrepreneur. George Suckling, at Chito-
koloki (PB), was unduly preoccupied from the beginning with
various ways to make money for himself and his mission.49 Julius
Torrend, at Kasisi (SJ), spent nearly every week worrying about
his profits from potatoes or pigs. His diary contains daily entries
on these subjects.50 W. Govan Robertson, at Kawimbe, made himself
into a super-accountant and self-styled treasurer for the LMS
missions. 51 His careful balancing of ledgers was appreciated by
his directors, although they indicated that no other missionary any-
where in the world had the time to forward such detailed reports
of expenditure and profit. The general secretary of the LMS wrote:
4y Shortage of gold often caused mission crises. See Robertson to Douglas
Buchanan, May 17, 1912; Robertson to Hawkins, Sept. 17, 1912; LMS archives.
49 Fisher to Darling, July 2, 1920, Fisher Papers National Archives, Salis-
bury; Suckling, Echoes, 1920, 230-31; see Slade, Missions, 234.
50 Torrend, diary, 1914-1921, passim, especially Aug. 11, 1914.
51 Robertson to Directors, July 30, 1902; LMS archives. Robertson to
Bradford, Mar. 7, 1912, Abel Papers. McFarlane, in a letter to the author,
Apr. 21, 1960.
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I have grave doubts as to whether in a very small mission like the
Central Africa mission it is necessary for the treasurer to give so
much of his time to the preparation of ... a report. . .
.
[It] is
far more elaborate and detailed than any similar [financial] report
we get from any other missions, most of which are very much
larger than the Central Africa mission and the accounts of which
are very much more complicated. My anxiety is that an undue
proportion of time should not be spent by the treasurer on purely
financial and administrative work . 52
Wherever there were mission stations there were stores run by mis-
sionaries. By 1902, LMS imports of trade goods exceeded 15 tons:
Kawimbe (LMS) alone was stocked with 1,600 fezzes, 4,300 fancy
scarves, 1,850 pounds of soap, 5,400 yards of red calico, 39,000
yards of sheeting and other calico, 2,000 pounds of beads, and
large amounts of cheap jewelry, watches, umbrellas, salt, and
chains. 53 Kalene Hill (PB), on an important caravan route, kept
a wide variety of colorful goods. 54 Kasisi (SJ) would probably
have been deserted had it not had a store. 55 The UMCA, Brethren-
in-Christ, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, South African
Baptist Missionary Society, Primitive Methodist Missionary Society,
SAGM and Dutch Reformed Church all ran profitable enterprises
on their stations.56 Home boards rarely objected to such trading
activities because usually they, as well as their missionaries, wel-
comed any method of defraying expenses. The LMS only objected
to Robertson’s activities after other missionaries had complained
about the amount of time he spent trading, and because of the
sizeable capital immobilized by his schemes.
We do not want the LMS to be anything but blemish free on the
question of trading. . . . Every missionary should observe most
carefully the rule that barter goods are to be used only for necessary
purposes and that the mission is to discourage . . . those who are
52 Thompson to Robertson, Apr. 25, 1914, CA xi, 466; LMS archives.
53 Wright to Thompson, Jan. 23, 1903; Johnson to Thompson, Nov. 7, 1903;
LMS archives.
54 See Fisher to Darling, July 31, 1914, Fisher Papers.
55
“Take the store away and we shall very likely be left alone in the middle
of white people.” Torrend diary, May 2, 1919.
56 “Our store will soon rival the Mandala for the variety and amount of
stock in hand.” Msoro Logbook, ii, July 9, 1923; Chapman to Pickett, Nov. 14,
1903, Chapman Papers, MMS archives.
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in its own employment from expecting the missionary to have a
stock of goods which they can purchase from him. We have no
right to come into competition with the regular trader, even for . . .
our own workers. 57
Government also disliked trading by missionaries because it
believed such activity constituted unfair competition for the African
Lakes Corporation and individual shopkeepers. In 1915, it insisted
that missions should take out trading licenses and refrain from
locating their stores on lands originally conveyed to the mission
by the British South Africa Company, on payment of only nominal
fees. One Jesuit missionary wrote:
I have taken a £5 trading license for V* year. Without it there is too
much danger of going to gaol, because cash alone here will not do
to pay servants, much less to buy grain for our own consumption.
Yet, if I use goods for any of these purposes I am in constant danger
of being sent to gaol, as happened 2 T/2 years ago. ... It was for
paying three or four servants partly with such things as a singlet,
an old worn coat, and I do not remember what else, that I was sent
to gaol. Again with cash alone last year I was not able to buy as
much as one-half the grain I needed for our own consumption. . . .
Judge Beaufort . . . insisted . . . that for a man in my position the
only practical thing was to take a trading license and have done
with all difficulties.58
Missions attempted to increase profits in innumerable other ways.
Gardens, worked by inexpensive labor, produced large quantities
of agricultural produce marketable wherever there were Europeans.
The LMS in 1900 also retailed 16,000 pounds of various indigenous
crops to Africans. Export of beeswax and honey became a mono-
poly of the western Brethren.59 The Brethren, Jesuits, UMCA,
Brethren-in-Christ, and Seventh-day Adventists early had large
scale, and profitable, developments in animal husbandry.60 The
57 Thompson to Johnson, June 20, 1903, CA xxxi, 282-83. Wright to Thomp-
son, Nov. 20, 1902, LMS archives. See also Harold Wareham, “The Central
African Mission in 1902,” unpublished typescript (n.d., c. 1944), Wareham
Papers, Hayling Island, England. (Privately held.)
58 Torrend, diary, Aug. 29, 1918 and Oct. 18, 1918.
59 Personal interviews, Charles Geddes (Loloma, June 27, 1959); Ffolliot
Fisher (Hillwood Farm, June 24, 1959).
60 Fisher to Darling, July 31, 1914, Fisher Papers; Mapanza Diary, Nov. 9,
1913, July 11, 1917, Feb. 28, 1918; Brethren-in-Christ, Minutes of General
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sale of furniture and other industrial projects became, for a time,
a very lucrative mission endeavor. Indeed, Suckling plunged him-
self into debt in expectation of amassing large profits from a furni-
ture factory at Chitokoloki (PB), and other missions were worried
regularly about the quality of their woodwork and about obtaining
markets for it. 61 Suckling went to the trouble of building boats
specifically to transport furniture made by Africans, under his
supervision, down the Zambezi River to markets in Livingstone.62
The major ways in which missions exerted considerable secular
influenced have been discussed. Missionaries also contributed to
Northern Rhodesia’s development in the course of many daily
routine activities. They had to build their own roads; often they
were the first to connect isolated parts of Northern Rhodesia to
main centers. Stanley Buckley (PMMS) cut the first motor road
from the Zambezi Valley to the railway line. Others maintained or
cleared paths or roads from administrative bomas to tribal settle-
ments or to their own stations. Methodists, the Paris Mission, and
those of the UMCA, South African General Mission, or the Brethren,
all ran their own postal systems until the government was prepared
to provide runners and post offices. Others distributed grain during
periods of seasonal hunger or acted as quarantine officers during
smallpox or influenza epidemics. They built bridges, inoculated
cattle, and generally behaved in such a way as to mediate between
indigenous culture and an encroaching Western civilization.
European missionaries could not betray their own social context
and behave other than as Western men. In responding to their
Conference, 1907, copies at superintendent’s residence, Bulawayo; Moreau to
Parry, Mar. 12, 1922; Moreau to Brown, Jan. 10, 1924, Campion Papers;
Magoye District Notebook, 277-79.
61 Fisher to Darling, Apr. 4, 1921, Jan. 31, Mar. 18, 1922, Fisher Papers;
Suckling, Echoes, 1920, 230; Sept. 30, 1921, Echoes, Jan., 1922, 13-15;
Robertson to Thompson, Aug. 14, 1904; Robertson et al. to Thompson, Aug. 11,
1904; Robertson to Thompson, n.d. Apr., 1904; Wright to Thompson, Nov. 20,
1902; LMS archives. Czarlinski to Parry, Nov. 15, 1920, Campion Papers,
Salisbury. Resident Magistrate’s Notebook, Mongu, i, 33.
62 Suckling, Sept. 30, 1918, Echoes, Feb., 1919, 64-65. Fisher to Darling,
Jan, 31, 1922, Mar. 12, 1923, Fisher Papers.
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evangelical environment they had to assume innumerable tasks
which were not necessarily germane to their spiritual pursuit. In
order to survive, missionaries became transporters, brickbuilders,
hunters, and herdsmen. They became educators, shopkeepers, and
rural magistrates. In all these different roles the missionaries per-
formed important tasks to ease their own physical lot and the
lot of their charges. Significantly, they also introduced Africans
to the Western way of life in nearly all of its manifestations.

IX.
The Economic Background
to the Revival of Afrikaner
Nationalism
by
LAURENCE SALOMON
New York City
1
It was thought in the early 1930’s that Afrikaner nationalism1
was disappearing as a divisive force between the Afrikaans- and
English-speaking sections of the South African white population.
The historian W. M. Macmillan, considered that “there need be
little mention,” in his Complex South Africa (1930), “of the dead
or dying feuds of the two white peoples.” An American historian
in a 1945 study of nationalism grouped South Africa with the
U.S.S.R. and Switzerland as examples of “successful multi-national
states.” On the basis of studies published in the previous decade,
he wrote: “Already Boers read English books avidly, and their
own literature is remarkably free of anti-British bias.”2
This point of view accurately reflected certain aspects of
the contemporary scene. Several of the issues that had led to
the formation of the National Party by General Hertzog in 1912
had been or were being settled. With the unanimous consent of
the mainly English-speaking Parliamentary Opposition, General
Hertzog’s administration had obtained recognition for Afrikaans
as one of the country’s two official languages in 1925; it had
secured South Africa her own national flag, alongside the Union
Jack, in 1928; and with the passage of the Statute of Westminster in
1931, had won Britain’s full acknowledgement of South Africa’s
national sovereignty.
Moreover, since 1924, Afrikaner Nationalists and English-speak-
ing South Africans had begun working together politically. The
National Party had come to power that year in coalition with the
Labour Party, an organ of mainly English-speaking white workers.
Political co-operation between the two white language groups
acquired an even broader foundation in 1933, when the depression
1 This paper is based on research conducted in South Africa between 1958
and 1960 under a fellowship granted by the Ford Foundation.
2 Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities ( with Special
Reference to East-Central Europe ) (New York, 1945), 68.
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led to a coalition of the National Party and its principal opponent,
General Smuts’ South African Party, which had long represented
the interests of the wealthier English-speaking whites and non-
nationalist Afrikaners. In the subsequent General Election of that
year, the Coalition won 144 of the 150 House of Assembly seats.
So harmonious and popular was the co-operation of Hertzog and
Smuts that the two parties fused their individual identities to form
a new entity in 1934, the United Party. Only a handful of the
more “imperial-minded” of General Smuts’ followers, and nineteen
of General Hertzog’s former parliamentary party colleagues, led by
Dr. D. F. Malan, decided not to join the United Party. They
established separate organizations on its wings, the Dominion
Party and the Purified National Party. The former’s appeal was
virtually confined to one province, Natal, where pro-British senti-
ment was strongest, while the Purified Nationalists, in the light of
Hertzog’s achievements and continued attachment to Afrikaner
interests, appeared to lack concrete issues which might be turned
to political account: the constitution of the United Party allowed
its members to make propaganda for turning South Africa into
a republic; the Party undertook to apply bi-lingualism in practice;
the country was free to secede from the Commonwealth and to
remain neutral in time of war if Parliament so decided. To con-
temporary observers, the facts of the birth, parliamentary pre-
dominance and all-embracing policy of the United Party may well
have signified the beginnings of a broad feeling of community
between the two white groups, and a future that would see the
memories of the Anglo-Boer War and other conflicts fade away.
We now know that this did not happen. The 1938 General
Election, the first after the formation of the parties, saw the
Purified Nationalists increase their parliamentary representation
to twenty-seven, a small figure compared with the 111 members
elected for the United Party, but one representing approximately
half the Afrikaner electorate and only ten per cent short of the
percentage of popular votes that would enable them to take office
ten years and two elections later. 3 In the months following the 1938
General Election there was an astonishing revival of Nationalist
3 See Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since
1948 (London, 1958), Chart I, 448f.
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feeling, stemming from the centenary celebrations of the Great
Trek. Afrikaners by the thousands donned Voortrekker costume,
grew beards and went to hail the ox-waggon trains that were sent
plodding through countryside, hamlet and town to commemorate
their ancestors' great journey into the interior. The Voortrekkers'
tribulations at the hands of Briton and Bantu were recalled, and
it was proclaimed at enormous festive rallies by such renowned
orators as Dr. Malan that the Afrikaner's enemies were still the
same.4 As the waggons converged on their final destination,
Pretoria, "an extraordinary spirit of fervid patriotism, bordering on
adoration, swept over the country. Enthusiasm became nearly
religious and sometimes hysterical, women bringing their babies to
be baptised in the shadow of the waggons.”5
South Africa had never seen such a celebration. The spirit of
exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, thus renewed, did not fade with
the passing of the centenary. It was fanned by the United Party's
vote to take South Africa into the Second World War (a decision
that caused General Hertzog and thirty-six of his followers to
leave the Party); and it was reflected in succeeding years in the
host of agencies that were established to duplicate for Nationalists
the functions of organizations ranging from the Boy Scouts to
the South African Automobile Association and the Red Cross.
Cleavages between Boer and Briton multiplied rather than dimin-
ished, so that when Dr. Malan became Prime Minister in 1948, it
was no longer surprising that for the first time in the history of
the Union, a South African Cabinet was composed of members
of only one of the white groups.
Why were the expectations of the early 1930’s proved wrong?
Why did the political split among the white people persist and
widen?
An attempt to deal with these questions comprehensively is
beyond the scope of this paper. I shall confine myself to a discussion
of the role socio-economic factors played in the revival of Afrikaner
nationalism. Certainly here a basis existed for the persistence of
4 Dr. D. F. Malan, Die Nuwe Groot Trek: Suid-Afrika se Noodroep: Dr.
D. F. Malan se Rede op Bloedrivier 16 Desember 1938 (Kaapstad, n.d. ), 5.
5 D. W. Kruger, The Age of the Generals: A Short Political History of the
Union of South Africa, 1910-1948 (Dagbreek Book Store, 1958), 185.
222 Laurence Salomon
sectional feelings among whites. Nothing that General Hertzog’s
administration had accomplished in the way of securing official
equality of Afrikaans with English, or legal and symbolic equality
between South Africa and Britain, had significantly narrowed the
economic inequalities existing between the white language groups.
Of every eight Afrikaner men in the country’s nine biggest
cities in 1939, one was an unskilled laborer, in contrast to one
out of every eighty-five non-Afrikaner white men; on the other
hand, only one out of every 213 Afrikaner men was a merchant,
against one out of every nineteen non-Afrikaner white men.6
The origins of the Afrikaner’s economic backwardness in rela-
tion to English-speaking whites ( the details of which will be more
fully described later on) can be traced to events that occurred long
before the first arrival of Britons, to 1657, the year that saw the
start of European (Dutch) colonization in South Africa, and also
the beginning of slavery in the country. The use of imported slave
labor for all occupations below that of its supervision helped
establish a barrier to large-scale European immigration. Up until
1795, when British occupation of the Cape began, only 2,164
Dutch immigrants had found it profitable to enter the country.7
Even after the abolition of slavery in 1833, the continued use of
low-paid, indigenous, non-white labor for all manual work remained
a factor restricting the growth of the white population mainly to
that of its natural increase. In 1865, on the eve of the discovery of
diamonds, the total white population is estimated to have been
350,0008—one per cent that of the contemporary United States.
Most of this small white population was thinly dispersed over
huge stretches of country, eking out a modest livelihood through
cattle and sheep farming. The economy of the white pastoralists
was not strictly self-sufficient,9 but their needs and those of their
6 S. Pauw, Die Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner in die Stad (Stellenbosch,
1946), 235.
7 Andre Pieter du Plessis, Die Nederlandse Emigrasie Na Suid-Afrika:
Sekere Aspekte Rakende Voorbereiding Tot Aanpassing (Amsterdam, 1956),
17.
8 L. T. Badenhorst, “The Future Growth of the Population of South Africa
and its Probable Age Distribution,” Population Studies, IV (Oct. 1951), 3 f.
9 See S. Daniel Neumark, Economic Influences on the South African
Frontier
,
1652-1836 (Stanford, 1957), 172-74.
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low-paid non-white laborers, herdsmen and domestic servants were
too limited to constitute a market sufficiently large to stimulate any
appreciable specialization and manufacturing development. The
advent of gold mining in the Transvaal in 1886 found that area
a desert as regards industry, and the few rudimentary manufacturing
enterprises in the country were almost entirely confined to the
Cape Colony. Flour milling, baking, cart and waggon making, wine
and brandy distilling, candle making, food preserving, blubber
boiling, boat building and tanning more or less sum up South
Africa's industrial development after two centuries of white
settlement. 10
The country and its people were caught almost wholly un-
prepared for the new economic activities which set in following
the opening of the Kimberley diamond field in 1870 and the
discovery of the Witwatersrand gold reef in 1886. Not only did the
machinery and equipment for the mines and allied secondary
industries have to be shipped in from overseas, but with local
agriculture not geared to meet urban demands, even much of the
food consumed by the mining populations had to be imported. 11
More significant was the absence of a local skilled labor force.
No laboring class, skilled or unskilled, existed among the white
population, and the Coloured artisans of the small Cape enterprises
were neither numerous or available. 12 The exploitation of the
discoveries necessarily became the work of immigrants.
Over 400,000 European—mostly British—immigrants entered
South Africa between 1875 and 1904, a number greater than the
entire white population in 1875. 13 Probably—the exact figure is
unknown—more than half a million foreign Africans crossed the
country’s land borders during these years; and though these were
ostensibly migrant mine workers, many did not return to their
original homes. 14
10 M. H. de Kock, Economic History of South Africa (Cape Town, 1924),
283.
11 See R. K. Cope, Comrade Bill: The Life and Times of W. H . Andrews,
Workers’ Leader (Cape Town, n.d. ), 19.
12 Pauw, Beroepsarbeid
,
31.
13 C. G. W. Schumann, Die Ekonomiese Posisie van die Afrikaner (Bloem-
fontein, 1940), 67 f.
14 See G. V. Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa (Cape
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This sudden influx rapidly transformed an economically stagnant
land into the world’s largest gold and diamond producer and laid
the foundations for sustained industrial growth. A year after its
founding in the wild scrub country of the north east Cape Colony,
Kimberley had 50,000 inhabitants—including more whites than
had taken part in the Great Trek; 15 the population of Johannesburg
passed the 100,000 mark ten years after the city’s first appearance
on the Witwatersrand hills. 16 Sixty-three miles of railroad on the
eve of the diamond era were extended to 6,894 by 1909, as the
mining cities were connected with five ports. 17 The total tonnage
of ships berthing in South African harbors increased more than
twenty-one-fold between 1862 and 1898; 18 the total value of imports
rose almost tenfold and exports nineteenfold between 1865-69 and
1905-09. 19 Such was the turn of events that in 1882, the export of
diamonds alone was worth more than South Africa’s total exports
in the year of the discovery of diamonds, and exceeded the value
of the combined exports of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.20 By
1892, the private income of an immigrant, Cecil John Rhodes, who
had arrived in South Africa with a few pounds in his pocket, was
said to be thrice what the entire income of the Cape Colony had
been twenty years earlier, and it was still growing.21
The element of continuity present during the industrializing
experience of many other countries, in that indigenous populations
direct or execute the new economic activities, was largely absent
in South Africa’s case, despite the fact that the latter was neither
Town, 1961), 15, and Summary of the Report of the Commission for the
Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South
Africa, Union Government [hereafter U.G.], No. 61, 1955, 41.
15 C. W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic,
(London, 1941), 89.
16 du Plessis, Emigrasie, 30 n.
17 A. J. H. van der Walt, J. A. Wijd and A. L. Geyer, Geskiedenis van
Suid-Afrika (Kaapstad, 1955), II, 240.
18 de Kock, History, 340.
19 Ibid., 328.
20 S. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa: Its Course and Effects
(London, 1938), 54.
21 Sir James Tennant Molteno, The Dominion of Afrikanerdom: Recollec-
tions Pleasant and Otherwise (London, 1923), 25.
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an empty or recently settled land. For many years participation of
the older white and non-white population in the new industrial
economy was inconsiderable. In 1910, forty years after the Kim-
berley fields were opened and 18 years after the beginning of
deep level mining on the Witwatersrand, 72.8 per cent of the
then 7,255 white, skilled mine employees were immigrants; not until
1921 did the number of white South African- exceed that of
foreign-born miners.22 The unskilled black laborers who did most
of the manual work in the mining operations also came mainly
from outside the country. In 1904, 76.5 per cent of the 77,000
African gold and coal miners working in the Transvaal came from
foreign territories, chiefly Portuguese East Africa; and of the
323,000 black miners employed in the Transvaal at the outbreak
of the Second World War, 51.99 per cent were peasant migrants
from neighboring countries.23
The majority of the skilled and semi-skilled labor force for
the railways, the building trades and other industries that sprung
up in response to the markets created by mining and urban growth
also was recruited mainly in Europe.24 In the higher paid occupa-
tions, the predominance of the foreign-born was as pronounced and
even more enduring. In 1921—thirty-five years after the discovery
of the gold reef and half a century after the opening of the diamond
fields—immigrants ( chiefly English-speaking ) controlled most South
African industry and provided the bulk of its professional require-
ments, as the table below shows.
It will be seen that only in the lowest-paid professions, teaching
and the civil service, were South African-born whites in the
majority. (The top-salaried civil service positions were held pre-
22 de Kock, History, 442.
23 Sheila van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (Cape Town,
1942), 216 f.
24 Report of the Unemployment Investigation Committee, 1932 (U.G.
30-’32), para. 18; Cape of Good Hope, Report of the Select Committee on the
Poor White Question, 1906 (S.C. 10-’06), para. 7; du Plessis, Emigrasie, 32;
Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South
Africa, The Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report of the Carnegie
Commission (5 vols., Stellenbosch, 1932), I, 72. [Hereafter, Carnegie Com-
mission.]
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TABLE I
Percentage of Males Born Overseas, in a Number of Occupational
Groups in South Africa, Based on 1921 Census Data25
Occupational Group
Percentage
Bom Overseas
1 . Company Directors 76.0
2. Merchants and Business Managers 68.8
3. Doctors 62.3
4. Architects 80.4
5. Chartered Accomitants 70.8
6. Teachers 29.9
7. Fitters and Turners 55.8
8. Electricians 40.0
9. Typesetters 59.8
10. Carpenters 48.3
11. Bricklayers 28.6
12. Civil Servants 37.3
13. Underground Goldminers 34.3
14. Barbers 52.1
15. Unskilled Laborers 10.0
16. Farmers 5.8
dominantly by immigrants.26 ) In the trades, immigrants still com-
prised a considerable proportion of the personnel. The last two
items in the table are noteworthy. They indicate what the local
white inhabitants were doing when industrialism set foot in South
Africa, and the occupation through which many of them first
encountered the new economy.
This encounter was generally involuntary and unpleasant for many
of the Afrikaans-speaking descendants of the original Dutch
settlers. It was brought about by forces that made the countryside
uninhabitable for more and more of the latter, forces which the
newcomers helped speed in motion, but whose workings had begun
manifesting themselves before the arrival of industrialism.
By 1870, the land frontier was coming to an end.27 A hundred
years of warfare with African tribes had left 90 per cent of the
25 Source: Pauw, Beroepsarbeid, Table VII, 122; the table relates to white
people only.
26 Ibid., Table III, 77.
27 van der Walt et al., Geskiedenis, II, 250.
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country’s land area under white, chiefly Boer, ownership.28 It had
also ensured that the field of agricultural labor would remain
closed to whites, for Africans were taken on as tenants and laborers,
in many cases on their former tribal lands, and set to work for a
remuneration no white man would accept. After 1870, Boer sons
generally could no longer hope to own new farms, and as there was
no place for them as farm laborers the solution adopted by their
prolific parents was to divide up the family farm equally among
the children. For generation upon generation fragmentation of
farms proceeded. Many of the once customary 6,000 acre farms over
the years shrunk to tiny plots. In 1908, the Transvaal Indigency
Commission reported a case where a single heir was entitled to
296,387,007/4,705,511,234,760 of a farm of 5,347 acres, i.e., less
than half an acre.29 Two decades later, the Carnegie Commission of
Investigation on The Poor White Question in South Africa—the
names of these commissions are indicative of what was happening
—
came upon an old man with 55 acres, ten children and more
than 50 grandchildren, who informed the Commissioners that he
intended dividing his property equally among his children so
that each would at least have his own “sitplekkie” (sitting spot).
Portions only of the 55 acres were arable in good seasons.30 The
onset of any natural disaster—drought, locusts, rinderpest being
the most common—would be sufficient to dislodge these folk from
their small holdings. They would then be compelled to sell out
to more fortunate farmers and become bywoners (men living “on
land belonging to another—usually a relative—without any clearly
defined rights or duties”31 ) of whomever would have them. Field
laborers or domestic servants they could not and would not become,
because here they faced competition from landless Africans even
poorer than themselves.
There was an early indication of the later “Poor White Problem”
28 The Natives (Land) Act of 1936 provided for a land purchase scheme
to add land to the African Reserves. When the scheme is completed, Africans
will have title to about 13 per cent of the country’s land.
29 Transvaal Government, Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission,
1906-1908, Transvaal Government [hereafter T.G.], No. 13, 1908, para. 117.
30 Carnegie Commission, I, 121.
31 T.G. 13-’08, para. 17.
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in 1882, when the Boer Government in the Transvaal dispatched
an expedition against the Mapoch chief, Niabel, ostensibly because
of Niabels refusal to deliver up to Republican justice an African
who had murdered his step brother, the Sekukuni chief. The results
of the expedition suggest that this was not its sole motive. To the
surprise of none of the Boer commandos, the lands of the Mapoch
were confiscated, surveyed and distributed in small holdings among
their indigent comrades. The Mapoch themselves were ordered to
be indentured as laborers and servants in Boer households and
on farms throughout the Republic.32
The advent of mining only temporarily relieved the growing
pressure of population in the rural areas. As there were no railways
in the Transvaal in 1886, the whole of the mechanical equiment of
the mines as well as food and supplies for the mining population
had to be brought in by animal transport from the coast or from
neighboring areas. Transport riding for a time furnished the Poor
White countrymen with a socially acceptable occupation. Moreover,
the arrival of a mining population created a market for agricultural
produce which had never previously existed. Meat, forage and
mealies were required, and these commodities the Transvaal farmer
could most easily produce.
But the period of prosperity brought on by these developments
was short-lived. The decline set in with the construction of the
railways to Johannesburg. The Cape line reached the Rand in
1892, and by December 1895 the lines from Durban and Lourenco
Marques had been completed. Those transport riders working on
the major routes lost their jobs. Unfitted by previous education and
training to seek skilled or semi-skilled employment on the railroads
or in the mines,33 they and others deprived of their living by the
32 Francois Stephanus Cillie, “The Mapoch’s Gronden: An Aspect of the
Poor White Question” (unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Pretoria,
1934), 9 f.
33 Although industrial and vocational schools had been established for
Coloured and African pupils in the Cape as far back as 1854, it was not until
forty years later that attempts were made to institute industrial education for
whites—and then these efforts were aimed specifically as a remedy for the
emergent Poor White problem. Even so, vocational education was associated
for many years thereafter with mental deficiency and criminal tendencies, as
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railways were forced back into the rural areas. Simultaneously,
the farmers were hit. The forage and supplies for the thousands of
animals engaged in transporting goods to the Rand were no longer
required. Furthermore, the railways were bringing more cheaply
from the coastal colonies and their ports supplies to the Witwater-
srand population which had previously been purchased at high
prices from local producers. Goods trains were unloading American
maize at Park Station, Johannesburg, at a price almost equal to the
cost of transport alone to the Afrikaner farmer riding his ox-waggon
load into town from the Magatos Mountains, a few hundred miles
away.34 The immediate effect of railway construction, therefore,
was to throw back onto the land large numbers of people pre-
viously engaged in transportation services, just at a time when the
Transvaal farmer found his chief market threatened from the
outside.35
No sooner had many of the transport riders returned to their
precarious bywoner positions on the farms than they were swept
away again, this time in many cases for good. In May, 1896,
rinderpest spread through the Transvaal, killing more than two-
thirds of the Republic’s cattle population. 36 The bywoners could
no longer plough and the impoverished farmers were unable to
support them. As a result, many of the former transport riders
trekked to the towns. From about this time dates the birth of white
slum districts along the Witwatersrand, and on the outskirts of
Pretoria.37
The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was the next major economic
disaster for Afrikaans-speaking whites. In order to secure their
military victory, the British adopted a scorched earth strategy.
Much of the Republics’ countryside was burned to a wilderness.
Agricultural implements, dams and an estimated 30,000 farm build-
well as with poverty. Carnegie Commission, Joint Findings and Recom-
mendations, para. 18.
34 T.G., 13-’08, Minutes of Evidence, Q. 5266.
35 T.G. 13-’08, paras. 19-21.
36 Adriaan Nicolaas Petrus Pelzer, “Die ‘Arm-Blanke’-Verskynsel in die
Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek Tussen die Jare 1882 en 1889: ’n Sosiaal-Historiese
Studie” (unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1937), 62.
37 T.G. 13-’08, para. 22.
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ings were destroyed, Boer villages were razed to the ground, cattle
and sheep were slaughtered or carried away.38 In so devastating areas
where Afrikaners lived, while leaving the cities of the English-
speaking immigrants unscathed, the war increased the economic
inequality between the two groups that has lasted to the present
day.
It should be noted, however, that war damage was slight in
rural areas of the Cape Colony, also farmed mainly by Afrikaners;
and that some of these districts produced as many Poor Whites,
the Carnegie Commission found, as the most impoverished regions
of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. 39 But the link between
the British anti-guerilla campaign and the Poor White problem
proved to be more memorable.
In the winter months following the peace treaty, the ranks of
the impoverished bywoners were swollen by destitute Boer land-
owners. Many of the latter returned from war to find their stock
gone, their buildings demolished, the processes of rural life dis-
organized, requiring time, capital and morale before they could be
set going again. Although the British government made a small
grant and guaranteed a large loan to help repair war damage and
promote economic development, the times were not propitious for
complete recovery. From the beginning of January to the end
of September 1903, only 8.09 inches of rain were registered in
South Africa—a record drought.40 That same year saw the start of
a six-year trade depression.41 The indigent white population of
Pretoria trebled.42 Ten thousand Afrikaners with nowhere to go
stayed on in the British concentration camps for months after
the war had ended. 43
38 Cecil Headlam (ed.), The Milner Papers: South Africa 1899-1905 (2
vols., London, 1933), II, 273; J. Ramsay Macdonald, What I Saw In South
Africa
,
September and October 1902 (London, 1902), 52; G. B. Beak, The
Aftermath of War: An Account of the Repatriation of Boers and Natives in
the Orange River Colony 1902-1904 (London, 1906), 17; Pauw, Beroepsar
-
beid, 64.
39 Carnegie Commission, III, 217-20.
40 Beak, Aftermath
,
119.
41 Schumann, Posisie, 78.
42 Report of the Commission In Re Pretoria Indigents, para. 15.
43 T.G. 13-’08, para. 24.
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Most gates to employment were closed to them. Agricultural
labor, it has been seen, had become the province of landless Africans
and Coloureds. Skilled labor in the mines and in their satellite
industries and services was provided by immigrant artisans with
whom the uneducated Afrikaners were not qualified to compete.
Unskilled labor in the mines, which offered the greatest scope
outside agriculture for the employment of untrained workers, had
become the domain of chiefly immigrant African migrant laborers,
whose wages and working conditions, due to the industry’s need
to economize, were such that health and in many cases life itself,
could not be maintained. It was estimated that in 1910, the death
rate among the 180,000 African miners recruited from Portuguese
East Africa was 82/1,000, or about 7,000 in all.44 Even had Poor
Whites been prepared to toil underground alongside Africans at
the latters’ rates of pay, it is doubtful whether the mine managers
would have hired them. The trouble with white laborers, said
Mr. P. R. Frames, the director of the country’s biggest diamond
mine, was that whatever they might be paid
You could not search them and could not put them in a compound.
You could not put them in detention houses at the end of the
period of service, to see that they do not take any diamonds out. To
be perfectly candid, you would have them on strike. You cannot
have a big industry like that dependent upon labour that can any
day go out.45
In these circumstances, the number of those classified as Poor
White continued to rise: 106,000 in 1916; 120,000 in 1921; 300,000
in 1929-30.46 This last figure represented 17.53 per cent of South
Africa’s white families, who were described by the Carnegie Com-
mission as being “very poor”—so poor that they depended on
charity for support, or subsisted in “dire poverty” on the farms.
These “very poor,” along with another 30.97 per cent of the
Union’s white families, classified simply as “poor”
—
“so poor that
44 Assembly Debates, I (1911), col. 1179.
45 T.G. 13-’08, Minutes of Evidence, Q. 6944.
46 Verslag van Het Kerkelik Kongres Gehouden te Cradock op 22 en 23
November, 1916: Het Arme Blanken Vraagstuk (Kaapstad, 1917), 9; Second
Interim Report of the Unemployment Commission, 1921 (U.G. 34-’21), para.
2; Carnegie Commission, III, 217-22.
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they cannot adequately feed and clothe their children,” made up
nearly half the white population of South Africa. At least nine out
of ten of these impoverished families were said to be Afrikaans-
speaking.47
Periodic droughts (1919, 1924-27) and depressions (1920-23,
1929-33
)
progressively drove more and more of these people off the
land. Between 1911 and 1951, an estimated half million whites,
mostly Afrikaners, left the countryside for the towns and cities.48
Whereas before 1899 there were less than 10,000 Afrikaners in all
South African towns, there were over a million by 1951, representing
69 per cent of the total Afrikaner population.49
Aside from the particular difficulties of finding work, the Afrikaner
urban migrant encountered a situation unlike that experienced by
his West European counterpart. The latter usually came among
people of his own national group, speaking his own tongue. The
Afrikaner entering the cities, like the African, did not. Misunder-
standing, prejudice and hostility enjoyed greater play. The Com-
mission In Re Pretoria Indigents—a title suggesting the business-
like approach of its (English-speaking) members—considered
the poor Afrikaner migrants in 1905 and damned them as an
"undesirable influx”:
The poor white class is chiefly drawn from the original European
settlers of South Africa whose function should essentially be that
of cultivators of the soil.60
The Commission pointed out that Poor White children were
"exposed to many temptations” in the towns; that the presence
47
J. H. Coetzee, Verarming en Oorheersing (Bloemfontein, 1942), 36; Dr.
N. Diederichs, Ekonomiese Bewuswording: Kongresrede Gehou by Geleentheid
van die Derde RDB.-Kongres in Bloemfontein op 3, 4 en 5 Julie 1945 (RDB.
Voorligtingreeks No. 10), 9, claims that 98 per cent of Poor Whites were
Afrikaners. See also Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, “Die Bestryding van Armoede en
die Herorganisasie van Welvaartswerk,” in Verslag van die Volkskongres oor
die Armblanke-Vraagstuk Gehou te Kimberley
,
2 tot 5 Okt. 1934, 28-30.
48 Van der Walt et al, Geskiedenis, 279; Pretoria News, Mar. 23, 1955, in
Press Digest 13/1955/134 f.
49 Vereeniging News, Feb. 18, 1950 in Press Digest 8/1950/82; Pretoria
News, Mar. 23, 1955, in Press Digest 13/1955/134 f.
50 Report of the Commission In Re Pretoria Indigents, paras. 23, 18. (My
italics )
.
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of their parents there was “not desirable from an economic and
moral standpoint, and that endeavours should be made to settle
them on the land”; it noted that a commission of Afrikaners in the
days when the Boers were masters in the Transvaal had reached
the same conclusion.51
For years this attitude persisted. In 1916, a member of the
Relief and Grant-In-Aid Commission decided that the “remedy” for
the problem lay in keeping as many Poor Whites on the land as
possible.52 On the occasion of the 1923 Poor White Congress, the
Bloemfontein English-language newspaper, The Friend
,
according
to Dr. Malan, called for a stepping-up of British immigration as a
protective measure for city dwellers against the lowering effect
of the Afrikaner influx.53 Two years later, a “witness of standing”
advised the Economic and Wage Commission that the Poor Whites
should all be exported “to other countries.”54 The mood of the
migrants was perhaps captured by a Afrikaner poet, who later
spoke of them as
om stief op stasies uit te klim,
klein stippels teen n blinde kim. . . .55
(step-children geeting off at stations,
small specks against a blind horizon. . .
.)
In the General Election of 1924, the economically conservative
and mainly English-supported South African Party of General
Smuts was defeated. A Nationalist-Labour coalition took office and
immediately inaugurated a systematic policy for dealing with the
problems of Poor White unemployment and unemployability.
51 Ibid., para. 54.
52 Province of the Transvaal, Report of the Relief and Grants-In-Aid Com-
mission, Transvaal Province [hereafter, T.P.], No. 5, 1916, First Minority
Report, para. 27.
53 Dr. D. F. Malan, Die Groot Vlug: ’n Nabetragting van die Arm-Blanke-
Kongres, 1923, en van die Offisiele Sensusopgatve (pamphlet containing articles
appearing between 10 and 24 July, 1923, in Die Burger ), 6.
54 Report of the Economic and Wage Commission 1925, 1926 ( U.G. 14-’26),
Andrews-Lucas-Rood Report, para. 171.
55 G. A. Watermeyer, “Die Tweede Trek,” in Die Republiek van Duisend
Jaar (Johannesburg, 1957). I am indebted to Mr. Watermeyer for permission
to quote this extract and the poem at the end of this article. I owe the
English renderings to the work of Mrs. Marcelle Varney.
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“Civilised labour” (i.e., white) was ordered to be substituted for
“uncivilised labour” wherever feasible in the public service. The
substitution was given effect on the largest scale by the State-owned
Railways where, between 1924 and 1933, the proportion of un-
skilled white laborers employed rose from 9.5 to 39.3 per cent
(representing an absolute increase of 13,023), while that of Africans
fell from 75 to 48.9 per cent (an absolute decrease of 15,556).56
By 1953-54, over 100,000 mainly unskilled and semi-skilled whites
were working for the Railways, then the greatest single employer
of white labor in the country.57
The “civilised labour policy” was also implemented in the Post
Office and other Government agencies and departments. It was
introduced on the local governmental level by Central Government
grants reimbursing municipalities for most of the extra expense
incurred through the substitution of equally productive but more
highly-paid white for black laborers.58 By means of subsidies, as
well as by threats to lower tariff protection for, and withhold
Government contracts from firms not employing a “reasonable
proportion of civilised workers,”59 the policy was also extended to
private industry where it was similarly effective: in six industrial
categories affected by the threat or promise of tariff adjustments,
white employment rose 111.9 per cent from 1924 to 1933, against
a 37.25 per cent increase in non-white employment.60
Although this policy opened a protected route for landless Afri-
56 Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Cape Coloured
Population of the Union, 1937 (U.G. 54-’37), para. 217.
67 C. S. Richards, “The Growth of Government in South Africa since
Union,’’South African Journal of Economics, XXV (Dec. 1957), 248 ff.
58
J. H. Botha, “Maatreels tot Werkverruiming in Stedelike Werkkringe,”
Verslag can die Volkskongres oor die Armblanke Vraagstuk Gehou te Kim-
berley, 1934.
59 Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 13: The Economic
and Social Conditions of the Racial Groups in South Africa, 1948 (U.G.
53-’48), para. 54.
60 Report of the Customs Tariff Commission 1934-1935, 1936, (U.G. 5-’36),
paras. 37, 39. The proportion of white employees to all employees in the
secondary industries of South Africa’s major industrial areas rose from 34.99
per cent in 1924-1925 to 41.86 per cent in 1933, Report of the Industrial
Legislation Commission, 1935 (U.G. 37-’35), para. 230.
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kaners into the industrial economy, it acted as a drag on that
economy, and poverty among whites was not seen greatly relieved.
The “civilised labourers” were paid about double the wages received
by those whom they had replaced, so that little separated them
from the lowest living standards. In 1939, fifteen years after the
policy came into force, 58,000 white families, comprising 289,000
persons, were reported to be still living in “terrible” poverty, all
with monthly incomes below £-12—an amount considered to be
the minimum necessary for the preservation of health.61 Dire
poverty disappeared as a general phenomenon among Afrikaners
during the industrial boom years of the Second World War, though
“porridge and pumpkins, pumpkins and porridge, porridge and
pumpkins” remained, no doubt, the menu of some.
Thus, although a solution was achieved to the problem of Afri-
kaner unemployability, it was not of such a nature as to close the
economic gap between the two white language groups. Most Afri-
kaners entered the urban occupational pyramid at the bottom, as
far as whites are concerned; theirs and the Bantu tongues remained
the languages chiefly heard in mine shafts, factories and railway
yards, and more rarely in offices and banks.
It will be seen below that as recently as 1948, Afrikaners were
heavily over-represented, in relation to the proportion they comprised
of the big city white population, in physically hazardous, low status
occupations, and under-represented in high prestige, high salary
occupations. The nature of the general income differentials obtain-
ing between the two groups was brought out by the 1951 census.
At that time, the annual per capita income of Afrikaners in Johan-
nesburg and nine other cities along the Witwatersrand (where Afri-
kaners comprised 43 per cent of the total white population) was
£182, compared with £349 for English-speaking whites. A similar
disparity prevailed in the other leading urban areas—Pretoria, Cape
Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth; even where Afrikaners predominated
among whites numerically, as in Bloemfontein (73.3 per cent), the
corresponding figures are £180 and £318. 62
61 Die Transvaler, May 31, 1941.
62 Lukas Johannes Potgieter, “Die Ekonomie van die Afrikaner en sy Aan-
deel in die Sakelewe” (Unpublished Master of Commerce Dissertation, Pot-
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TABLE II
Percentage of Afrikaners Among White Men in Various
Occupational Groups in the Cities of South Africa,
Based on Census Data and Voters’ Lists63
Occupational Group 1926
Percentage
1939 1948
1. Unskilled Laborers 60 82 86
2. Mineworkers 53 69 79
3. Railway Workers 42 57 74
4. Factory Workers — 50 63
5. Carpenters 18 31 46
6. Bricklayers 32 53 65
7. Fitters 10 8 21
8. Clerks 13 19 32
9. Civil Servants 32 43 54
10. Teachers 28 49 61
11. Business Managers
(Commerce) 6 8 15
12. Merchants — 4 10
13. Professional People 11 9 15
14. Company Directors, Manufac-
turers (Industry), etc. — 3 5
Percentage of Afrikaners
Among All Whites Surveyed 23 30 4064
chefstroom University, 1954), 40 f; G. T. Visser, “Stedelike Koopkrag van
Afrikaans- en Engelssprekendes,” Volkshandel, XV (Mar., 1954), 56, Table III.
63 The figures for 1926 are taken from Pauw, Beroepsarbeid, Table XXIII,
222-25, and those for 1939 and 1948 from S. Pauw, “Die Afrikaanse Onder-
nemer, die Verbruiker en die Werker,” in Verslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese
Volkskongres (1950), 4, 5, en 6 Oktober 1950, Bloemfontein (Johannesburg,
n.d. ), Table II, p. 113. Omissions and the composite figure in the 1926
column are due to the lack of comparable statistics. A discussion of the
methods employed in the collection of the data appears in the sources cited.
64 Approximate estimate based on the 1951 Census. At that time, the
Afrikaans-speaking ( home language ) white population of the nine urban
areas represented in the table was 40.2 per cent of their total white popula-
tion (excluding 26,826 persons with both English and Afrikaans listed as
home language). Union Statistics for Fifty Years 1910-1960 (Compiled by
the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Pretoria, 1960), A-18.
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There is no evidence that establishes a causal relationship be-
tween Afrikaner economic inferiority and the revival and spread
of Afrikaner nationalist sentiment after the formation of the United
Party. However, there are several connections between the two
phenomena. One is that the relative economic positions of the two
white groups (as distinct from the Poor White problem) became
a public issue in the period after 1934. It was made so by Afrikaner
Nationalists, and it is to them that we owe most of our information
about it. “The Economic Position of the Afrikaner” “The Occupa-
tions of the Afrikaner in the City” “Capitalism, Party Politics and
Poverty” “The Economy of the Afrikaner and His Share in Business
Life
”
“The Afrikaners Present Position and Struggle on the Eco-
nomic Terrain”—these are the titles of some Afrikaans publications
that had not been written when the United Party was born.
Much, though not all, of this literature attributes the Afrikaner's
relative economic backwardness “to political circumstances forced
on the Afrikaner at a former stage of his economic develop-
ment”65—forced on him by “British Imperialism” and “Anglo-
Jewish Capitalism”—the terms often used. In a chapter entitled,
“Direct Economic Losses as a Consequence of [British] Domina-
tion,” in a work published under Nationalist auspices in 1942 as
part of the “Second Trek Series” (i.e., the trek to capture the cities),
the author gives a tally of economic setbacks suffered by the Afri-
kaner as a result, allegedly, of British policy. The listing includes
the human and material losses inflicted on the Afrikaner during
the Anglo-Boer War, and goes back to the number of houses
burned, horses, cattle and sheep stolen, in an 1834 frontier war
with Africans that broke out under British colonial administration.66
It is hard to doubt that such interpretations seemed valid to those
who advanced them. On the other hand, it has been seen that the
Afrikaner's economic backwardness vis-a-vis other whites originated
in conditions established before English-speaking people set foot
in the country, and was subsequently affected by natural disasters
as well as by human intervention. The reasons why the Afrikaner’s
economic standing was explained by such a selective reading of
65 Dr. P. J. Meyer, “Die Afrikaner se huidige Posisie en Stryd op Eko-
nomiese Gebied,” Volkshandel, XV (Aug., 1954), 37.
66 Coetzee, Verarming.
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history—why, indeed, the Nationalist outlook survived—must there-
fore be sought in the contemporary situation. To say that an anti-
British viewpoint was useful to the National Party does not explain
why it was so widely shared. There must have already existed
widespread animosity towards the English-speaking section, due
in part to the latter’s tendency to regard Afrikaners as social in-
feriors. It was probably circumstances of this nature, which are
bound up with the economic disparities between the two groups,
that helped make a disinterested view of the past impossible.
The Afrikaner’s economic circumstances became after 1934 the
subject not only of studies and polemics, but of an organized move-
ment aimed at completely altering them. Launched at Bloem-
fontein in October 1939, the Afrikaner Economic Movement set
out to “penetrate the existing economic structure and gain [for
Afrikaners] a controlling share in the economic life of the coun-
try.”67 At the time, Afrikaner-controlled businesses accounted for
only 5 per cent of the total volume of business turnover. 68 As
Afrikaners comprised almost 60 per cent of the country’s white
population, at least half the businesses in every town ought to
belong to them, Dr. N. Diederichs, a leader of the Movement and
presently Minister of Economic Affairs, declared shortly after its
inception. 69 A number of agencies were established with functions
co-ordinated towards the attainment of this goal. One of these
agencies, the Reddingsdaadbond (Deed of Rescue Union), was
designed for mass membership. Within two years of its founding,
it claimed 63,000 members organized in 343 branches throughout
the country.70
The methods and course of the Afrikaner Economic Movement
belong to the foreground of Afrikaner nationalism and do not
concern us here. It may be noted, however, that even after 1948,
by which time the Movement had made headway, the National
67 Volkshandel, Aug., 1943.
68 Dr. A. J. Visser, “Die Ekonomiese Posisie van die Afrikaner,” Volks-
handel, XVI (May, 1955), 25.
69 Die Volksblad, Nov. 21, 1940, in Press Digest, 215/1940.
70 Verslag van die Reddingsdaadbond van sy Werksaamhede Gedurende
die 10 Jaar van sy Bestaan, in Verslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volks-
kongres (1950), 161.
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Party had come to power, and Black-White relations had become
the major national problem, Afrikaner socio-economic inequality
vis-a-vis English-speaking whites remained an obstacle to white
unity71 and continued to evoke a sense of injustice among Afri-
kaners :
Ons het die poorte wyd gebloei
waardeur die handel vrugbaar vloei,
ons het die vlaktes oopgeslaan
waar mynstellasies rifdiep staan;
met Trekkerswee en Driejaar-leed
het ons die erwe uitgemeet
waar winkelsentmms volkhoog reik;
maar weining van ons name pryk
op uithangborde, staan gegrif
in swaarvergulde bodeurskrif;
en word daar dividend verklaar
oor voorbladruimte in die “STAR’’
blaai ons verby—soek volgens loon
na huurvertrekke om te woon. 72
(We opened up the gates with blood
to let trade flow prosperously,
we hewed open the wide plains
where mine headgears grow from reefs;
with doleful Trek and Three-year woe73
we measured out the plots of land
where shopping centers reach the clouds;
but few names of our people stand
71 At the second Afrikaner Economic Congress held at Bloemfontein in
1950, by which time the Afrikaner’s overall share of business turnover had
increased to 11 per cent, requests by two English-speaking businessmen for
more co-operation between the two white groups were rejected by a leading
Afrikaner manufacturer with the statement that the Afrikaner’s economic share
was “far too small for us now to pull out all the props from beneath this
little volk’s edifice (“Volksgebou”) in order to go building bridges to others.”
This view was formally endorsed by the Congress which declared the “recom-
mendation in connection with further co-operation with other race groups”
to be unacceptable “at this stage,” and referred the matter to a committee.
See Verslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres (1950), 96, 134.
72 G. A. Watermeyer, “Volkshandel III” in Die Republiek van Duisend Jaar
( Johannesburg, 1957).
73 I.e., the Anglo-Boer War.
240 Laurence Salomon
on nameboards, or are etched
in heavy gilt upon the doors
and when the dividends are declared
for front-page space in “THE STAR”74
we page on—and seek furnished apartments
according to wages.)
Aside from continued resentment over inferior status, there is
probably another principal reason for the revival of Afrikaner
Nationalism. The Afrikaner has had to enter and remain in the
urban-industrial structure mainly as a worker. He has had to con-
tend for job opportunities and job security not only against the
competition of the non-white, but simultaneously against the efforts
of the English-speaking employer to hire his often equally capable
but lower paid rival. He has sought this opportunity and security
through the passage of laws designed to reserve certain jobs for
his own color group. The fact that laws have been necessary to
restrain white employers from giving preference to non-white
workers indicates the existence of limits to voluntary co-operation
among the whites, and implies one of the bases for their continued
division.
The struggle to secure legal job reservation was initiated by
English-speaking immigrant workers, but with the steady influx of
landless Afrikaners into the cities and the gradual transformation
of the white working class into one of predominantly Afrikaans
composition (of. tables I and II), the maintenance and extension
of such protection has become primarily an Afrikaner effort. Thus
the National Party enacted a new labor law in 1956, empowering
the Minister of Labour on the recommendation of a Government-
appointed Industrial Tribunal to reserve any job for white workers
that was previously not subject to legal reservation. The relevant
section of this law (section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act
of 1956) was carried over the objection of the South African
Federated Chamber of Industries, other English-speaking em-
ployers’ organizations, and the United Party. The Opposition in
and outside Parliament argued that the measure would limit oppor-
tunities for non-whites; would enable the Government to reserve
74 The lohannesburg afternoon English-language daily.
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unemployment for non-whites during recessions and depressions
and thus ‘‘light flames in the country which would be difficult to
put out”; and, in limiting management’s right to select its labor,
would block optimum productivity and lead to increased costs of
production. The Minister of Labour saw the measure as a “warning
to employers not to replace employees under some pretext or other
when the true reason is cheaper labour. . . .”75
Although some trade union organizations, particularly those
accepting affiliation from mixed or African unions, objected to the
measure, predominantly Afrikaner employee organizations have
taken the initiative in requesting its implementation where the jobs
of their members have been threatened by non-white competition.
Thus at the request of Die Yster en Staalbedryfsvereniging (The
Iron and Steel Industry Union) specified types of jobs were legally
reserved for white workers to prevent employers, who were finding
it difficult to compete successfully in the open market, from replac-
ing the Union’s members by non-white workers. 76 In some sectors
of private industry, such as the domestic appliance industry, ap-
plication of the law involves the removal of non-white workers from
positions that they have hitherto held. 77
Job opportunity and security for white workers has been a recur-
ring issue since the advent of a white working class in the country
after 1870. It was this issue that led to the last violent clash between
organized groups of white people in South African history in 1922,
when the Chamber of Mines, to meet a decline in gold prices,
sought to replace 2,000 whites by non-white workers. The result
was a general strike which turned into an unsuccessful revolution
when the Smuts Government sent in troops to curb the strikers’
violence. Within two years of the strike’s suppression the Smuts
Government was overthrown at the polls and the first Nationalist
Government took office in coalition with an English-speaking
Labour Party. Since that time, the rapid Afrikanerization of the
white working class has resulted in a pronounced ethnic as well
as class alignment on this issue, and it has seen the National Party
75 See A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1955-1956, 178-84.
76 A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1959-1960, 177.
77 Ibid., 179.
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capture most of the white working class vote. 78 As English employer-
Afrikaner employee discord over the racial organization of employ-
ment opportunities is likely to remain chronic, political quarrels
between the two sections of the ruling population are unlikely to
cease. Only a common, imminent threat to their positions, arising
out of foreign intervention or an African uprising, seems capable
of causing them to close ranks. In normal circumstances, that is
while the border of African authority approaches South Africa’s
frontier and the problem of managing the indigenous African popu-
lation becomes simultaneously more acute, threats to their respec-
tive positions will probably continue to be partly mutually posed.
That the Afrikaner’s economic position brings him into simulta-
neous conflict with White as well as Black may yet have far reach-
ing consequences. Should the country experience a serious eco-
nomic set back leading to an attempted large scale substitution of
white for non-white labor, one wonders whether the resulting poli-
tical crisis would not then be more complex than a confrontation
of only Black and White.
78 It was this vote which brought the present Nationalist Government to
power in 1948, according to B. J. Schoeman, a member of that Goverment,
Die Vaderland, June 12, 1957. In the 1948 General Election, the Nationalists
took 19 working class constituencies from the United and Labour Parties, E. S.
Sachs, The Choice Before South Africa (London, 1952), 208.
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On 18 November, 1897, Sir Alfred Milner, High Commissioner for
South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony, wrote a letter to H.
H. Asquith, a member of the front bench of the Liberal party,
then out of office. Until now our knowledge of this letter has been
based on a lengthy extract published by Cecil Headlam1 and it has
rightly been regarded as an excellent statement of the conflict of
obligations facing a British High Commissioner.2 The full text of
the letter, however, raises some interesting questions, particularly
if it is placed in political context. Furthermore, the letter was sent
by Asquith to John Morley, Liberal Secretary for Ireland, 1892-95,
to Lord Ripon, Liberal Secretary for the Colonies, 1892-95, and to
Sir Arthur Lyall, a member of the Council of the Secretary of
State for India. Their comments, and those of Asquith, will be ex-
amined here. 3
The conflict of obligations arose from the fact that in South
Africa white minorities were in power over native4 majorities and
all British governments felt that they had some obligations to the
native population. However, the definition of obligations was com-
1 C. Headlam. (Ed.), The Milner Papers, (2 vols., London, 1931), I,
177-81.
2 For example, G. B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa 1902-1910
(Oxford, 1955), 87; Cambridge History of the British Empire (8 vols., Cam-
bridge, 1929-1941), III (1959), 355. (C.H.B.E.)
3 This paper is an expanded version of one given at the Institute of Com-
monwealth Studies, London University, in January 1961. I would like to thank
C. F. Goodfellow of Rhodes University, South Africa, R. Davenport and Mrs.
Z. Katzen of University of Cape Town, and John Livingston of Newton High
School, Newton, Mass., for critical comment. I thank also the following for
giving me access to material: Mr. Mark Bonham Carter (the Asquith Papers);
Viscount Harcourt (the Sir William Harcourt Papers); the Warden and
Fellows of New College, Oxford (the Milner Papers); and the Trustees of the
British Museum (the Ripon Papers).
4 The contemporary terms “native” and “Dutch,” as well as the modem
“African” and “Afrikaner” respectively, will be used throughout this paper.
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plicated by questions of interest. Cape Colony contained a major
strategic point in the naval base at Simonstown. Since the discovery
of diamonds and gold, South Africa had become an important mar-
ket for British goods, a field for British capital and the home of a
large number of British subjects. Dutch, British and native popula-
tions were widely dispersed in two self-governing colonies, two
Dutch republics, the territory of the British South Africa Company,
and directly administered "protectorates” like Basutoland and the
Bechuanaland Protectorate. Could British obligations to South
African white men be met, and British interests in South Africa be
secured, without prejudicing the rights of South African natives?
It was characteristic of Milner to attempt a definite answer to a
difficult question which most of his contemporaries evaded.
I
The full text of Milners letter is as follows; omissions by Head-
lam have been placed in squared brackets:
Confidential
Government House
Cape Town
18 November, 1897
Dear Asquith,
I have just been reading with great interest, [though alas! in a
bad Reuter abstract,] the substance of a speech [at Wormit] in
which you dealt largely with our South African difficulties. With
your two great principles that (1) we should seek “to restore the
good relations between the Dutch and English” and (2) we
should “secure for the Natives, particularly in that part of S. Africa
called Rhodesia, adequate and sufficient protection against oppres-
sion and wrong,” I most cordially agree with this reservation, that
I don’t quite see the ground for your “particularly.” It seems to
me, we are equally bound to secure the good treatment of the natives
in the Transvaal, where we specially and most solemnly promised
them protection when we gave back the country to the Boers, and
inserted the provision in the Convention giving us the fullest right
to intervene in their behalf.
This, however, though an important point, is not the particular
point, which I want to make in this letter. What I am so anxious
that you and other English Statesmen—especially Liberal States-
men—should understand is that object No. 2 is the principal ob-
stacle to the attainment of object No. 1,—is, and always has been.
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I should feel quite confident of being able to get over the Dutch-
English difficulty, if it were not so horribly complicated by the
Native question.
[In spite of Majuba, in spite of Jameson, I remain firmly of the
opinion that, if it were not for my having some conscience about
the treatment of blacks, I personally could win over the Dutch
in the Colony and indeed in all the S.A. dominions in my term of
office, and that I could do so without offending the English. You
have only to sacrifice “the nigger” absolutely and the game is easy.
But any attempt to secure fair play for him makes the Dutch frac-
tious and almost unmanageable. Deep down in the heart of every
Dutchman in S. Africa is the ideal of a white landowning aristocracy
resting on slave labour. (Of course the word “slave” is carefully
eschewed nor do they exactly want slaves but simply cheap labour
of a black proletariat without rights of any sort or kind . ) ]
Rhodesia is a case in point. The blacks have been scandalously
used. Even now, though there is great amendment, and though the
position of the black man in Rhodesia is now probably more hope-
ful than in any part of South Africa not under direct imperial
control, except Natal, I am not at all confident that many [very]
bad things will not happen. I am doing my best, in fact there is
nothing out here which I consider either so important or so diffi-
cult—but I have to walk with extreme caution, for nothing is more
certain than that if the Imperial Government were to be seen taking
a strong line against the Company for the protection of the blacks,
the whole of Dutch opinion in South Africa would swing round
to the side of the Company and the bulk—not the whole—of
British Colonial opinion would go with it, [for the British Colonist
though far better than the Dutchman in his attitude to the black
is still essentially selfish with regard to him and regards the views,
not only of the professional negro-philist, but of the average healthy-
minded Englishmen on this subject as “cant” or “fad”] You have
therefore this singular situation, that you might unite Dutch and
English by protecting the blackman, but you would unite them
against yourself and your policy of protection.
There is the whole crux of the South African position. [You say
and say truly that self-government is the basis of our colonial policy
and the key stone of colonial loyalty. That principle fearlessly and
unflinchingly applied would make S. Africa as loyal as Canada
—
but what would be the [?]? The abandonment of the black races,
whom you have promised protection, and the tolerance of a state
of things in a self governed state under the British flag which we
should never tolerate for a moment in India, in Egypt, or in any
of our Crown Colonies.
The following is the order of the S. African States and Colonies
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as regards their treatment of the black man—bear in mind that
in the best of them his status is worse than it would be in any
country under the Imperial control:
The best is Natal, for here the black population is so enormous,
compared with the white, that though they are kept in subjection,
prudence, apart from all other consideration, would necessitate
their not being treated too harshly. Besides, the white men are
mainly of British race.
The next best is Rhodesia, I mean the somewhat purified Rhodesia
of to-day, not the Rhodesia entirely run by fortune hunters, as it
was in the first years of the occupation. Here, too, it is the fact
that the settlers are mostly British, and to a great extent nowadays
,
a good type of British, who helps. A good step lower down is the
O.F.S. This is rim on the pure Dutch principle—white aristocracy
—
black proletariat— : But the Dutchmen of the Free State are of a
comparatively refined type and there being no longer any struggle
the complete subjugation of the black being a fait accompli and he
is a useful animal, the kindly natured master is not needlessly
brutal to the servant.
Next worse is the Cape Colony. The laws here are better, but
their administration is bad, because all Cape governments are
forever angling for the Dutch vote, and there is no panacea for
obtaining it like disregard of native rights.]
By far the worst is the Transvaal. Here the black has no rights
whatever and there is neither kindliness nor wisdom to restrain
the brutality of the ruling oligarchy.
In contrast with all these more or less sharp contrasts according
to the particular rung of the ladder which you look at, is the posi-
tion of the black man in Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protec-
torate. Here there is absolute ‘protection” of the black man “against
oppression and wrong.” In fact, they are the preserves of the black
man, in which our authority, a very light one, is simply exercised
to keep the peace. But look at the result. The Imperial position in
Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate is a source of con-
stant friction with the Colonists. The Cape Colony is constantly
trying to get hold of the former, the Chartered Company of the
latter—it had just got it in 1895, as you remember, when the
Raid occurred and the whole arrangement was knocked on the
head. Personally, I am dead against all these efforts. I want to
preserve the Basuto and the Bechuana, for the present at least,
from the tender mercies of the Bond and our friend Cecil J. Rhodes.
But observe, that by doing so I am weakening my hand in the
game of conciliating the Colonists, Dutch and English, and in
uniting Dutch and English. Dutch and English in the Colony are
united in wanting to take over Basutoland. Even the Dutch would
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like to see Rhodes pocket Bechuanaland, I mean the Bechuanaland
Protectorate. The Colony of British Bechuanaland is already in-
corporated with the Colony and has consequently been the scene
of a needless rebellion, [brutally put down.] They hate Rhodes for
the moment—but they hate an independent Native State more
—
and at all times.
I tell you all this, not to magnify my difficulties but to help you
to understand them. I feel that, if I fail out here, it will be over
the Native Question. Nothing else is of the same seriousness. At
the same time my course is clear. I have a strong conviction of what
policy I ought to pursue, having regard at once to Colonial rights
of self-government and to the plighted faith of Great Britain to the
natives. Within the Colony of which I am Governor, I can only
use personal influence, doing all I can to encourage the minority,
which is for fair treatment of the Natives, and to restrain the major-
ity without overstepping the limits of my power as a strictly con-
stitutional ruler. In Rhodesia, I still have, and if the Imperial
Government retains, as I hope it will retain, a certain control
over the administration, I shall continue to have greater power, and
I shall exercise it, through the agents of the Company, to introduce
not an ideal system, but one which I hope will be at least as
humane and progressive as that of Natal. The great thing here is to
secure the appointment of honourable and capable men as Magis-
trates and Native Commissioners. If that can be done, I think the
lot of the natives may be a very tolerable one, and that even a
system of compulsory labour, indeed under fair conditions and proper
safeguards, may be turned to their advantage. As regards Basuto-
land and the Protectorate, I am dead opposed to any change in the
status quo. I know that some day or other these districts must be-
come a part of some self-governed white community. But I want
to defer the change as long as ever I can and to make it dependent
upon a great improvement, in the interval, in the treatment of
the Natives already subject to the Colonial rule. “Do you want
to govern more Natives?” in effect I say to them, “then show your-
self worthy of the trust by governing better those whom you already
have/’ Lastly, as regards the Transvaal, I think very likely the
question will solve itself, because the Transvaal oligarchy is bound
sooner or later to topple over. But if it does not, then some years
hence
,
I may see my way to giving some effect to our promises
and the Boer pledges to treat the Natives fairly. But it is much too
soon to attempt anything of the kind. The Transvaal Boers are
still so sore with us, that it is useless for us to make any remon-
strance which we are not prepared to support by war.
Forgive this long lecture
—
liberavi animum. It is a great com-
fort to me to think that if these questions ever become the subject
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of discussion in England where the intemperate or ill-informed dis-
cussion of them may do infinite harm, there will be at least one
outside critic, who knows what my difficulties are and what I am
driving at, and who, whether he approves or disapproves my
methods, will, at least, understand and, I believe, sympathise with,
my objects.
P. S. If you like at any time to show this letter to Morley, or
to any other good man and true on your side, do so. I know that
you would only do so with all discretion. Remember, the Colonials
are intensely sensitive about English criticism, and any criticism
which does not recognize their difficulties
—
(and the difficulties
of governing a vast black population are very great)—does more
harm than good. 5
When one considers how committed Headlam was to Milners
views of empire, the two published volumes of Milner’s papers are
remarkable for the degree to which Headlam allowed Milner to
speak for himself. The omissions in this case, however, alter seri-
ously the sense of the letter. First, Headlam omitted Milner’s very
large claim that by sacrificing the “nigger” the game of white con-
ciliation would be easily won. Secondly, with a fine impartiality he
omitted that very strong criticism which Milner made of both
Englishmen and Dutchmen in South Africa. When taken with the
excision of Milner’s emphatic phrase “brutally put down ’ when
writing of the “needless rebellion,” these omissions suggest that
Headlam wished to tone down the criticisms of South African white
men. 6 Thirdly, the analogy of South Africa with Canada, as a
region to which a policy of “self-government” could be applied, was
left out. Fourthly, the fascinating—and revealing—ordering of the
South African states and colonies was omitted: by going straight
from “the crux of the South African question” to “by far the worst
is the Transvaal,” Headlam once more toned down the criticism of
South African white men generally, and he effectively concealed
the strongly “racial”—i.e., anti-Dutch—basis of Milner’s analysis.
Finally, for the record, Headlam understandably failed to notice
that the letter was written from Rhodesia, not from Cape Town. 7
5 Asquith Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
6 It is just possible, though rather far-fetched, that Headlam wished to do
nothing to spoil the harmony of the year of the Statute of Westminster.
7 Milner did not tell Asquith that he was writing from Rhodesia; there
seems to be no reason for thinking that the omission was a calculated one.
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Milner was on an extended tour of Rhodesia and on 18 November,
he was still in Salisbury. 8
II
Milner was writing with an object, as he stated candidly enough:
he wanted, so he said, to point out to Opposition statesmen that
ill-informed discussion of the native question could make his prob-
lems more serious. An examination of Asquith’s speech, and the
context in which it was made will show, however, that Milner
probably had another aim as well, viz., to stop the Liberals from
attacking Rhodes and the Chartered Company, and to show that
the real villains were elsewhere.
On 29 December, 1895, Dr. Jameson had invaded the South
African Republic—the Transvaal—with a force employed by the
British South Africa Company. This unsuccessful Raid was an event
of the first importance in British, European and South African
history. In 1897 a Select Committee of the House of Commons held
an inquiry and its report was debated on 25 July, in the House of
Commons, with much reluctance on the part of both front benches.
Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, made his celebrated
"man of honour” speech, by which he was widely held to have
wiped out the emphatic censure passed by the Committee on Cecil
Rhodes for preparing a rising in, and an invasion of, the Transvaal.
Moreover, a motion calling on the Company’s solicitor, Bourchier
Hawksley, to produce a set of telegrams withheld from the Com-
mittee, was rejected by the House.9 The Leader of the Opposition
in the Commons, Sir William Harcourt, and Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, the next Liberal Prime Minister, had both been mem-
bers. They were seriously embarrassed within their own party by
the failure of the Committee to prove complicity on the part of the
Imperial government, and by the apparent willingness of both
Government and Committee to allow themselves to be defied by
the widely hated Company. 10
8 Milner Papers
,
I, 85, 134.
9 For a short account of the genesis and course of the debate, see J. Van
der Poel, The Jameson Raid (London, 1951), 235-41.
10 A. G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt (2 vols., London,
1923), II, 432-37.
252 Jeffrey Butler
Asquith spoke at Wormit on 12 October, 1897. He devoted nearly
the whole of his speech to South Africa, applauding the censure
passed by the Committee on that “sordid and criminal enterprise.”
He tried to move the responsibility for the failure to extract the
telegrams from the Committee on to the House of Commons, to
which the Committee was responsible. 11 For twelve months before
the Committee first met, said Asquith,
the apologists and champions of Mr. Rhodes . . . were bruiting it
about that these telegrams . . . would prove conclusively that the
Imperial Government of Great Britain was in connivance and
complicity with these criminal transactions.
The failure to force production of the telegrams had been made
worse by Mr. Chamberlain s speech, he continued.
He did not think [Asquith said] that these proceedings would
facilitate the heavy task of administration in South Africa. . . .
The problem . . . was, on the one hand, to restore the relations,
broken for the time being, between the English and the Dutch
populations, and on the other hand, to secure for natives, particularly
in that part of South Africa called Rhodesia, adequate protection
against oppression and wrong. 12
The speech by a future Liberal Imperialist was an attempt to
help the Liberal leaders in a politically embarrassing position and
to attack the Government at the same time. Secondly, Asquith re-
sented what he regarded as attempts by Rhodes and his friends to
pin the major share of responsibility for the Raid on to the Imperial
government. The Raid was, it should be noted, an event in the
struggle between white men, and Asquith was aware of its South
African significance, i.e., as affecting relations throughout colonies
and republics. Thirdly, however, Asquith apparently regarded the
native question as “particularly” a Rhodesian one, a point Milner
commented on. It was the Company, Asquith clearly implied, that
was the major sinner in relation to both the native question and
conciliation of white men. Moreover, the Committee and the “pro-
11 Asquith was being kind to the Committee and to his leader. The prob-
lem had arisen because the Committee had failed to report a recalcitrant
witness at once to the House. For a ruling by the Speaker see Parliamentary
Debates (P. Deb.), LI, 1093, July 25, 1897.
12 The Times, Oct. 13, 1897.
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ceedings” which preceded and followed its report, had made the
task no easier.
There were probably two reasons for Asquith’s saying this. First,
the Committee had lamentably failed to follow its own terms of
reference, which were:
... To inquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion
into the South African Republic by an armed force, and into the
administration of the British South Africa Company, and to report
thereon, and further to report what alterations are desirable in the
government of the territories under the control of the Company. 13
The second half of the inquiry—into the administration of the
Company—was never undertaken, and no “alterations” were sug-
gested. Indeed, the Committee made no proposals of any kind. For
anyone who was interested in good government generally, and of
natives in particular, the Committee had been of no use at all, and
it had even failed to convince many people in both British parties
that it had investigated the “incursion” properly. 14 Secondly, As-
quith may have been afraid that Chamberlains defence of Rhodes,
and the failure of the Committee to assert itself, indicated an un-
willingness—even an inability—to control the Company in Rho-
desia.
Ill
Asquith and Milner had been contemporaries at Balliol College,
Oxford. When Milner was given an impressive public dinner be-
fore leaving to take up his duties in South Africa, Asquith had taken
the chair. 15 They were not regular correspondents, however, as
Milner makes clear; this letter was written with the clearly stated
purpose of keeping in touch with the leaders of the Opposition in
England and, if possible, of influencing their course of action.
Asquith was a rising star in the Liberal Party and he was, for Mil-
ner, an obvious point of contact.
Milner was not concerned with the success or failure of the
South African Committee. He had disliked the Committee virtually
from its appointment in August, 1896, praying for an Act of God
13 P. Deb., XLV, 762, Jan. 28, 1897.
14 See note 9 above.
15 The Times, Mar. 29, 1897.
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in the form of an earthquake to destroy it at its first sitting. 16 Fur-
thermore, halfway through of the sittings of the Committee he had
seen, with considerable prescience, what effects its proceedings
would have on Anglo-Boer relations. He wrote to Sir William Har-
court on 6 April, 1897
:
I feel rather low to-night. What is the use of sending me out, with
a penny squirt, to try to extinguish a raging fire in South Africa,
if the great and wise at home are going to pour gallons of oil
upon it all the time? First we have Rhodes to madden the Dutch,
then Schreiner to madden the English; now we have to have all
the gossip of the Raiders’ camp to remadden the Dutch. Surely I
would be as much use in Piccadilly?17
Secondly, Milner was not as hostile to Rhodes and his friends as
Asquith had been. Asquith’s complaint had been based on the
Committee and on the Company’s administrative record. Milner
clearly wanted to ignore the Committee. It was in any case be-
coming an historical issue, the discussion of which embittered,
rather than allayed, white conflict. He was optimistic about Rho-
desia and he wished to give Rhodes every encouragement there.
Furthermore, he regarded the revival of an alliance between
Rhodes and the Afrikander Bond as perfectly possible, perhaps
probable, if the Imperial Government acted unwisely. He implied
that he did not want to see the alliance renewed: Rhodes was not
an obstacle to the Anglo-Dutch conciliation for which he was
working. It was probably going to be protection of native rights,
not the failure of the Committee, which would delay an acceptable
union of South African whites.
Thirdly, Milner emphasised the South African, not merely the
16 F. Whyte, The Life of W. T. Stead (2 vols., London, 1925), I, 98;
Milner to Stead, Nov. 16, 1896: “. . . An earthquake which should engulf the
Committee at its first sitting would clearly be the best thing.”
17 Harcourt Papers, Stanton Harcourt, Oxon. Rhodes and W. Schreiner, a
former colleague of Rhodes’ who broke with him on the issue of the Raid,
had both given evidence. On Apr. 5, 1897, Sir John Willoughby, the com-
mander of Jameson’s troops, had declined “on public grounds” to tell the
Committee why he had believed that the Imperial government had known
and approved of the invasion of the Transvaal. House of Commons, Sessional
Paper No. 311 (1897): Report of the Select Committee on British South
Africa, Question 5646.
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Rhodesian, character of the problem of the protection of African
rights. Asquith appeared to him to be ignoring British rights of
intervention in the Transvaal, “the brutality” of the Transvaal “oli-
garchy,” and the poor record of Cape Colony.
Milners analysis was a “racial” one, i.e., his problems increased
almost in direct proportion to the percentage of Dutchmen in the
population. The two areas which had homogeneous English speak-
ing white populations, Natal and Rhodesia, were the “best” in South
Africa, outside the areas governed as Crown colonies or protector-
ates. The Orange Free State was better than the Cape or the Trans-
vaal because its Dutchmen had been “refined” in some way. The
Transvaal was “by far the worst.” Furthermore, Milner implied that
one of the reasons why it was “by far the worst” in its administra-
tion of native races was that Englishmen had no part in its govern-
ment. There was no need to intervene, he said, because the oligar-
chy was sure to “topple.” When that happened, the question would
“solve itself” and the need for “remonstrance” would either disap-
pear, or be less. It was also a “racial” analysis in another sense, and
characteristic of the time: it was unthinkable for Milner to anta-
gonize South African white men by an active trusteeship on behalf
of native races. Retaining the friendship of whites was a crucial
limiting condition.
Milner claimed that protection of natives by the British govern-
ment “is and always has been” the “principal obstacle” to the ac-
ceptable conciliation of South African white men to each other.
This was neither an imprecise nor a modest claim and both the
historical and the contemporary versions of it require considerable
qualification. There had, it is true, been many conflicts between
the British government and Dutchmen which had their origin,
partly or entirely, in the willingness of the British government to
protect native rights. But the protection extended by British govern-
ments had neither created an unacceptable union of South African
whites, nor stimulated conflict between them. Hostility to Britain
was not a result of this protection which had been an additional,
not a sole, basis of conflict. To take an important example: between
1872 and 1881 Liberal and Conservative governments made the
first major attempts to create a loyal and stable union of the South
African states and colonies. The attempts failed, not because the
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British government had been too solicitous of African rights, but
largely through poor political management, particularly in failing
to extend self-government to the newly annexed Transvaal in
1877. 18 Moreover, it could also be argued that the annexation of
Basutoland to the Crown in 1868, bringing the expansion of the
Orange Free State to a halt, had not prevented a considerable
degree of conciliation by 1890. Within the Orange Free State, be-
tween the Orange Free State and Cape Colony, and between the
Orange Free State and Great Britain, serious Anglo-Dutch conflict
was subsiding. 19
What then of the period of which Milner was writing? Conflict
between South African whites became serious in the nineties. First,
the rulers of the Transvaal failed to come to a political accomoda-
tion with their largely British immigrant population; secondly, that
conflict was exacerbated in the Transvaal, and exported to Cape
Colony, by the Jameson Raid and its aftermath. It is important to
emphasise that that conflict was new: British settlers had sympa-
thised with Trekkers in the eastern Cape Colony in 1836.20 Indeed,
in the nineties Milner's proposition could be reversed: the need to
conciliate whites and to mitigate conflict on issues concerning white
men only, had become the major obstacle to the protection of
Africans.
Milner's use of the analogy with Canada was especially mislead-
ing. He implied that the crucial difference between Canada and
South Africa was that South Africa had a native population and
Canada did not. But there was a profound constitutional, and an
equally profound political difference. The devising of the policy of
self-government after the Canadian rebellion of 1838 had come
after seventy years of British rule. A colonial constitution was
amended and colonial responsible government developed. The re-
conciliation of a non-British people to imperial rule was achieved.
But in South Africa sovereignty was itself an issue. Milner, like many,
even most, British statesmen of his day, spoke of “South Africa”
18 C. W. de Kiewiet, The Imverial Factor in South Africa (Cambridge,
1937), 238-40; E. A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (London, 1957),
363-65, 376-77.
19 Walker, Southern Africa, 405-09.
20 Walker, The Great Trek (London, 1960), 99-105.
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as a region for which Britain had some overall responsibility.21
"South Africa”—not only Cape Colony, Natal, or Rhodesia—would
be made "as loyal as Canada” by "self-government.” Moreover,
Milner claimed a right of intervention in the Transvaal on behalf
of the natives there.22 But it was precisely this claim to an overall
supremacy, with a consequent right of intervention, that clashed
with the vigorous republicanism of the Transvaal, and it was the
resistance to the British claim that brought on the South African
War in 1899.23
It might well be asked which "nigger” rights could be used in
1897 as a means of gaining the loyalty of all South African whites.
As Milner acknowledged, the only important bargaining counter
remaining to him was the territory still under imperial control,
which could be used as a sort of bribe to raise the quality of South
African native administration. Three points can be made here:
first, he thought only of retaining these territories for a few years.24
Secondly, he thought of transferring them to colonial governments.
They could not be used to solve the problems created by the rival
ambitions of Kruger and of Rhodes, to mitigate the conflict over
the Raid, or to bring about an agreement on bitterly fought issues
of tariff and railway policy. Thirdly, the bribe of the ultimate trans-
fer to the South African Union of the High Commission Territories,
Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, was
written into the South Africa Act of 1909.25 The bribe has clearly
proved to be of limited effectiveness and Milners opposition to
territorial transfer in 1897 seems to have been a part of a long
term change in British policy.
21 R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London,
1961), 410, 420, 427, 437-38.
22 See p. below.
23
J. S. Marais, The Fall of Krugers Republic (London, 1961), 327-32.
24 Milner Papers, I, 106: Milner to Lord Selbome (Under-Secretary of
State for the Colonies), June 2, 1897: “No doubt the [Bechuanaland] Protec-
torate is costly in itself, but if the expenditure of £60,000 or thereabout
for just a year or two longer makes a really great improvement in your whole
position, it is folly to consider it,” i.e., folly to consider transfer to the British
South Africa Company.
25 L. M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910 (Oxford,
1960), 269-79. Swaziland was separated from the Transvaal in 1902.
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To sum up: Milners political analysis was defective. His “racial”
approach in this letter foreshadows that shown in his diplomacy
and in his public conduct in South Africa from 1898 on.26 He was
to work for the mobilisation of British sentiment across republican
and colonial boundaries, rather than to recognize the deep divisions
within the Dutch community, and perhaps to take advantage of
them until an acceptable union of South African white men could
be achieved. Writing from Rhodesia, in close touch with English-
men on the frontier, he wanted to give the Company every oppor-
tunity to develop its domain.27 He tried, therefore, to persuade
Liberals to abandon an attack on Rhodes and the Company. It
was, apparently, the first time that he attempted to influence his
friends on the Liberal front bench on questions of South African
policy. It was not to be the last.28
IV
Asquith sent the letter to John Morley (as Milner had suggested),
who replied:
Many thanks for sending me the enclosed. It is a wonderfully clear
and concise statement of the well known difficulty of the situation.
That difficulty will be enormously aggravated for Milner and
J[oseph] C[hamberlain] if or when it suits Rhodes to play for the
Dutch vote by anti-native proposals in which he has gone pretty
far before now.
I have great confidence in Chamberlain’s humanity. He has real
feeling about ill treatment of natives and will do as much as any-
body to keep the brutes of colonists in order in those matters. . . .
When you write to Milner be sure to convey to him all good wishes
from me .29
26 In particular his celebrated Graaff Reinet speech on Mar. 3, 1898, in
which he called on the Cape Dutch to urge reform on the rulers of the Trans-
vaal. Milner Papers, I, 244-47. For the effect on South African politics see
Marais, Fall, 208: “From this time he [Milner] was regarded as the com-
mander-in-chief of the ‘British party’. . . .”
27 Milner Papers, I, 139-46: Milner to Chamberlain, Dec. 1, 1897.
28 Milner was in close touch with the Liberal Imperialists, and particularly
with Haldane, throughout the South African War. See Milner Papers, II,
263-64: a letter from Milner to Haldane July 1, 1901 and reply, July 6, 1901,
a characteristic exchange at the time of the crisis brought in the Liberal party
by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s speech on “methods of barbarism” in
South Africa.
29 Asquith Papers, Dec. 21, 1897.
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Morley had accepted Milners “statement of the well known diffi-
culty.” He then underlined Milner’s fear of handing over native
people, in Milner’s words, “to the tender mercies of the Bond and
our friend Cecil
J.
Rhodes.” In doing this, Morley was probably
taking a line which Milner would have disliked. Within a month
of arriving in South Africa Milner had pressed for the support of
Rhodes in South Africa, though with strict control over the methods
used by Rhodes, a clear reference to the proven danger of trusting
Rhodes with military force.30 A month later Lord Selborne, Under-
secretary at the Colonial Office, replied:
. . . Mr. Chamberlain was a good deal disturbed by your last letter.
He evidently had not expected that you would be so impressed that
Rhodes is still a great factor to reckon with in South Africa.31
Chamberlain was closer in opinion to Morley than he was to Milner.
He had long disliked Rhodes on several grounds: for wanting to
“eliminate the Imperial factor in South Africa,”32 for this treatment
of natives,33 and he clearly hoped that Rhodes’ political position in
South Africa had been destroyed by the Raid.34 Moreover, through-
out 1896 and in January, 1897, there had been a fierce conflict, be-
hind the scenes, in which Rhodes had tried to blackmail Chamber-
lain into suppressing the Select Committee.35 On the crucial issue
of support of Rhodes, Milner, the “Man on the Spot,” was differing
both from his chief and from an important figure in the Opposition.
V
After Christmas Asquith sent the letter to Lord Ripon, adding
“I have never seen the crucial problem of South African administra-
tion more clearly or forcibly stated.”36 Ripon replied:
... I have no doubt that his general view of the situation in South
Africa is right. The native question is our abiding difficulty there.
30 Milner Papers, I, 105: Milner to Selborne, June 2, 1897.
31 Ibid., 112: Selborne to Milner, luly 6, 1897.
32
J. L. Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain (3 vols., London, 1934), III,
32-33.
33 Ibid.
34 See note 30.
33 Van der Poel, Raid, 156-57, 182-83.
36 Ripon Papers, British Museum, Add. Mss., 43518 f 194, Dec. 28, 1897.
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In the self-governing colonies the more fully we can accept their
self government in its fullest sense and leave them to deal with the
natives in their own way on their own responsibility the better for
our relations with them and for the maintenance of their loyalty.
But I doubt whether people in this country would accept the
whole consequences of this doctrine—though anything short of
this must lead to constant friction.
I agree with Milner as to native policy in British dominions out-
side Cape Colony and Natal and like him I would let no more
natives come under the management of those Colonists until we
have greater security than now exists as to how they would be
treated. I cannot help being somewhat doubtful whether Milner or
anyone else could if the native difficulty were out of the way,
restore trust and good feeling between the British and the Dutch
as soon and as easily as he seems to expect. I would have thought
that the mischief done by the conspiracy and the raid was too deep
and bitter for such early removal. But he is more likely to be right
than I.
I do not quite concur with what he says about the Transvaal.
We are not equally bound to secure the good treatment of the
natives there as in our own dominions. The Treaty obligations of
the South African Republic in regard to the natives give us a right
of remonstrance but as we have no other means of enforcing such
remonstrances than war our duty to the Transvaal natives is surely
of a different character from that which we owe to natives in British
territory. The point however is not of much practical importance,
as Milner says towards the end of his letter that he does not think
of raising the questions with the S.A. Republic till some years
hence.37
Ripon, as a former Colonial Secretary, was better informed about
South Africa than was Morley; his reply was more critical though
he agreed that protection of Africans produced an "abiding diffi-
culty.” Between 1892 and 1895 Ripon had controlled the negotia-
tions which had resulted in the transfer of Swaziland to the Trans-
vaal38 and British Bechuanaland (not the Protectorate) to Cape
Colony.39 In the latter case there had recently been, in Milners
37 Asquith Papers, Dec. 29, 1897.
38 N. G. Garson, “The Swaziland Question and a Road to the Sea, 1887-
1895,” Archives Year Book for South African History, II (Pretoria, 1957),
407-15.
39 C.H.B.E
.
,
VIII, 559. The transfer of British Bechuanaland was done
under Ripon’s successor, in August, 1895, but the negotiations had been begun
under the Liberal government.
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words, “a needless rebellion brutally put down .”40 Ripon’s con-
version to a doctrine of retaining land under imperial control was
a recent one.
It is, perhaps, surprising that it should have been Ripon, rather
than Morley, though both men showed a common hostility to
Milner in the South African war, who saw the flaws in Milners
political argument. Ripon emphasized the blow to Afrikaner con-
fidence by the Raid and the conspiracy which had preceded it, and
he questioned, surely correctly, the ability of Milner to reconcile
the conflicting aims of British and Transvaal policy even if no native
difficulty existed.
Less surprising, but equally fundamental, was Ripon’s objection
to Milner’s doctrine of a legal right to intervene on behalf of the
natives in the Transvaal. It should be noted that Milner was making
a very large claim, indeed, he seemed to be suggesting that Britain’s
rights stemmed from the Convention of 1881 “when we handed the
country back,” rather than from that of 1884.41 The status of the
1881 Convention became a major diplomatic issue later.42 Ripon
denied that Britain had an equal responsibility for natives in Rho-
desia and the Transvaal respectively. But he appeared also to con-
fuse the issue by basing the nature of the obligation on the type of
sanction which would have to be applied to enforce it. The Con-
vention imposed a duty on the Transvaal but apparently it gave
to Britain a right of remonstrance only.
Ultimately, the enforcement of remonstrances within an)d be-
tween political systems rests on force. Within a political system,
however, the status of rules, if questioned, can be determined by a
recognized judicial procedure and if necessary, force under the law
can be used. Britain had the legal right, if it chose, to force re-
sponsibly governed colonies and chartered companies to live up
to their obligations. If force were used it would be regarded as a
“police operation” unless it became so serious as to change its
character into a “war of independence.” Ripon’s argument that a
remonstrance could only be enforced by “war” was to imply that
40 See p. 249 above.
41 G. Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African
History (London, 1918), 455, 469.
42 Marais, Fall
,
195-202.
262 Jeffrey Butler
the Transvaal was outside the British political system and to recog-
nize that there was no accepted way of deciding a conflict of inter-
pretation of the obligations which the Transvaal had to Britain.
Milner claimed a right and a duty; Ripon admitted the right but
denied the duty. Both, however, were unwilling to take immediate
action. The difference between them shows an important difference
of emphasis: Milner was prepared to expand rights of intervention;
he claimed rights as great as Britain possessed the case of the Com-
pany; Ripon was far nearer to regarding the Transvaal as an inde-
pendent state. 43 This was to be a major issue between Britain and
the Transvaal, particularly in 1898-99.44
VI
Asquith replied to Milner on January 12, 1898.
I was very glad to get your letter of Nov. 18th, and I need not
say that it interested me greatly. The aKopia [translated by Headlam
as “impasse” or “difficulty”] is a very formidable one, and the
more so as one does not see any natural force at work in the direc-
tion of a better treatment of the natives. There is, morever, I
should imagine a real danger that Rhodes or his successors might
play for the Dutch vote in the Cape Colony by anti-native proposals
such e.g. as an agitation for the incorporation of Basutoland. I am
aure that you are right in setting your face strongly, in the circum-
stances, against the extension of the area in which the white
aristocracy is able to lay down its own laws for the government of
the blacks. I am glad that you are able to perceive a real change
for the better in Rhodesia: the difficulty there of keeping any real
supervision and still more any effective control over the administra-
tion must be enormous. I showed your letter to J. Morley and to
Ripon, who were both much struck by it, and you may be sure
that, in carrying out the general scheme of policy which you in-
dicate, we shall all watch you with great sympathy, with a full dis-
position to appreciate and make allowance for the fetters upon
free action and the checks to rapid progress which the local condi-
tions impose. 45
43 Ripon was shifting his ground from a stand he had taken at the begin-
ning of 1895, when he refused to allow the drafting of a Foreign Office des-
patch which would have conceded that independence had virtually been
granted in 1884. L. Wolf: Life of the Marquess of Ripon (London, 1932), II,
228: Ripon to Kimberley (Foreign Secretary), Feb. 15, 1895.
44 Marais, Fall, 195-200, 325-27.
45 Milner Papers, I, 180, Jan. 12, 1898.
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It is interesting to note that Asquith virtually lifted a phrase
from Morley’s letter in referring to Rhodes’ “anti-native proposals”
and that a transfer of territory was regarded as anti-native in itself.
Asquith, Morley, and Chamberlain all thought that a reunion of
the Bond and Rhodes was possible. Indeed, when Chamberlain was
taken to task for his “man of honour speech,” he wrote to John
Ellis, a Liberal fellow member of the South African Committee:
Have you and others thought of what would be the consequences
of driving Rhodes to the wall? If in his despair or desperation he
joined forces with the extreme Dutch element and took advantage
of the prejudices so easily roused against the “unctious rectitude”
of a British government, we could hardly keep the Cape Colony
without a war.46
The fear of such a reunion appears far-fetched today, but only
because today we have evidence denied to contemporaries. One
historian has vehemently rejected the idea that Chamberlain could
have thought that an effective political combination was possible
between Rhodes and the Bond. 47 But there is evidence that Cham-
berlain was concerned, and like many other imperialists, he feared
the founding of an Uitlander republic in the Transvaal. He was not
one to take the loyalty of the South African British for granted.48
Moreover, he regretted that the British party in South Africa “has
no leader except Rhodes.”49
Chamberlain, of all people, was not one to believe in eternal
friendships or animosities in politics. Ripon, however, appeared to
put a far higher value on the political consequences of the Raid:
he pointed to the bitterness which the Raid, not protection of
natives, had created. It was on Ripon’s part, it is argued, a typical
Gladstonian reaction: moral outrage at the Raid would not, and
perhaps should not, soon be forgotten. It showed a better aware-
ness of the length of Dutch historical memory.
46 A. T. Bassett, The Life of John Edward Ellis (London, 1914), 157-58:
Chamberlain to Ellis, Oct. 14, 1897.
47 Van der Poel, Raid, 243.
48 Memo by Chamberlain, June 12, 1896, stating his fears of “an entirely
independent Republic governed by or for the capitalists of the Rand.” See
E. Drus: “A Report on the Chamberlain Papers Relating to the Jameson Raid
and the Inquiry,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXV (1952),
49.
49 Milner Papers, I, 71: Chamberlain to Milner, July 5, 1897.
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VII
One other comment on Milners letter was found in the Asquith
Papers, made by Sir Alfred Lyall, member of the Council of the
Secretary of State for India.
14 January, 1898
India Office
My dear Asquith,
I return with many thanks Milner’s very interesting letter. I
have no doubt that his estimate of the “black” difficulty is so far
right that it is one of the most important with which an English
governor has to deal in South Africa. Any one who knows the
outlying [?] countries [?] under British rule is aware of the
strong indomitable race feeling which Europeans carry with them
into dependencies inhabited by a mixed population, whether Afri-
can or Asian and of the great difficulty in which this places the
government that has to keep conscientiously on just terms with all
races. The native question has troubled us at the Cape from the
earliest times and was at the bottom of our earlier wars. I tried,
very cautiously, to sound H. M. Stanley on the subject yesterday;
but he was, naturally, on the European side, and declared that in
Rhodesia the native is decently treated. He went on to say, however,
that the opposition to English authoritative interference in the
matter is only part of the rooted antipathy, which he tells me is
universal in South Africa, from Cape Town to Bulawayo, against
any interference by the Colonial Office, as represented by the
Governor, in the domestic affairs of the Colony. The colonists,
Dutch or English, Cape or Company, he says, are all for entire
independent self-government, and will unite against any attempt of
the Governor, or High Commissioner, to exercise any real authority
over their internal administration. So long as he remains King Log,
he is popular; when he begins to govern then his popularity de-
creases in proportion to his interference. Stanley assures me that
he found, to his great surprise, precisely the same feeling among the
English residents in the Transvaal—though of course the case is
here different. They like to have the support of the Colonial Office
in pressing their grievances upon Kruger; but they are quite against
any possible interference with the Boer government; and Chamber-
lain’s military menaces only alarmed the English. One leading
Englishman related to Stanley how Chamberlain, at an interview
in London, mentioned to him the possibility of 30,000 British troops
being sent to enforce the claims of the injured Britisher in the
Transvaal; and how he, the colonist, replied that in that event he
would himself take up a rifle against them. I give this for what
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it may be worth—but Stanley was clear that a British army land-
ing at Cape Town will find English and Dutch combined to invite
them to go away. One instance of Colonial jealousy, Stanley noted,
in their saying that Milner had been “making too many speeches”
—
they did not, apparently, like his coming forward so much. All this
surprised Stanley quite as much as it might surprise us in England;
and he says he talked to everybody everywhere—he is not a bad
observer. My conclusion, if Stanley’s observations are sound, is
that Milner’s situation is delicate and difficult; yet if any one can
manage it, he is the man.
A. C. Lyall50
Lyall’s letter is interesting for its account of the conversation with
Stanley, who had recently returned from South Africa and was at
the time Liberal Unionist member for Lambeth North. He was not
likely to exaggerate South African antipathy to any intervention.
In public he pointed out the necessity of continued British “pro-
tection” if South Africa were not to become a “Dutch republic.”
He assumed victory “after a short campaign,” if a war were to
come, but he emphasized that there would be great political costs.51
There is, moreover, other evidence of resistance on the part of
South African colonials, British as well as Dutch, in Cape Colony
and in what became ultra-Loyalist Natal, to forcible intervention
in the affairs of the Transvaal.52
British colonists have almost always combined an extravagant
loyalty with a touchy sense of their ability to govern themselves
without assistance from London. In 1897 there were many expres-
sions of loyal devotion to the Queen and not only from people of
British stock. The Diamond Jubilee was widely celebrated, in the
Transvaal as well as in the colonies.53 Milner made glowing and
public reference to the loyalty of the Cape Dutch and the warmth
50 Asquith Papers.
si The Times, Feb. 24, 1898.
52 R. H. Wilde, “Joseph Chamberlain and the South Africa Republic,” Ar-
chives Year Book of South African History (Pretoria, 1957), I, 37, for evidence
of pressure from the governments of Cape Colony and Natal in April, 1896 for
a peaceful policy in South Africa. By the middle of 1897 racial divisions in
Cape Colony had deepened but Sir John Sprigg’s government in Cape Colony
was too weak to adopt an aggressive “Imperial” policy. Marais, Fall, 164-70.
53 Milner Papers, I, 49, 51-52.
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of the celebrations.54 The highly mobilized British loyalist senti-
ment that was to be such a phenomenon in mid-189955 had not
appeared in 1897. Stanley's observations, if accurate, made Milner’s
problem even more difficult than he (Milner) had stated it; i.e.,
there was not only British South African opposition to interference
with native policy, there was also opposition to taking a high hand
with the Transvaal on white questions. South African Englishmen
had not yet despaired of a political settlement among whites with-
out the help of the imperial government.
VIII
Milner’s letter is one of the early statements of the dilemmas
facing the Imperial Government and, in spite of its shortcomings
it is a remarkably detached and able analysis. Furthermore, what-
ever its motives, it is an excellent statement of the long-term prob-
lems of South African society. Milner’s suggestions as to policy and
the comments of his English contemporaries show both impotence
in the present and pessimism about the future.
The impotence arose from the facts of self-government. These
men were well aware that self-government in South Africa, far
from solving the long-term problem, had, in fact, destroyed much
of the Imperial government’s ability to deal with it. Even the loy-
alty of the South African British was fragile, and on more than one
issue. In Cape Colony, important English-speaking leaders like
W.P. Schreiner had moved to a position of political, not personal,
hostility to Rhodes.56 If the retention of the loyalty of South Afri-
can white men was essential, then there was little freedom of
manoeuvre over native policy. Support of Rhodes, in Rhodesia or
in Cape Colony but particularly in the latter, might be hazardous.
Milner recognized the limits clearly enough and in talking of native
policy the only policy which he suggested, besides delay of trans-
fer to remaining territory,57 was to improve the quality of adminis-
54 Ibid. A despatch from Milner to Chamberlain, June 23, 1897 comment-
ing on the loyalty of all races was published in The Times
,
Sept. 9, 1897.
55 Robinson et al., Africa, 453-54.
56 E. A. Walker, W. P. Schreiner, A South African (1937), 73, 81-82, 95.
57 See p. 249 above.
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tration by better recruitment. Yet even in this limited field he could
do nothing in either the self-governing colonies or the republics.
It was characteristic of Milner to think in such administrative
terms. He was appalled at the low standards of administration in
South Africa when compared with “India, Egypt, or any of our
Crown Colonies.” Though he claimed that the “native question”
was ultimately the most serious, he did not act on that claim nor
did he regard the ‘question' as a political one. He gave the Cape no
credit for its more liberal franchise, indeed, he denied its effective-
ness in protecting the rights of non-whites by asserting poor ad-
ministration of “better” laws, through appeals to the “Dutch vote.”
During the war he made his position clear. In abortive peace
negotiations with General Botha in February and March, 1901, it
was Chamberlain who had pressed for better terms in future for
the Coloured population. 58 In 1902, presumably in their despera-
tion to end the wasteful war, British negotiators dropped all refer-
ence to Coloureds in the peace terms.59 Furthermore, it was Milner
who persuaded Chamberlain to allow the ex-republics to deal with
the franchise after “self-government,” not “representative govern-
ment,” as had been the case in the suggested terms in 1901.60 Mil-
ner’s views were characteristic, consistent with the line in his letter
to Asquith, and had been formed long before any peace negotia-
tions began. He wrote to Chamberlain on 5 March, 1900:
It will be very unfortunate to raise the question of native voters.
There would be practically none in the Transvaal, and for the
sake of a theory it would be unwise to start with a conflict with the
whites. The Cape experience is not encouraging. If necessary the
thing could possibly be brought in sub silentio . 61
And in 1903, at an Inter-Colonial Conference at Bloemfontein,
Milner had strongly supported F.R. Moor, Secretary of Native
Affairs in Natal, when he asked for acceptance of the principle
58 Milner Papers, II, 212: Chamberlain to Milner, Mar. 3, 1901. “Coloureds”
here refers to non-whites of mixed racial origin, not to “natives.”
59 Ibid., 350-60.
60 Thompson, Unification, 11-12.
61 Milner Papers, New College, Oxford: XXV, f. 16. I would like to thank
Professor G. H. Le May of the University of Witwatersrand for drawing my
attention to this document.
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that “the political status of the Native should conform to conditions
which will ensure the constant dominance of the white race/’62
Milner was later to regret, according to Headlam, “that he had
yielded to the Boers over the Native franchise,” regarding this as
the greatest mistake he had ever made.63 But it is clear that Milner
had yielded before any negotiations began, and in fact persuaded
his Chief to do so as well. In 1905 he protested that “if I had known
as well as I know now the extravagance of the prejudice on the
part of almost all whites
. . . against any concession to any
coloured man, however civilized, I should never have agreed to so
absolute an exclusion ... of the whole coloured population from
any rights of citizenship.”64 Yet he had long been aware of the
extravagance, at least since 1897, and this regret in 1905 was prob-
ably an afterthought. The Cape Liberal tradition was not one
worthy of extension: a civilisation franchise was a “theory,” not a
practice to be recommended. Obligations existed to the natives
but he thought of them in administrative, not political, terms. In
1905, Milner may have been more aware of the limitations of the
administrative approach than he had been in 1897, or even 1902.
The detached pessimism is equally noteworthy. Milner, Asquith y
Ripon and Lyall were aware of the difficulties raised by South
African British as well as by the Dutch. Asquith could see no
“natural force” in favour of natives; Morley referred to “brutes of
colonists.” No one would suggest the lines of an active trusteeship,,
such as had been followed by United Kingdom governments in the
1820’s and have been followed in the radically changed conditions
of the nineteen fifties. Sir Michael Hicks Beach in 1899 expressed
both the impotence and the pessimism. “We can never govern from
62 Thompson, Unification, 117.
63 Milner Papers, II, 353. See W. K. Hancock, Smuts, I: The Sanguine Years
1870-1919, I (1962), 159, for an account of an amendment of a clause in
the draft terms of peace in 1902 from: “The Franchise will not be given to
Natives until after the Introduction of Self-Government” to “the question of
granting the Franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the intro-
duction of self-government.” According to Hancock, Smuts was responsible
for the new draft which was accepted. Milner could hardly describe this
change as “yielding” to the Boers if this is meant to imply serious reluctance
on his part. See note 59 above.
64 Milner to Selborne, May 10, 1905, in Milner Papers, II, 353.
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Downing Street any part of South Africa in which the whites are
strong enough to defend themselves against the natives.”65 History
has proved Sir Michael only partly right, for with the end of
acquiescence on the part of the African majority, Downing Street
has begun to govern once more in Kenya and Central Africa, with
the object of soon ending its government altogether, and placing
the lion’s share of power in the hands of the natives.
Milner was clear enough in his letter in arguing that the immedi-
ate problem was that of conciliation, to which trusteeship was an
obstacle. He was equally clear that he preferred Englishmen and
hoped they would gain power in the Transvaal. His major failing
has been held by historians to have been a lack of political under-
standing, particularly of Afrikaners, and therefore, a serious weak-
ness as a diplomat. 66 All that can be acknowledged. But the failing
may have been even more fundamental. He did not act on his own
logic. Having argued correctly that self-government would not
have the same effects in South Africa as it had had in Canada, he
did not argue, as he could have done as an interventionist, that
societies like South Africa needed close ties to a larger political
unit until a stable political system had been developed. He was,
in fact, unable to answer a question which he posed in 1899. “It is
clear that the white man must rule, but how?”67 On his own show-
ing the creation of a united, loyal, white oligarchy would not
necessarily produce a justly governed South Africa.
In his letter to Asquith, Milner was writing only six months after
arriving in South Africa. Though he was not yet writing in the stri-
dent interventionist tone which he was to use later, he showed
clearly enough that he regarded the South African problem as one
to be solved by changes in the composition of the governing oli-
garchy. The first question to be answered was not “How to rule?”,
but “Which white men to rule?” In the latter half of 1898, he set
about mobilising British opinion in South Africa to support an inter-
vention in the Transvaal68 and the war which broke out in 1899
65 Robinson, Africa, 456.
66 See, e.g., Marais, Fall, 329-31; C.H.B.E., III, 362.
67 Milner Papers, II, 35: Milner to Fitzpatrick, Nov. 28, 1899.
68 Robinson et al., Africa, 453-54. See also N. G. Garson, “British Im-
perialism and the Coming of the Anglo-Boer War,” South African Journal of
Economics, XXX (June, 1962), 150-53.
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was regarded by some of his contemporaries as essentially “Mil-
ner’s” war. 69 The Union of South Africa, which came into being in
1910, was one of the results of that war, but it failed to achieve
three of Milner’s objects. First, Dutch and English have drifted
into separate political camps; secondly, the Dutch (i.e., Afrikaners)
—not yet anglicised and still republican in sentiment—are in con-
trol of the country; thirdly, the question of “how to rule” the Afri-
can majority is as unanswered as when he posed it.
As a “British Race Patriot,”70 Milner believed that British obliga-
tions to natives need not necessarily be sacrificed in the attempt to
create a British-dominated oligarchy. He was prepared to use his
power to encourage British immigration, to promote the anglicisa-
tion of the Dutch, and thereby, he hoped, to create the basis of a
stable, loyal and united South Africa. When he wrote this letter,
he was still feeling his way in a situation which was new to him.
But he did not explore systematically the question of “how to rule”
or deal with the probability that a united white South Africa
would be even more difficult to influence as to the manner of its
ruling. It is perhaps ironic that since World War II the question
of “who to rule” has become important once more. Milner, like Dr.
Nkrumah later, but with very different objects in view, sought a
political kingdom. It was, however, a political kingdom for an oli-
garchy already entrenched and one which required, in Milner’s
view, an internal reconstruction. Milner hoped that this would
guarantee its loyalty to the imperial power of which he was such
a devoted and distinguished servant. Like most of his contem-
poraries, he believed that a united, loyal, white oligarchy would be
better able to answer the question “How to rule?” than a divided
one.
69 Richard Haldane, a Liberal Imperialist, used the term “Milner’s . . . war”
with approval on the outbreak of war. The Times, Oct. 11, 1899. See E. Stokes:
“Milnerism,” The Historical Journal, V (1962), 53 for another, less approving,
contemporary view, that of Henry Sidgwick, brother-in-law of Arthur Balfour.
70 A statement of Milner’s “Credo” was found in his papers and published
after his death in The Times, luly 26, 1925. For an extract, see Hancock,
Smuts, I, 74. There is no reason to think that this “Credo” was not the basis
of his thinking in the nineties.
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